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ABSTRACT
In this work, the term Entropic Grid is coined to describe a power grid with
increased levels of uncertainty and dynamics. These new features will require
the reconsideration of well-established paradigms in the way of planning and
operating the grid and its associated markets. New tools and models able
to handle uncertainty and dynamics will form the required scaffolding to
properly capture the behavior of the physical system, along with the value
of new technologies and policies. The leverage of this knowledge will facil-
itate the design of new architectures to organize power and energy systems
and their associated markets. This work presents several results, tools and
models with the goal of contributing to that design objective. A central idea
of this thesis is that the definition of products is critical in electricity mar-
kets. When markets are constructed with appropriate product definitions in
mind, the interference between the physical and the market/financial systems
seen in today’s markets can be reduced. A key element of evaluating mar-
ket designs is understanding the impact that salient features of an entropic
grid—uncertainty, dynamics, constraints—can have on the electricity mar-
kets. Dynamic electricity market models tailored to capture such features are
developed in this work. Using a multi-settlement dynamic electricity market,
the impact of volatility is investigated. The results show the need to imple-
ment policies and technologies able to cope with the volatility of renewable
sources. Similarly, using a dynamic electricity market model in which ramp-
ing costs are considered, the impacts of those costs on electricity markets
are investigated. The key conclusion is that those additional ramping costs,
in average terms, are not reflected in electricity prices. These results reveal
several difficulties with today’s real-time markets. Elements of an alternative
architecture to organize these markets are also discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Many changes are coming to the power industry due to new policies and new
technologies. This is bringing new challenges in operating and planning the
power grid. Some of these challenges take the form of increased or more exotic
dynamics, and greater volatility and uncertainty. For example, renewable
energy sources will inject volatile and uncertain patterns of energy into the
grid, smart meters and appliances will increase demand uncertainty, new
information technologies may increase cybersecurity risks, and new products
and market participants may induce changes in dynamics and uncertainty.
The design and operation of the grid of the future will require a theoretical
scaffolding able to deal with uncertainty and dynamics. These tools must
complement the successful power and energy systems methodologies that
are used today. It is necessary to understand and control complex dynamic
systems subject to uncertainty, variability, and shared constraints.
In this chapter, we provide an overview about the motivation, vision, and
topics developed in this work.
1.1 The Entropic Grid
The power grid has been defined as one of the biggest achievements of human
engineering. This is evident after reviewing key characteristics of today’s
grid. Maybe the most salient element of the grid is its complexity. Thousands
of elements such as generating units, transmission lines, distribution systems
and loads interact on a network, and are subject to strict constraints such as
physical laws. An example of this complexity is clear by looking at the map
of the European transmission system in Fig. 1.1.
In terms of technologies and operational paradigms, today’s grid heavily
relies on big controllable generating plants. Nuclear, fossil-fueled and hydro
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Figure 1.1: Europe transmission system.
plants make up the bulk of installed capacity. The operation usually is
based on centralized control schemes, making the role of Independent System
Operators (ISOs) critical in this task. At the distribution level, end-users
have historically had a well-defined role: being only consumers of energy
with a passive role.
The power grid is key to the proper functioning of society, hence many
mid- and long-term changes and initiatives are driven by political decisions
and mandates. Politics is a key element of today’s grid. A clear example
is the current trend of imposing renewable energy targets as a way to move
towards a more sustainable grid.
Another characteristic of today’s grid is its relationship with markets struc-
tures. This is bringing many risks faced by both consumers and suppliers.
Many of those risks are associated with the volatility seen on current elec-
tricity prices—from spikes lasting minutes to periodic bursts lasting weeks.
Volatility that, as is going to be presented in later chapters, is inherent to
current electricity markets designs. A picture with four emblematic cases of
price volatility is shown in Fig. 1.2
In this environment, consumers face the risk of being subject to market
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Figure 1.2: Volatility of electricity prices around the world.
power by suppliers; the California crisis of 2001 and the Enron scandal to-
gether constitute one of the clearest examples. Similarly, suppliers are also
subject to many risks. The volatility of prices is a big risk for suppliers, in
terms of entry, as well as reliable day-to-day income. This has been particu-
larly critical with the introduction of renewable sources. Suppliers associated
with these technologies have additional risks due to the inherent uncertainty
and volatility of such sources.
Summarizing, the current power grid is an already extremely complex sys-
tem. What can we expect for the future? Many changes resulted from the
Smart Grid initiatives [1]: the move from big generating plants at the trans-
mission level to more distributed energy sources, many of them deployed at
the distribution level; greater participation of renewable energy sources such
as wind and solar; and the active role of end-users resulting from advanced
metering infrastructure and the use of smart appliances. Deployment of more
information technologies, which will improve the situational awareness of the
grid, will facilitate its control, but might also bring new risks such as cyber-
security threats [2]. The list of expected changes and challenges is broad and
diverse.
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Entropic Grid The increased dynamics, volatility and uncertainty of to-
morrow’s grid will increase the “disorder” or “uncertainty” of the system. In
thermodynamics and in Shannon’s theory of coding and communication, the
notion of entropy plays a central role. In a precise sense, entropy captures the
number of attainable state trajectories in a system: The larger the entropy,
the larger the number of possible state trajectories on a given time-horizon.
In the proposed Smart Grid, with all the features described above, it is clear
that the system will be much more “uncertain” and it is also clear that the
range of possible system behaviors may increase greatly. For these reasons,
until the appropriate level of intelligence can be assured, the term Entropic
Grid is adopted to describe the new power grid, with all of its new complex-
ity and uncertainty. The intention is to highlight the fact that although new
technologies and policies bring many new opportunities for energy reduction
and efficiency improvements, they also bring the potential for an extremely
complex or “entropic” system. With proper design, this uncertainty can be
reduced, and the term Smart Grid will be justified.
However, why is the need of a proper design so critical and necessary?
On the planning and operation side, the expertise and intuition of system
operators, along with the infrastructure of the power grid, were developed
in an evolutionary way: over a long time horizon, with much trial and error.
The new paradigm of new technology combined with new policy will bring
uncertainty and complexity that rule out the reliance on evolutionary adap-
tation. Attempts of relying on trial and error can be a big waste of resources
and a bridge to nowhere [3]. There is no time for evolution.
From a general perspective, the current designs are structured under two
main paradigms: vertical integration or electricity markets. In the verti-
cal integration design, a whole company owns and operates all the assets
—generation, transmission and distribution. In the electricity market struc-
ture, markets and competitive forces are deployed at some levels of the in-
dustry, generally at the generation level. The motivations for the establish-
ment of market structures are multifold and explained throughout this work.
However, there is still no agreement about the real achievements of the de-
ployment of markets in electricity. Issues such as system reliability [4], high
tariffs trends [5], and the failure of spot prices as investment signals [6] are
well-understood and recognized unsolved problems. On the other hand, in-
novation, increased efficiency in running companies, and the development of
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new technologies are usually mentioned as the good outcomes [7, 8].
The main challenge is that many of those unsolved issues in the electricity
market arena could be magnified in an entropic grid setting without proper
design. New ways of thinking about operations and planning of power and
energy systems and its associated markets emerge as critical requirements for
the achievement of a reliable, sustainable and efficient system [9–11]. The
overall goal is to obtain a better intuition regarding technological and system
needs for the grid of the future, and how to ensure that these needs will be
met via policy combined with markets.
1.2 Setting the Stage and Needs
It is recognized that the main challenge of electricity markets is the coexis-
tence of two different coupled dynamical systems:
• A physical system driven by hard and soft engineering constraints in
which reliability is the leading objective.
• A market/financial system driven by self-interests of players in which
economic efficiency is the leading metric.
Additionally, each of these systems has its own uncertainties and complex-
ities, not to mention the often orthogonal objectives among its players —
energy companies, engineers, policy makers, and consumers [12, 13]. One of
the ideas developed in this work is that many of the current issues of elec-
tricity markets can be explained as results of the interference between the
physical and the market/financial systems. A common diagnosis of many
electricity markets around the world is the fact that many design elements
help to achieve financial/market objectives but need to be modified to attain
the physical objectives, and conversely. The augmented level of complex-
ity resulting from many Smart Grid initiatives could certainly increase such
interference, reinforcing the need for careful and thoughtful design.
A key element to conciliate the physical and the market/financial systems
is the definition of products. The product is the object that links the physical
and market/financial systems. As discussed in Chapter 3, a bad product def-
inition can certainly impact the market outcomes. Efficiency, risk allocation,
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information aggregation and several other market issues are impacted by the
product definition. However, if the product definition also does not match
technological realities, then the physical system could also be impacted. For
example, the lack of consideration of technological attributes in capacity
markets might not facilitate the achievement of a reliable system [13].
In our view, one step required to define appropriate products is to start
considering electricity not as a simple commodity, without qualitative dis-
tinctions, but as a product or service with attributes beyond energy. In other
words, electricity should be seen as a more complicated product in which en-
ergy is just one of the dimensions or attributes to consider. Examples of
other attributes might include flexibility, controllability and environmental
impact of the resources.
In the electricity markets literature, there is almost no discussion of prod-
uct definition issues. The explanation seems to be just another legacy of
the idea of using spot markets and treating electricity as a commodity, in
which the underlying product is 1 MWh. In a market for commodities the
definitions are clear; e.g., a “product” is a barrel of oil or a pound of copper.
The elegant market formalism of Schweppe et al. [14] led many to be-
lieve that spot markets for energy would be sufficient to create appropriate
economic signals for electricity markets. Empirical evidence collected over
decades combined with recent theory demonstrates that energy-only markets
are deficient on many grounds.
Recently, policy makers have started to recognize that services beyond en-
ergy are needed. In response, new federal policies have been implemented.
One example of a “service” is the ramping of generation to respond to volatil-
ity in the grid. FERC order 755 is designed to ensure that ramping capa-
bilities are properly compensated [15]. Appropriate market mechanisms to
provide adequate compensation remain a subject of intense debate. These
mechanisms are mainly grounded in the spot-pricing framework for electricity
markets.
However, once the complicating factors and characteristics of the entropic
grid are taken into account, the use of spot-markets, and in particular real-
time markets, must be reconsidered. Several results presented in this thesis
support this viewpoint. For example, in the context of volatile resources
integration, the results presented in Chapter 4 show the need to reconsider
market structure to stimulate greater penetration of volatile resources. The
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consideration of dynamic costs, investigated in Chapter 5 for the case of
ramping costs, illustrates how those additional costs are not captured by the
electricity prices.
In order to evaluate market designs, it is crucial to understand the behavior
of the physical system. This will require the use of models and tools tailored
for the new entropic setting. A critical element is the consideration of the
real costs and value of power. In the same line, it seems key to move beyond
snap-shot-based modeling paradigms to the use of models in which dynamics
and uncertainty are considered. All these elements are taken into account in
the models presented throughout this work. An overview is provided in the
next section.
Another need is to reconsider the economic framework in which current
markets have been designed: competitive equilibrium analysis and spot pric-
ing theory. It is recognized that competitive equilibrium analysis may give
some valuable insights. However, it is a crude model of reality, and in particu-
lar too crude for long-term prediction of system behavior. In the competitive
equilibrium setting, once dynamics and uncertainty are brought into play,
the competitive outcomes of electricity markets are characterized by volatile
and high prices [12]. Advocates of the current market designs may argue
that there is no problem: If this is what the competitive equilibrium looks
like, then we better accept volatile prices and price spikes because in the
“long-term” society will be better. However, is it really so important that we
achieve this “long-term” or “equilibrium” nirvana in the energy grid? How
can we be so sure that we will converge?
Energy companies are seeking profits: Big profits, generally, may come
from “disruptive technologies”, or from “market manipulation”. By the time
we converge to the hypothesized optimal equilibrium, the entire system would
have changed due to new policies and new technologies. Consequently, it is
our belief that the notion of “long-term” convergence is meaningless in energy
markets. Societal objectives such as efficiency, reliability and sustainability
must be treated as drivers rather than the result of a “long-term” convergence
process.
Based on all these considerations, an alternative architecture for organiz-
ing future power and energy systems is required. It should be constructed
around the ideas of addressing entropy; achieving multifold objectives such
as economic efficiency, reliability and sustainability; conciliating the physi-
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cal and market/financial systems; and treating electricity as a service, not a
commodity, that can be provided not only by conventional generators but,
depending on the service, by many other technologies. Proper design is
required to harness all that potential and achieve a reliable, efficient and
sustainable grid. A visual representation of the type of resources, inputs and
objectives of the future’s grid is pictured in Fig. 1.3.
The main way to address entropy is to reduce it. In that line, the role of a
central authority setting rules is a key element of alternative architectures. It
might be argued that this could create a loss of efficiency in the ideal sense of
economics, but we see it as a necessary cost given the importance to society
of reliable energy.
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Figure 1.3: multifold resources and attributes.
This idea of restricting behavior is not new and it is everywhere. A clear
example is highway engineering: Nobody would claim that the highway sys-
tem is efficient. On paper it might be possible to prove that efficiency can be
improved by eliminating lanes or speed limits. In practice, it is well under-
stood that the range of possible behavior of drivers must be reduced through
lanes and speed limits to achieve a more predictable and safer transporta-
tion grid. It is required to accept that similar restrictions are necessary to
improve the predictability and the achievement of societal objectives in the
energy grid.
The best architecture for the energy highway of the future is not yet obvious
and its realization will require a lot of research and effort, but it is likely
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to include elements of today’s day-ahead markets combined with long-term
contracts. However, it is certainly clear that lanes and speed limits, incentives
and penalties, are going to be required in order to achieve a predictable and
reliable system.
1.3 Scope and Contributions
The goal of this work is to contribute to the design and operation of power
and energy systems able to cope with the many challenges associated with an
Entropic Grid. As previously discussed, achieving this objective will require
the deployment of new tools and models able to capture and handle uncer-
tainty, dynamics and shared constraints. Such models and tools will form the
scaffolding to understand the behavior of the physical system along with the
systemic and private value of attributes associated with new technologies.
The leverage of this knowledge will facilitate the design of new architectures
to organize power and energy systems and their associated markets. These
tools will also guide the formation of new government policies.
This thesis, for the purposes of control, market design and evaluation,
focuses on
• Product definition in electricity markets
• Models that capture uncertainty and dynamics
The key role of the product definition in an electricity market is investi-
gated in Chapter 3. Several analytical and numerical results, motivated by
the analysis of real market designs, are used to unveil the importance of the
product definition in the market outcomes. Based on the findings, elements
and recommendations to define products in electricity markets are presented.
As mentioned above, another main topic developed in this thesis is to
understand the impact that key features of the entropic grid can have on
electricity markets. In order to achieve that goal, appropriate models able to
handle uncertainty and dynamics are developed. Several dynamic electricity
markets models, tailored to capture diverse elements of the entropic grid, are
presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
In Chapter 4, these models are used to investigate the value of volatile
resources in electricity markets. The big research objective is to understand
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how the volatility and uncertainty associated with these resources can im-
pact their value. In addition, the incentives that current electricity markets
provide to the deployment of volatile resources are investigated. The results
show the need to implement policies and technologies able to cope with the
volatility of renewable sources, and the need to update market structures.
In a similar vein, using a dynamic electricity market model in which ramp-
ing costs are considered, the impacts of those additional costs on electricity
markets are investigated in Chapter 5. The key conclusion is the fact that
at the competitive equilibrium those additional ramping costs, in average
terms, are not reflected in average prices.
Finally, based on all the topics and findings, linking the definition of prod-
ucts ideas with the impacts on electricity markets once constraints, dynamics
and uncertainty are considered, general elements to organize these markets
around contractual agreements are discussed in Chapter 6. The viewpoints
are illustrated via an investigation of the system-wide value of operational
flexibility, along with the market implications.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis is structured in several chapters. An overview of each chapter,
with its topic and main contributions, is given here.
Chapter 2
Basic background material is presented. An overview of basic elements of
competitive markets and electricity markets is provided. Basic notation and
elements of Markov decision processes (MDP), a key element of the results
of the rest of the chapters, are discussed. Specific models for an entropic grid
setting are also reviewed. In particular, models for the dynamic economic
dispatch of energy and reserves along with elements of dynamic electricity
markets are reviewed. Those models are the starting point for many of the
models developed throughout this work.
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Chapter 3
The role of product definition in electricity markets is unveiled in this chap-
ter. A product definition implemented in some U.S. electricity markets is
used to illustrate several critical aspects that must be considered when elec-
tricity products are defined. Several analytical along with numerical results
are presented. Based on these findings, elements of an alternative product
definition which overcomes some of the investigated issues are discussed.
Chapter 4
The value of volatile resources in electricity markets is investigated in this
chapter. A multisettlement electricity market model, considering a day-ahead
and a real-time market, is the vehicle to perform the analysis. This is con-
ducted in an idealized competitive equilibrium setting that incorporates both
dynamics and uncertainty; closed form expressions are obtained for the sup-
plier and consumer surpluses in this stochastic model. The results show the
need to find resources and to create operational schemes that address volatil-
ity. Moreover, it is argued that current market structures must be updated
to support greater renewable integration.
Chapter 5
The difficulties of incentivizing responsive generation in a real-time market
setting are exposed. The analysis of a dynamic electricity market, that also
includes also ramping costs, shows that average prices may coincide with av-
erage production marginal cost. Hence, the cost of ramping is not captured
by those average prices. Several numerical illustrations are presented. The
results underscore the need for finding alternative ways to structure electric-
ity markets.
Chapter 6
Elements of an alternative view for organizing the markets in a Smart Grid
scenario are discussed. Defining the products in these new markets will re-
quire a careful understanding of the systemic and private value of the differ-
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ent attributes. The emphasis of the chapter is on investigating the resource
allocation problem, getting resources appropriately sized in advance. The
solution to this problem offers insights, and provides sensible guidelines for
how many resources, and of which type, are required. Our viewpoints are il-
lustrated via a detailed investigation of the system-wide value of operational
flexibility, along with the market implications.
Chapter 7
A summary of the results and findings of this work is presented. In addition,
several research avenues for future work are discussed.
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CHAPTER 2
SCAFFOLDING FOR GRID AND
MARKETS MODELING
In this chapter, basic background, terminology and references for the top-
ics developed in the following chapters are provided. Elements of compet-
itive markets and basic elements of current electricity market designs are
presented. Similarly, an overview of Markov decision process concepts and
models that capture uncertainty and dynamics are discussed. These models
are used as a starting point for other ones presented throughout this work.
2.1 Electricity Markets
We provide a review and bibliography of key elements of electricity markets.
Recognizing that each electricity market has its own peculiarities, there are
common elements shared by many designs. We start providing basic concepts
of competitive markets in general. A good overview is provided in [16].
2.1.1 Basics of Competitive Markets
The general idea behind competitive markets is to achieve a desirable society
state in a decentralized way, without the need for a central planner. The
optimal allocation of resources is achieved through an appropriate price sys-
tem and individual optimization. The usual desirable society state is usually
characterized in terms of the so-called Pareto efficiency. Informally, Pareto
efficiency means that no agent can be better off without making another one
worse off.
Closely related to the notion of Pareto efficiency in a decentralized way is
the idea of Competitive equilibrium, the basic notion of equilibrium in eco-
nomic systems. It resembles the notion of equilibrium in closed physical sys-
tems, in which, given a set of prices and allocations, each agent maximizes his
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own welfare, subject to his physical constraints of production/consumption.
The welfare theorems of economics provide the link between these concepts
[17]. The first welfare theorem states that any competitive equilibrium leads
to Pareto efficiency, a formal characterization of Adam Smith’s invisible hand.
The second welfare theorem states that any Pareto efficient allocation can
be supported in a decentralized way by a competitive equilibrium. However,
the conditions and assumptions behind these theorems are too idealized with
respect to real world situations complicating their applicability [18]. This
point is going to be evident in the case of electricity in which the physical
reality of the process of generation, transmission and distribution challenges
the deployment of market structures.
2.1.2 Basics of Electricity Market Design
The general structure of many electricity markets is based on the notion of a
centralized market. A system operator receives offers and bids of consumers
and suppliers respectively and runs a clearing mechanism determining the
dispatch and prices of the system. The basic structure is pictured in Fig. 2.1
IGO
seller r
buyer u
MWh $
Figure 2.1: Centralized electricity market structure.
A key element is a multisettlement structure of markets, in which the
multiple markets are differentiated by the time at which the decisions are
taken and the time at which the energy is delivered. The basic paradigm of
this multisettlement structure is a day-ahead market (DAM) coupled with a
real-time market (RTM).
The reasons for doing that are two-fold and are related to the economics
and the physical operation of the system. From a physical viewpoint, in
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centralized markets, there is a need to accommodate the commitment of the
units in advance. From an economic viewpoint, the day-ahead market is a
forward market which can improve the economic efficiency [19,20]. It is also
pretty common to have a series of forward markets for different time scales,
as the experiences of Chile and Brazil show [6]. The diverse time-frames are
depicted in Fig. 2.2
time axish - monthh - year
forward markets 
h - day
day-ahead market 
for hour h
1
associated real-time 
markets for hour h 
Mm
spot markets 
Figure 2.2: Time-frames of multi-settled markets.
Another key element of many electricity market designs of interest for the
current work is the lack of differentiation among technologies. This idea is
explained by the underlying motivation of treating electricity as any other
commodity.
2.2 Markov Decision Processes
Markov decision processes (MDPs) provide the theoretical framework for
many of the models presented in this work. We provide a brief overview of
some key concepts in the theory of MDPs that will facilitate the reading and
introduce some notation of the present work. We follow [21,22].
In a colloquial way, an MDP aims to solve the problem of making decisions
under uncertain and dynamic conditions. A system is evolving in time over
a state space. Such evolution is the result of the dynamics of the system,
uncertainty and actions taken in each state. Associated with the state and
the actions, there is some reward or cost function. The overall goal is finding
the best policy — which action to take given the current state — to achieve
some objective.
In more formal terms, a Markov decision process consists of a state space
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X, an action space U, and the controlled transition matrix,
Pu(x, y) := P{X(t+ 1) = y | X(t) = x, U(t) = u} x, y ∈ X, u ∈ U (2.1)
For each state x ∈ X there is a set U(x) ⊆ U whose elements are admissible
actions when the state process X(t) takes the value x. A policy φ is a
sequence of functions {φt} from Xt+1 to U such that the allocation sequence
defined by
U(t) = φt(X(0), ..., X(t− 1), X(t))
satisfies U(t) ∈ U(X(t)) for each t.
The Markov property for the controlled process is: For x0, x1 ∈ X, u ∈
U, t ≥ 0,
P{X(t+ 1) = x1 | (X(0), U(0)), ..., (X(t), U(t));U(t) = u,X(t) = x0}
(2.2)
= P{X(1) = x1|U(0) = u, X(0) = x0}
= Pu(x
0, x1)
Once a policy φ is adopted, the controlled transition matrix becomes a tran-
sition matrix for a Markov chain. All the stability theory and ergodic theory
for Markov chains [21] provides the theoretical framework for analyzing and
characterizing optimal policies for MDPs.
Usually a cost or penalty function is given. Based on these functions,
performance criteria are considered such as
Average cost: φ := lim sup
N→∞
Ex
[ 1
N
N−1∑
k=0
c(X(k))
]
(2.3)
Discounted cost: J(x) := Ex
[ ∞∑
k=0
βkc(X(k))
]
(2.4)
where the constant β appearing in 2.4 is the discount parameter, assumed to
lie in the open interval (0, 1).
Usual methodologies for solving MDPs include linear programming ap-
proaches and algorithms such as Value Iteration (VIA) and Policy Iteration
(PIA) [22]. However, solving any MDP for many power systems applications
using those algorithms becomes really challenging due to the large-scale na-
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ture of the system. For that reason, the use of approximation techniques such
as approximate dynamical programming [23] and workload relaxations [22]
or the use of reinforcement learning schemes such as TD- and Q-Learning
becomes necessary.
The most basic approach to optimization via simulation is the stochastic
approximation technique (SA) of Robins and Monro [24]. In one formulation,
we have a real-valued function f : Rn × Rm → R, which is interpreted as a
cost that depends on a ‘parameter’ θ ∈ Rn and ‘chance’ w ∈ Rm. The goal
is to minimize the average cost f¯(θ) = E[f(θ,W )], where the expectation is
w.r.t. the random variable W , which may or may not be known.
If f¯ were computable and differentiable, then we might apply the gradient
algorithm to estimate the minimum,
θk+1 = θk − ak∇f¯ (θk), k ≥ 0, (2.5)
where {ak} is a sequence of step-sizes. The SA method is simply this sequence
without the averaging: It is assumed that a sequence of random variables
W = {Wk : k ≥ 1} is observed, and estimates of the optimal parameter θ∗
are generated by the “stochastic gradient” recursion,
θk+1 = θk − ak∇f(θk,Wk+1), k ≥ 0 . (2.6)
Under general conditions it can be shown that (2.5) and (2.6) have the same
limits, as k tends to infinity. There are also Newton-Raphson refinements to
improve convergence and reduce variance. To generate the random variables
W = {Wk : k ≥ 1} with low computational costs one can apply recent
techniques such as MCMC [25].
The most typical gain sequence is given by ak = 1/(k+1), and in this case
the SA algorithm is a generalization of the standard Monte Carlo method to
estimate the mean of some function c(W ). Denote θ∗ = E[c(W )]. It can be
shown that θ minimizes the mean-square error E[(c(W ) − θ)2]. On writing
f(θ, w) = 1
2
(c(w)− θ)2, the SA recursion (2.6) becomes,
θk+1 = θk − ak(θk − c(Wk+1)), k ≥ 0 .
Under the assumption that ak = 1/(k + 1), this recursion can be solved
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exactly to give
θk =
1
k
k∑
i=1
c(Wi), k ≥ 1 . (2.7)
All of the analytical tools that are known for the simple Monte Carlo recur-
sion (2.7) have analogs in SA.
2.3 Models for the Entropic Grid
Conventional static optimization based models provide a valuable starting
point for modeling and analysis. These models must be extended to take
explicitly into account dynamics, uncertainty and volatility in an increasingly
entropic energy network.
We begin with a description of network models suitable for operations and
analysis. We introduce a dynamic dispatch model that captures some of the
dynamic issues and uncertainty of the entropic grid.
2.3.1 Dynamic Dispatch for Operations
The models must include uncertainty in many forms. In the grid of the past,
uncertainty arose from demand variability, generator outages, and weather.
Volatility will increase substantially with greater integration of energy from
solar and wind sources. The uncertainty and dynamics of these energy re-
sources are very different from anything seen in the past. As the results of
Chapter 3 show, the volatility that comes with renewable energy resources
can be costly, even though these energy resources are free. Greater uncer-
tainty could be achieved with the introduction of demand response, espe-
cially with dynamic, real-time pricing. While it is often argued that demand
response has clear potential benefits for improving reliability and reducing
overall volatility, a system with price-responsive demand may in fact be less
predictable: The unconstrained behavior of consumers may reveal statistics
as exotic as those of the wind!
Once we have settled on network architecture, the specific policy for im-
plementing demand response, and commitment decisions for wind, nuclear,
and coal generation, we will have a significant variability and uncertainty.
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To cope with these new dynamics combined with greater uncertainty, we will
require better mechanisms for reserve management.
It is well known that the deployment of reserves is key to hedge against such
uncertainty [26–29]. One way to address the implementation of reserves is by
applying parallels between this task, and reserve management in inventory
models [22, 30]. Optimal reserves will be zonal and dynamic, depending
on current loads at various zones, the mix of available generation, and the
ramping capabilities of generation units.
The reserve management approaches described in [22, 30] are based on a
version of the models described next.
Line 1 Line 2
Line 3
ES1
ED1
ED2 ED3
RS1
ES3ES2 RS3RS2
Figure 2.3: Three bus system.
Network Topology The basic topology is defined by a graph in which
each node represents a bus, and each link represents a transmission line. A
simple example is shown in Fig. 2.3. Located at each node are one or more
of the following: Generation and exogenous demand. A lossless DC model is
used to characterize the relationship between generation, demand, and power
on the various links. There are `n nodes, denoted N = {1, . . . , `n}, and L
transmission lines, indexed by {1, 2, ..., L}. The network is assumed to be
connected.
Demand-side We denote by Dn(t) the demand at time t, at bus n, and by
EDn(t) the energy withdrawn by the consumer at that bus. We assume that
there is no free disposal for energy, which requires that EDn(t) ≤ Dn(t) for all
t. If sufficient generation is available at bus n at time t, then EDn(t) = Dn(t).
19
In the event of insufficient generation, we have EDn(t) < Dn(t), i.e., the
consumer experiences a blackout.
Supply-side We denote by ESn(t) and RSn(t) the energy and reserve pro-
duced by the supplier at bus n. Generation capacity, GS, coincides with
ES + RS. The operational and physical constraints on the production of
energy and reserve are expressed abstractly as
(ES,RS) ∈ XS (2.8)
The usual DC power flow relations are included for the transmission system.
In addition, rate constraints are imposed on generation that are a conse-
quence of the physics of both generators and the grid.
Constraints The remaining assumptions on the dynamic network model
are described as follows:
(i) Generation capacities are subject to strict bounds: For n ∈ N and t ≥ 0,
Gn(t) ≤ Gn (2.9)
where G = (G1, . . . , G`n)
T are fixed `n-dimensional vectors.
(ii) Generation capacity is rate constrained : For all t1 > t0 ≥ 0,
ζ− ≤ ES(t1)− ES(t0)
t1 − t0 +
RS(t1)−RS(t0)
t1 − t0 ≤ ζ
+ . (2.10)
(iii) Lossless network, so it neither generates nor consumes energy. Conse-
quently, the network is subject to the supply-demand balance constraint,
1TES(t) = 1
TED(t) , t ≥ 0 (2.11)
(iv) Power flows over the network are consistent with the DC power flow model.
Suppose bus 1 is selected as the reference bus, based on which the injection
shift factor matrix H ∈ [−1, 1]N×L is defined, where Hnl denotes the power
distributed on line l when 1 MW is injected into bus n and withdrawn at
the reference bus [30].
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Let fmaxl denote the capacity of transmission line l. On letting Hl ∈ RN
denote the l-th column of H, the capacity constraint for line l is expressed,
−fmaxl ≤ (ES − ED)THl ≤ fmaxl (2.12)
The network shown in Fig. 2.3 provides an example of the general model
in which there are sources of demand and supply at each of three nodes.
The vector of nodal power flows P is given by
P = (ES1 − ED1 , ES2 − ED2 , ES3 − ED3 )T ,
where the directions of positive power flows are as indicated by arrows in the
figure. If the impedances are identical in the three transmission lines, then
with bus 1 chosen as the reference bus, the injection shift factor matrix is
given by
H = 1
3

0 0 0
−2 1 −1
−1 −1 −2
 (2.13)
The flow on the lines are given by P TH.
2.3.2 The Social Planner’s Problem
Based on this model we can make precise the optimization goals posed by the
social planner. This is the first step in assessing the efficiency of an outcome
in a market setting.
Objective Function To formulate a control problem we introduce a cost
function. The production cost for energy injected at bus n at time t is de-
noted cEn(ESn(t)), and for the reserve provided at that bus is c
R
n(RSn(t)). The
marginal cost of black-out is denoted cbon . For given generation, reserves, and
demand {ESn , RSn , Dn, EDn} ⊂ R`n , the cost function c(ESn , RSn , Dn, EDn) is
defined by ∑
n∈N
(
cEn(ESn) + c
R
n(RSn) + c
bo
n (Dn − EDn)+
)
. (2.14)
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Optimization Problem Putting all the above elements together, the ba-
sic optimal control problem becomes
min
ED,ES,RS
∫ ∞
0
e−ηsEx[c(s)] ds, (2.15)
subject to the operational/physical constraint (2.8), the network constraint
(2.12), and energy-balance constraint (2.11). The optimization problem (6.5)
is a sort of dynamic economic dispatch, in which the objective function cor-
responds to the expected discounted total cost.
Observe that the cost is a function of the 4`n variables contained in the
`n-dimensional vectors {ESn , RSn , Dn, EDn}. For a network with 1000 gene-
rators in operation, such as the California system, this model is not suitable
for mathematical analysis. Techniques from decision and control such as ag-
gregate models and workload relaxations lead to a tractable model that can
be approximately solved. For example, in [30] insights about effective reserve
policies for a similar model are obtained.
This dynamic extension of the usual economic dispatch model is used as
the starting point for analyzing the competitive equilibria and the impact of
uncertainty, dynamics and constraints in electricity markets.
2.4 Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium for Electricity
Markets
The competitive equilibrium is an idealization in which it is assumed that
no market player is large enough to influence prices. In typical analyses of
static market models, the prices in this equilibrium are equal to the marginal
cost of production. In the literature it is found that this holds only on
average [12, 31–33]. The sample path behavior of prices can look as erratic
as the worst days during the crises in Illinois or California in the 1990s, or
in Australia today.
To explain these conclusions, the Lagrangian decomposition analysis in the
work [12] is recalled. The consumer and supplier’s objective function is the
long-run discounted expected profit with discount rate γ, represented by
KD := E
[∫
e−γtWD(t) dt
]
, KS := E
[∫
e−γtWS(t) dt
]
22
The supplier and consumer each aim to maximize their respective mean dis-
counted mean welfare KS, KD. We let W(t) :=WS(t) +WS(t) denote the
welfare function of the social planner.
The form of the welfare functions {WD(t),WS(t)} is not important for our
purposes here. The only requirement is that the sum be equivalent to the
negative of the cost c(t) defined above (6.5): For some constant κ,
E[W(t)] = κ− E[c(t)], t ≥ 0.
We now impose several idealistic assumptions for this dynamic model, each
of which is an extension of what is assumed in the competitive equilibrium
analysis of a static model.
(i) Consumers and suppliers share equal information. This is modeled as a
filtration: An increasing family of σ-algebras, denoted H = {Ht : t ≥ 0}.
The demand process, and the decisions of the consumers and the suppliers
are adapted to this filtration.
(ii) There is a price process P e that is adapted to {Ht : t ≥ 0}. However,
prices are exogenous : For each t0 > 0, the future prices {P e(t) : t > t0}
are conditionally independent of {ED(t), ES(t) : t ≤ t0}, given current and
past prices {P e(t) : t ≤ t0}.
Assumption (ii) is known as the price-taking assumption [34].
To Lagrangian decomposition of [12] is obtained on relaxing the constraint
that ED(t) = ES(t) for all t. Let {λ(t)} denote a vector-valued stochastic
process that is adapted to H, of the same dimension as ED(t) or ES(t), and
consider the Lagrangian relaxation: The dual functional Φ(λ) is defined as
the supremum of
E
[∫
e−γt
(W(t) + λ(t)T(ED(t)− ES(t))) dt]
over all adapted processes ES, ED. Under the assumptions of our prior work,
this optimization problem is decomposed into two problems — one for the
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consumer and one for the supplier, as follows:
Φ(λ) = max
ED
E
[∫
e−γt
(WD(t) + λ(t)TED(t)) dt]
+ max
ES
E
[∫
e−γt
(WS(t)− λ(t)TES(t)) dt] (2.16)
Under general conditions there is no duality gap: There is a process λ∗ for
which the solutions to (2.16) and the social planner’s problem (6.5) coin-
cide. Moreover, by inspection it follows that this forms a solution to the
competitive equilibrium, with P e(t) = λ∗(t) for each t.
Because of unique features of a power market, the equilibrium price process
looks very different from the solution obtain for a static model:
(i) The price is marginal value to the consumer. In particular, when reserves
are positive at a node in the network, the price is zero.
(ii) In the market models of [35] or [12], the average price for power never
exceeds the average marginal cost: For each node n,
E
[∫
e−γtP en(t) dt
]
≥ E
[∫
e−γt
( d
de
cEn (ESn(t))
)
dt
]
(iii) If the variance of demand or supply is large, then the variance of P e will
also be large.
Note that all of our discussion has focused on optimization in the real-time
market (RTM). In practice, this is coupled with a day-ahead market (DAM)
in which generation is scheduled to meet expected energy requirements, as
well as reserves. A model designed to couple the two markets is proposed
in [36], in which the welfare functions for both suppliers and consumers are
extended to include “day-ahead” welfares,
W ttlD (t) =WD(t) +WdaD (t) , W ttlS (t) =WS(t) +WdaS (t) (2.17)
The details of this construction can be found in Chapter 2. As a final step, to
illustrate the impact of dynamics on competitive prices, simulation results for
a multiple technology case are surveyed. These results are taken from [12].
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Primary and Ancillary Service Simulations
For a power market, the mean demand is often met by a primary service – the
cheapest source of service capacity – through a prior contract. The deviations
from mean demand can be met through primary service, as well as ancillary
service. Typically, ancillary service is costly, but it can be ramped up/down
at a much faster rate than the primary service. Nuclear and coal generators
can be viewed as primary service providers while gas turbine generators are an
example of more expensive, yet more responsive sources of ancillary service.
We consider the model of [35] in which Gp(t) and Ga(t) denote the instan-
taneous output of primary and ancillary generators at time t.
Primary service takes on positive or negative values since it represents
deviations from day-ahead schedules. Ancillary service is constrained to be
non-negative. In addition, the two sources of generation are distinguished
by their ramping capabilities: ζp+, ζa+, ζp− and ζa− represent the maximum
rates for ramping up and down the primary and ancillary services, respec-
tively.
−ζp−(t1 − t0) ≤ Gp(t1)−Gp(t0) ≤ ζp+(t1 − t0),
−ζa−(t1 − t0) ≤ Ga(t1)−Ga(t0) ≤ ζa+(t1 − t0) .
For simplicity, we focus on the case in which ramping down is unconstrained,
i.e., ζp−, ζa− = ∞. We assume that ζa+ > ζp+, to reflect the ability of
ancillary service to ramp up faster than primary.
The demand at time t is given as D(t) and the reserve at that time is given
by
R(t) = Gp(t) +Ga(t)−D(t), t ≥ 0 . (2.18)
In our model, we consider some demand-response capabilities; that is certain
loads can be turned off to maintain supply-demand balance in the event of
reserves shortfall. When the demand exceeds the available supply capacity,
demand response capacity is deployed first to balance the demand and supply.
If the difference between the demand and available supply is less than the
available demand response capacity – i.e. demand response capacity can
sufficiently cover the reserve shortfall – the price is set by the cost of demand
response. Otherwise, forced blackout will take place, in which case the price
equals the choke-up price. Since the cost of demand response is typically
lower than the cost of blackout, the price when the supply deficiency can be
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covered by demand response would be lower than that if demand response was
unavailable. Thus, demand response acts as a cushion between the normal
security operations and the blackout. In our model, we use r¯DRmax to denote
total demand response capacity. That is, r¯DRmax is the threshold up to which
load can be shed. Hence, we have black-out situations only if R(t) ≤ −r¯DRmax.
In this example the SPP can be converted to a cost minimization problem,
in which the cost function on (Gp,Ga,R) has the following form: For t ≥ 0
C(t) := cpGp(t) + caGa(t) + (cbo − cdr)I(R(t) < −r¯DRmax) + cdrI(R(t) < 0)
where cp, ca represent the per unit production costs of primary and ancillary
services respectively, cdr is the cost of demand response-based load shedding
and cbo is the cost of blackout [35].
Implications of these results for ancillary service providers We il-
lustrate the impacts using simulations based on a controlled random-walk
(CRW) model. That is, the demand is modeled as a random walk of the
form
D(k + 1) = D(k) + E(k + 1), k ≥ 0, D(0) = 0 ,
in which the increment process E is a bounded i.i.d. sequence. The reserve
R is modeled in discrete time using the expression (2.18).
The other model parameters used are as follows: cp = 1, ca = 20, cdr = 100
and cbo = 400. The ramp-up rates are taken as ζp+ = 1/10 and ζa+ = 2/5.
The marginal distribution of the increment distribution was taken symmetric
on {±1}.
We perform experiments based on a family of threshold policies. Such
policy is based on two thresholds (r¯a, r¯p). The policy considered, ramps
up at maximum rate the primary service anytime R(t) < r¯p subject to the
constraint that R(t) does not exceed the threshold
Up(t) = min(ζp+,max(0, r¯p −R(t)) (2.19)
in which Up(t) represents the increment of primary service. If R(t) ≥ r¯p,
then primary service ramps and Up(t) = r¯p−R(t).
For the ancillary service, if R(t) +Up(t) < r¯a, then ancillary service ramps
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up,
Ua(t) = min(ζa+,max(0, r¯a −R(t)− Up(t)) (2.20)
in which Ua(t) represents the increment of ancillary service. If R(t)+Up(t) ≥
r¯a then ancillary service ramps down
Ua(t) = max(−Ga(t), r¯a −R(t)− Up(t)) (2.21)
We perform experiments based on a family of threshold policies. Such policy
is based on two thresholds (r¯p, r¯a). Under the policy considered, primary
service is ramped up whenever R(t) ≤ r¯p. Similarly, ancillary service is
ramped up whenever R(t) ≤ r¯a. We refer the reader to [22, 30] for further
details about the threshold policy.
In the numerics we considered discounting as in (6.5), but in discrete time,
with discount factor β = 0.995. We find the “best-threshold” by estimating
the discounted cost by the standard Monte Carlo estimate. We perform
several experiments with varying levels of demand response. We use cdr and
r¯DRmax as simulation parameters to study sensitivity of average prices to demand
response capabilities.
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Figure 2.4: Optimal thresholds for primary and ancillary service.
Fig. 2.4 plots the optimal thresholds for primary and ancillary service with
respect to the demand response capacity r¯DRmax. The optimal threshold for
primary service is much higher than that of ancillary service, which reflects
the fact that the primary service ramps up slower than ancillary service, and
primary service is less expensive. The low sensitivity is consistent with the
conclusions of [35].
The average prices for primary service, and the conditional average of
ancillary service are shown in Fig. 2.5, for various values of r¯DRmax. The average
price E[P e] = cp is consistent with the conclusions of [31]. The conditional
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mean “E[P e | Ga > 0]” denotes[∫ ∞
0
e−γtP e(t)I(Ga(t) > 0) dt
][∫ ∞
0
e−γtI(Ga(t) > 0) dt
]−1
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Figure 2.5: Average prices and variance of P e.
Also shown in Fig. 2.5 is a plot of the variance of the equilibrium price with
respect to r¯DRmax. We see that the variance drops dramatically with an increase
in the demand response capacity, even though the optimal thresholds are
virtually unchanged.
Recall that the prices for primary and ancillary service are identical. How-
ever, the bulk of primary service is allocated in the day-ahead market. Con-
sequently, ancillary service, such as provided by gas turbines, will be exposed
to much greater variability in the efficient market outcome.
The results surveyed in this section can be interpreted in various ways.
First, we have shown that prices are highly volatile even under the most
idealistic assumptions of the competitive free market, so that volatile prices
are usually seen in real world should not be surprising. On the other hand,
under general conditions, in this equilibrium the average price of power is
only the average marginal cost of generation [12, 32, 35]. Given the high
variance of prices, we wonder how the suppliers can stay in business.
We can come to completely different conclusions on re-examining our as-
sumptions: The results of this section are all based on the competitive equi-
librium theory which, we believe, provides only a crude model of reality in
power systems applications. Information is not symmetric: The consumers
do not have access to the same information as the suppliers. Prices are not
exogenous : The number of suppliers is finite, so there is ample opportunity
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to exercise market power to influence prices in a real-world setting. Are the
prices shown in the introduction the result of market power, or the natural
price fluctuations in a competitive equilibrium? We do not know, because
we do not know what the generator operators are thinking.
This brings us to a source of uncertainty that is potentially greater than the
wind: The behavior of the consumers and suppliers of electricity. We cannot
pretend to know exactly how the suppliers and consumers will behave to
further their interests. This fact brings many research challenges.
2.5 Summary
Several basic results, terminology and references useful for the rest of this
work were presented. These results underscore the main challenge, and
promise, of this research: the need to understand complex economics and
engineering models. This need becomes clear in an entropic grid setting in
which it is mandatory to appropriately handle uncertainty and dynamics.
Additional required background and literature are provided at the beginning
of each chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
PRODUCT DEFINITION IN
ELECTRICITY MARKETS
In this chapter, the role of the product definition in electricity markets is
investigated. Electricity auction research has been mainly focused on the
auction structure such as pay-as-bid or uniform format. Recognizing the
key role of this aspect, the definition of the product itself emerges also as a
critical step. Appropriate products are fundamental for a constructive rela-
tionship between the market structures and the physical system. Poorly de-
signed products may impact both the market performance—creating negative
market conditions—and the physical operation of the system—inappropriate
generation mix, for example. In this chapter, focusing on the market dimen-
sion, we investigate the impacts that the product definition can have on the
market outcome. A product definition implemented in some U.S. electric-
ity markets is used to unveil several critical aspects that must be considered
when electricity products are defined. We illustrate those points by defining a
product which overcomes some of the investigated issues. Our results demon-
strate the importance of defining a proper product in electricity markets and
provide guidelines for future research. This chapter is based on [37–40].
3.1 Introduction
There is an ongoing worldwide trend towards the deployment of market struc-
tures in the electricity industry. The idea of implementing electricity markets
started a few decades ago and it was sustained by several dimensions. The
causes of this trend are multifold—technological, academic and historical—
and can be summarized as follows. On the technological side, economically
efficient generating units of small- and mid-size capacity became reality [41].
Consequently, on the generation side emerged the possibility of having multi-
ple suppliers of different sizes and the idea of implementing market in electric-
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ity, at least in the generation side, started to take shape. The idea was taken
up in academia, and the framework of spot pricing for trading electricity
emerged in the seminal work of [14]. Last but not least, there was the histor-
ical context of the late seventies and early eighties in which the deployment of
market structures at many levels of society became popular [4,42,43]. These
three dimensions paved the road to the deployment of market structures in
electricity in Chile and the UK in the early eighties [6] with the hope that
the harnessing of the competitive forces would stimulate innovation, facilitat-
ing the achievement of a more efficient system which eventually would result
in affordable prices. Although the restructuring process has brought some
benefits, in particular in terms of increasing the efficiency and management
of utilities [7], many authors have questioned and criticized the real accom-
plishment of the original market hopes and objectives [4, 43, 44]. Moreover,
some authors still believe that the salient characteristics of electricity make
vertical integration essential for an efficient planning and operation of electri-
cal systems [45]. An historical overview about the development of electricity
markets along with discussion of future challenges is provided in [46].
A key design element of electricity markets is treating electricity as a com-
modity. Accordingly, MWhs should not be treated differently from other
commodities such as copper or oil. In addition, the MWh commodity can
be provided without apparent distinction by any generating technology. As
a result of this electricity-as-a-commodity viewpoint, several market struc-
tures from other commodity markets such as financial derivatives or forward
contracts started to be adopted in electricity. These structures are typically
linked to the deployment of a spot market. Forward contracts are common
instruments in commodity markets to hedge risk [47]. From the viewpoint of
investments, a forward contract creates a long-term signal useful for investors
who do not want to rely on the volatile spot markets. In addition, a forward
contract market could also improve market efficiency. Using standard eco-
nomic theory, the authors of [20] show how the implementation of a forward
market can make a duopoly market competitive. However, for the particular
case of electricity, and once some of its complexities are considered, there is
no clear agreement about the market benefits of forward contracts [48, 49].
From a physical perspective, however, the use of forward contracts may
facilitate the achievement of other objectives such as resource adequacy or
appropriate technology mix. The auction processes held in Chile and Brazil
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are examples of the use of forward contracts for facilitating resource adequacy
[6]. In addition, in the case of Brazil, the auction processes have facilitated
the integration of new types of technologies. In terms of designing a market
for electricity contracts, what and how to buy/sell are two natural questions
that arise. Therefore, the essential issues are: (a) the product definition, the
way in which the load is going to be categorized and what the basic unitary
product is; and (b) the auction format, the way in which the sellers and the
buyers are brought together and the method to clear the underlying product.
Several of the research efforts in electricity auctions have been primar-
ily focused on the nature of the competitive bidding processes and on what
auction formats and rules should be adopted, e.g., uniform or pay-as-bid for-
mats [50], bypassing the discussion of the product definition. That discussion
is important especially given the experience in other instances such as U.S.
spectrum auctions, in which the results illustrate how the auction format and
rules can impact the market outcomes [51].
In the literature we find little discussion about the characterization of
the product in electricity markets. In the context of a public information
game theory, [52] and [53] make an analysis about the impact of the demand
packaging in the outcome efficiency, showing how vertical-type packaging
does not have efficient equilibria. Similarly, [54] and [6] present some notions
about the importance of the product definition.
This apparent lack of interest in the product definition might be also an
effect of treating electricity as a standard commodity, a view that fails to
capture many of the complexities associated with electricity production such
as ramping rates. For example, due to technical limitations, a coal power
plant has a maximum load ramping that prevents it from providing energy
faster than a hydro power plant. In a similar way, nuclear units are usually
used as base-load resource, due to their lack of ramping capabilities. Con-
sequently, it is not only the energy that matters but also the instantaneous
power and its trajectory. In addition, there are unique characteristics of elec-
tricity such as lack of massive storage capability, just-in-time manufacturing
use and the several technical constraints of electricity generation that need
somehow to be considered in the specification about what is being traded
in these markets. Recognizing in the definition of products the multiple ca-
pabilities and services that different technologies can provide seems critical
for having a constructive relationship between the physical systems and the
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market structures.
There are real market designs that help to illustrate the impact of a poorly
defined product. A clear example is the auction process performed in Illinois
during 2006 [38]. The level of prices attained in the process was so high that
the auction was canceled after one year of its realization and a new scheme
for the procurement of power was defined [55,56]. The final auction prices for
a subset of the auction products and the spot market prices in Illinois during
2007 are illustrated in Figure 3.1. Note that the final auction prices of some
products are above the market prices for about 90% of the time. In previous
works the failure of the Illinois process has been attributed to the product
definition based on the so-called tranches [38–40], definition that has been
also used in auction process held in Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania and New
Jersey. In addition to the Illinois experience, the aftermath of auctions using
this type of products has been less than promising. For many years, elec-
tricity rates in New Jersey increased considerably after the implementation
of auctions with these type of products. In Ohio the results of one auction
realization were rejected by regulators. In Maryland, the implementation of
the auction in 2007 resulted in a 72% increase of the electricity rates [40].
At a glance, the tranche-based product definition makes the winner of the
contracts responsible for a fixed percentage of the auctioned load. The prod-
uct is inherently random, resulting from the uncertainty in demand, in both
the power and the energy associated. Due to the tranche definition, which
seems to be very simple and convenient for the distribution companies, a
series of problems during the auction implementation arise. In particular,
as we explain in this chapter, tranche-based products may create economic
inefficiencies and create conditions for market concentration and participant
exclusion. In addition, these types of contracts fail to properly aggregate
information in markets and provide insurance beyond the interest of end-
consumers. Finally, the key structural characteristic—providing a fixed per-
centage of the load—creates conditions for high level of prices.
In this chapter, we discuss the impacts of product definition in electricity
auctions. Although the implications of a poorly defined product are noticed
in both the market behavior and the physical operation of the electricity
system, our focus is mainly on the market performance. Through some cases
and examples, we identify critical market aspects that should be considered
in the product design. Our results demonstrate the importance of defining
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Figure 3.1: Prices range of the Illinois Auction.
properly the product in electricity markets and provides guidelines for future
research. The structure of this chapter is as follows. The main elements of
the 2006 Illinois Electricity Auction are discussed in Section 3.2. Section 3.3
is devoted to provide economic reasons along with illustrative examples to
show the impact that the product definition can have in the market outcomes.
Insights about competitive prices for tranche-based products are presented
in Section 3.4. Based on our findings an alternative product definition is
discussed in Section 3.5. Concluding remarks and future research directions
are presented in Section 3.6.
3.2 The 2006 Illinois Electricity Auction
The 2006 Illinois Electricity Auction was created to procure supply for the
Illinois distribution companies after the ending of the transition period of
the Illinois electric industry. The basis of the Illinois electric industry is
the enactment of the Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law
of December 1997. The restructuring of the Illinois electric industry led
to the eventual establishment of the Ameren and Exelon holding companies
with their respective generation assets removed from the regulated companies
to form speculative market entities under the holding company structure.
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During the transition period, which was legislatively extended and lasted
nearly a decade, the tariffs of the residential and small commercial customers
were artificially frozen and the Illinois utilities met their demands using long-
term contracts. In 2004, the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) started
a series of workshops and forums to study what steps to take following the
end of the transition period. One of the recommendations was to introduce
auctions in the procurement process for mid-term duration contracts, along
the lines of other states, such as New Jersey and Maryland. In 2006 the ICC
approved the use of the auction mechanism proposed by the Illinois utility
subsidiaries of Exelon and Ameren. The auction was held in September 2006
and the impacts on the tariffs started to be felt from January 2007. The
Auction outcomes were nearly universally disliked in light of the high prices
that resulted.
The rationale for the Illinois Auction was to ensure reliable supply over
the next 17-41 months, starting on January 2007, for the Illinois distribution
companies owned by Ameren - CILCO, CIPS and IP - and the Exelon owned
ComEd. Two auctions, one for fixed-priced customers and the other for
hourly-priced customers, were run in parallel. Our analysis focuses only on
the fixed price section because the outcomes of the hourly price section were
immediately rejected by the ICC.
The 2006 Auction was designed and managed by NERA Economic Con-
sulting, and used the format of the New Jersey electricity auction. The 2006
Illinois Electricity Auction is a multiple-product reverse simultaneous descen-
dant “clock” auction. The reverse refers to the fact that the sellers, rather
than the buyers, have the active role, and the descendant clock indicates the
deployment of price decrements in the auction. The parties involved in the
auction are the regulated distribution companies (the buyers) holding com-
pany buyers, twenty-one selling entities including the Exelon and Ameren
generation subsidiaries and NERA, the Auction Manager. In addition, there
are the observers the ICC and the Auction Monitor. The role of the Auction
Monitor is to review the Auction results and to provide specific recommen-
dations to the ICC. The ICC takes the final decision whether to accept or
reject the Auction results. The structure of the Auction is summarized in
Fig. 3.2.
The multiple products of the Auction are differentiated in terms of the
distribution company, the customer class and the contract duration. The set
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Figure 3.2: Structure of the Auction.
of products is showed in Fig. 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Set of products of the Auction.
The unit of each product is specified in terms of the so-called tranche.
The tranche of the chronological load over a given period is defined to be a
specified fraction of the load at each point in time during that period. We
illustrate the supply of a week-long load in terms of 10 % tranches in Fig.
3.4. The total load is supplied by four sellers who provide one, two, three
and four tranches, respectively.
We now present the outcomes of the 2006 Illinois Electricity Auction. The
Auction began on September 5, 2006, with the initial prices set by the Auc-
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Figure 3.4: Basic Auction product.
tion Manager. The Auction went through 39 rounds and terminated on the
fourth day. The initial prices were 104 $/MWh for the large and 100 $/MWh
for the small to medium customers of Ameren and ComEd.
The Auction was performed in rounds in which the Auction Manager set
the prices for the 8 products for each round and each seller was allowed to offer
one or more tranches of each of the 8 products. The only information released
by the Auction Manager following each round was the price level for the next
round and the range of oversupply for the total number of products. As long
as there was an oversupply of any single product, a new round was launched
by the Auction Manager with the prices in the new round modified from
those in the previous round using non-negative decrements. The attainment
of the supply-demand equilibrium in the 8 products signaled the end of the
Auction. Each seller of a specific product received the identical price for each
unit of the product sold. We provide a plot of the sequence of prices in Fig.
3.5.
3.2.1 Analysis of the Results
The dominant characteristic of the Auction results is the uniformly high
prices for all the 8 products. The high prices are readily evident from the
wholesale electricity market prices in 2007, the first year covered by the Auc-
tion outcomes. In fact, the prices set by the 2006 Illinois Electricity Auction
were considerably higher than the average market prices in the Midwest ISO
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Figure 3.5: Auction round prices.
and PJM at the Illinois locations. It is interesting to note that, on the aver-
age, the ComEd purchase prices are lower than the Ameren ones. The high
level of prices is evident from a comparison of the Auction prices with the
daily locational marginal prices (LMP) on particular nodes of such system
operators. We present the results of the comparison for the Ameren products
of the Auction with the LMP at the so-called Illinois-Hub in the Midwest
ISO.
The Midwest ISO evaluates LMPs on a five-minute basis and determines
the hourly LMP as the time-weighted average of the five-minute values. We
define the daily LMP to be the average of the 24 hourly LMP values. The
Illinois-Hub is not a physical node but rather a fictitious node whose LMP is
computed by the Midwest ISO using the LMP values from about 150 nodes
located in the central, southern and southwestern parts of Illinois essentially
covering the service of the three Ameren distribution companies. The Illinois-
Hub LMP is a useful proxy for the wholesale electricity prices in the Ameren
locations.
We use the daily Illinois-Hub LMPs nodal prices for the period from Jan-
uary 1 - December 31, 2007, to represent the market prices. We present the
plot of these prices together with the price levels associated with the four
Ameren products over the same period in Fig. 3.6.
We observe that the price of each product exceeds the average Illinois-Hub
LMP for 2007. In fact, throughout the year, the daily LMP is below the
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Figure 3.6: Sample path of Market and Auction prices.
Auction prices expect for some short periods.
We can actually measure the fraction of time during which the exceptions
occur. We do so by rearranging the average daily LMPs from the highest to
the lowest to create a so-called price-duration curve. We present the Illinois-
Hub LMPs duration curve in Fig. 3.9 together with the Auction prices for the
four Ameren products. The LMPs exceed the Auction prices no more than
10 % of the time. In other words, the market prices are below the Auction
prices 90 % of the days in 2007. Indeed, the Auction price of the BGS-LF17
product is above the market price about 97 % of the days in 2007. These
conclusions clearly point out that MWh of each of the four Ameren products
may have been purchased at considerably lower prices in the market than
those set by the Auction.
The final Auction prices show a clear decoupling between the prices of the
products for small and medium size customers and those of the products for
the large industrial and commercial customers for both distribution compa-
nies. Even though the initial Auction prices for the two sets of products
started at nearly the same level - 100 $/MWh and 104 $/MWh, respec-
tively - the final prices are at the level of 65 and 64 $/MWh for the small
and medium customers of Ameren and ComEd, respectively, and 85 and 90
$/MWh for the large industrial and commercial customers of Ameren and
ComEd, respectively. The higher prices of the latter products aimed at the
large industrial and commercial customers of Ameren and ComEd reflect the
uncertainty issues associated with this class of customers with the greater
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flexibility to switch loads to alternative energy service providers. Since the
latter customers are more likely to migrate their loads, they represent an-
other source of uncertainty to the sellers. The difference between the price
for these products and those for the small and medium customers is, in effect,
the premium charged by the sellers to cover this additional uncertainty.
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Figure 3.7: Price duration curve.
There is also a counterintuitive outcome in the ComEd product prices, in
that the longer contracts are priced lower than the shorter ones. Since, over
the longer period, the uncertainty is higher, the expectation is that the prices
associated with longer-term contracts tend to be higher than those covering
shorter periods. The only explanation for this anomalous behavior is the
desire of the large amount of nuclear generation in Illinois to find assured
markets for longer period, even if the sales are at lower prices.
Our analysis indicates that the product definition is one of the key issues
in the Auction design. An obligation that requires a fixed quantity of energy
is vastly different from that requiring a fixed percentage of a given class load,
as is the case of the tranche-based product in the 2006 Illinois Electricity
Auction. The high prices attained in the 2006 Illinois Electricity Auction are
therefore attributable, in part, to the problems entailed by the tranche-based
product definition in use.
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3.2.2 Product Definition Issues
Forward contracts have been used in many electricity markets around the
world. The main objectives of such contracts are to
• Reduce the volatility of the price of electricity to the end users,
• Provide an assured market to generators at a specified price,
• Decrease the market power of certain companies in the electricity mar-
kets, and
• Provide effective price signals to stimulate investments in new genera-
tion assets.
The objective of reducing volatility of final prices serves the interest of
risk-averse consumers, who wish to avoid the huge price fluctuations that are
usual in the spot markets. Such risk-averse consumers are willing to pay a
moderate risk premium for the security of less volatile prices. On the other
hand, the economic’s literature suggests that the introduction of forward
contracts may act as a pro-competitive device, with possible reduction in
final prices, thus also benefiting consumers. Also, the markets provide good
mechanisms to aggregate information and provide reliable signals for the
necessity of further investments in generation.
Unfortunately, the contracts emanating from the tranche-based products
used in the 2006 Illinois Electricity Auction fail to achieve the objectives
above for a number of reasons, all of them entailed by the product definition
problems. The main problems include the following:
• The tranche contracts provide full protection to the distribution com-
panies, by transferring all the uncertainties to the sellers. However,
this protection is beyond the interest of consumers.
• The uncertainty associated with the migration of distributors’ con-
sumers has a component of information asymmetry that likely will drive
prices up.
• The products delivered under the contracts are highly artificial since
they involve the production of electricity that no single generating unit
is capable of producing or doing so efficiently.
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• The satisfaction of such contracts provides the impetus for consolida-
tion of generation assets, leading to the concentration of the market
into fewer entities. Such moves raise market power concerns and result
eventually in reduced competition.
• The product definition does not allow comparison of demand provision
among the sellers, because it refers to the unknown demand just in
percentage terms. Thus, the information aggregation function of the
market is undermined.
3.3 Analyzing a Product Definition
When a market for contracts is implemented, a natural question arises: How
do the terms of the contract impact the market outcomes? This question
has been overlooked in the electricity markets literature, mainly because in
standard commodity markets the product definition is somehow natural—for
example 1 barrel of oil or 1 pound of copper. However, electricity is radically
different from any other commodity due to the technology involved, its link
to a physical network that is highly complex, and its importance to society.
Based on previous electricity auction processes, we claim that the product
definition is a key element of any market for electricity contracts.
In this section, using a particular type of contract, we provide key elements
that should be taken into account in the design of electricity contracts. Such
elements are mainly related to economic and market performance. Although
not discussed in this work, the definition of the contracts also impacts the
achievement of other objectives beyond market and economic ones. In partic-
ular, the terms of the contracts will also play an important role in achieving
objectives such as system reliability and environmental fulfillment. A non-
interfering linkage between the market and the physical operation of the
system can be achieved only by having products that capture the physical
constraints and needs for achieving those objectives. Attributes such as loca-
tion of the generating resources, volatility that different resources inject into
the system, environmental impacts and flexibility should be also considered
in the definition of appropriate products.
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3.3.1 Tranche-based Products
We use the product definition used in the 2006 Illinois Auction to investigate
the impacts of the product definition in market outcomes. We start defin-
ing the key terms of these type of contracts. Firstly, we introduce a load
model. Assume that the load over a given period H is a random variable
l˜(h). Moreover, assume that the load can be further decomposed as
l˜(h) = lf (h) + ε˜(h) (3.1)
where lf (h) is a deterministic part and ε˜(h) is a random one. The determinis-
tic part is forecasted. Consider an index set I = {i : i = 1, ..., I} of suppliers.
The tranche-based contract (γi˜ ) is defined to supply a fixed proportion (αi)
of the total load,
γi˜ (h) = αi l˜(h) : 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 ∧
∑
i∈I
αi = 1 (3.2)
⇒
∑
i∈I
γi˜ (h) = l˜(h) (3.3)
Note that the contracts themselves are random variables as their associated
power depends on the not-yet-realized load. Consequently, the contracts are
associated not only with energy but to several other attributes such as risk
insurance and other ancillary services. In forthcoming sections of the chapter,
we focus on specific attributes associated with the tranche-based contract.
3.3.2 Model for Supplying Contracts
In order to illustrate economic issues emerging from the use of tranche-based
products, a simple model for supplying contracts is presented. In this model,
we focus only on the deterministic part of the load. Assume that the fore-
casted load (lf ) is decomposed in three components: base load (l
b), cycling
load (lc) and peak load (lp), i.e., lf = l
b+lc+lp. The load can be alternatively
represented by the triplet l =
(
lb, lc, lp
)
. Assume an idealized set of genera-
tors (I) to supply the load at the three load levels—base, cycling and peak
levels. Considering a generator i, the total generated power is decomposed
in base (sbi), cycling (s
c
i) and peak (s
p
i ) power with their corresponding base
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(cbi), cycling (c
c
i) and peak (c
p
i ) costs. The consideration of different costs for
each load segment allows one to capture some of the ramping capabilities of
the resources. If a generator i cannot attend the peak demand then its cost is
infinite, i.e., cpi =∞. The generated power is subject to the maximum power
(Pmax,i), i.e., si = s
b
i +s
c
i +s
p
i ≤ Pmax,i. The generated power and cost can be
alternatively represented by the triplet si =
(
sbi , s
c
i , s
p
i
)
and ci =
(
cbi , c
c
i , c
p
i
)
,
respectively.
Let (si)i∈I =
(
sbi , s
c
i , s
p
i
)
i∈I be the power allocation of all generators to
supply the base, cycling and peak load segments. We say that the allocation
(si)i∈I is feasible if ∑
i∈I
sbi = l
b;
∑
i∈I
sci = l
c;
∑
i∈I
spi = l
p; (3.4)
sbi + s
c
i + s
p
i ≤ Pmax,i,∀i ∈ I (3.5)
The set of feasible allocations is denoted by F . We say that a feasible allo-
cation (s∗i)i∈I is efficient if
(s∗i)i∈I ∈ arg min
(si)i∈I∈F
∑
i∈I
si · ci (3.6)
where si · ci = sbicbi + scicci + spi cpi is the standard inner product of vectors.
3.3.3 Market Outcome Analysis
By using several examples, we show that tranche-based contracts create prob-
lems such as economic inefficiency, competition reduction, market concentra-
tion, information aggregation, insurance distortion and information asymme-
try.
Inefficiency If tranche products are used to determine allocation, in-
efficiency occurs, provided that there are different generators. Consider
two generators with the following costs: c1 =
(
cb1, c
c
1, c
p
1
)
= (5, 15, 50) and
c2 = (10, 12, 15) and total capacity Pmax,1 = Pmax,2 = 10. Assume that the
demand is l =
(
lb, lc, lp
)
= (4, 3, 3). By inspection, the efficient allocation is
s1 =
(
sb1, s
c
1, s
p
1
)
= (4, 0, 0) and s2 =
(
sb2, s
c
2, s
p
2
)
= (0, 3, 3), with a total cost
of 4 · 5 + 3 · 12 + 3 · 15 = 101. However, any tranche allocation of α ∈ [0, 1]
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for generator 1 and (1− α) for generator 2 will produce a total cost of
α(4 · 5 + 3 · 15 + 3 · 50)+
(1− α)(4 · 10 + 3 · 12 + 3 · 15) = 215α + (1− α)121,
which is more expensive than the efficient one. uunionsq
Participant exclusion Consider the same system as before but c1 =(
cb1, c
c
1, c
p
1
)
= (5, 15,+∞). Being not able to provide power peak (cp1 = ∞),
generator 1 cannot supply a fixed proportion of the load (α1). The unique
tranche allocation is to assign the load to generator 2. Generator 1 is ruled
out of the market. The cost of this allocation is 121. uunionsq
Note that in this scenario monopoly occurs and payments can be even
higher than 121. In a general scenario with more generators, the tranche
allocation may lead to the creation of bundling contracts—a third company
could buy energy from different generators to meet the needs defined by
the tranche. This bundling option works as a coordination device or as a
mechanism of collusion. We examine it in the following example.
Market concentration Consider now three generators with the follow-
ing costs: c1 = (5, 15,+∞), c2 = (10, 11, 15) and c3 = (12, 12, 13). Assume
that the maximum capacities are Pmax,1 = Pmax,2 = 10 and Pmax,3 = 15. The
load is defined by l = (10, 7, 5). The optimal allocation is s1 = (10, 0, 0),
s2 = (0, 7, 0) and s3 = (0, 0, 5) with a total cost of 192. In the tranche al-
location, generator 1 is excluded due to its inability to provide peak power.
Thus, generators 2 and 3 have to supply a proportion of the load in its
three levels subjected to their maximum powers, i.e., s2 = αl ≤ Pmax,2 and
s3 = (1− α)l ≤ Pmax,3. Therefore,
s2 = 10α + 7α + 5α
= 22α ≤ 10 (3.7)
s3 = 10(1− α) + 7(1− α) + 5(1− α)
= 22(1− α) ≤ 15 (3.8)
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From Eqs. (3.7)-(3.8), the tranche allocation is restricted to 7/22 ≤ α ≤
10/22. The corresponding generator costs and total cost (cT ) are
c2 = c
b
2s
b
2 + c
c
2s
c
2 + c
p
2s
p
2 = 252α (3.9)
c3 = c
b
3s
b
3 + c
c
3s
c
3 + c
p
3s
p
3 = 269(1− α) (3.10)
⇒ cT = c2 + c3 = 269− 17α (3.11)
Consequently, the minimal total cost is cT ≈ 261.3 and occurs when α =
10/22. Now, assume that a company buys (or makes a financial arrangement
with) the first two generators. Then, the company can provide the allocation
(10α, 7α, 5α) with a cost of 10α·5+7α·11+5α·15 = 202α < 252α. Depending
on the auction’s rule, the firm will pocket the difference. Of course, the
company can do even better by combining all three generators. In that case,
the total cost for the company will be the efficient one, but now there is a
monopolistic firm in the market, which may charge even higher prices. uunionsq
The example above makes clear that the tranche-based product might
promote the concentration of companies. This can have undesirable impacts
in the competition and, consequently, on the final price.
But there are other elements and issues related to the tranche-based prod-
uct definition. Unlike the previous points, these additional elements are
related to uncertainty issues. First, the tranches market cannot work prop-
erly because it does not transmit or convey useful information. Consider the
following example.
Information aggregation Suppose that two companies have similar
costs, but different beliefs about the demand. One thinks that the demand
will be 110 MW while the other thinks it will be 120 MW. Let us assume
that the price of 1% tranche contract is 1 $/MWh. Consequently, the first
company is expecting $1.1 for the contract while the second expects $1.2.
Note, however, that the price facing both companies is the same: 1 $/MWh.
Hence, the same contract has different values for identical firms only because
they expect different loads. Since the competition is in dollars per MWh, it
is impossible to aggregate the generators’ beliefs in the electricity product.
In contrast, a normal contract of 1 MWh during a period will pay exactly
the same amount to both companies without being subjected to the demand
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uncertainty. uunionsq
This phenomenon occurs because the tranche contract has an extra-dimension
which is the load shape uncertainty. This additional dimension cannot be
captured using a single dimensional price. This issue suggests that energy
auctions with tranche-based contracts will reduce competition by favoring
large generating companies that can take the risk of an uncertain product.
In terms of market considerations, there are two more elements that should
also be taken into account in the design of contracts: first, understanding
the type of insurance that the contract is providing, and second, how the
contract terms can facilitate symmetry of information among the several
parties involved.
Uncertainty protection The tranche definition places all the uncer-
tainty on the sellers’ shoulders. The role of the distribution companies is
reduced to being simply the delivery channel to the end users, without car-
rying any uncertainty for the commodity delivered. The uncertainty in the
tranche-based product is a function of the yet-to-be-realized loads in the pe-
riod of interest since each seller must meet a specified fraction of the loads
and thus carries a fraction of the energy delivered and the maximum ca-
pacity required to meet the peak. We illustrate in Fig. 3.8 the impacts of
uncertainty using a four-seller case.
Figure 3.8: The impacts on the tranche-based product sellers of the
capacity and volumetric uncertainty in the load.
For the weekly period, the actual load differs from that forecasted and the
impacts on each of the sellers are indicated for this case. The loads and the
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resulting load shape are inherently random, as they are dependent on various
sources of uncertainty. Consequently, the power and energy associated with
a tranche are uncertain. A tranche seller has a volumetric and a capacity un-
certainty in what he sells. The volumetric uncertainty impacts the expected
revenues, and the capacity uncertainty entails uncertainty in the utilization
of the generation resources required to meet the tranche obligation. Such
capacity and volumetric uncertainty was historically faced by the “utility”
in the vertically integrated utility structure together with the uncertainty in
generation such as forced outages and fuel price escalation.
The concentration of uncertainty into the sellers’ hands suggests that one
of the objectives of the definition of contracts using tranches is to provide
insurance to the distribution companies. Such an objective may be viewed
as legitimate, given the goal of price volatility reduction. However, this
mistaken view arises from a confusion between the distribution companies
and the consumers. The distinction between the risks faced by the consumers
and the distribution companies is clear. While the former care only about
the price that they will pay, the latter face uncertainty about the total load
that must be served. Also, while consumers are naturally assumed to be
risk-averse, willing to pay a premium for less volatile prices, economists, in
general, classify companies as risk neutral.
Now, risk-averse agents will buy full insurance if and only if the premium
of the insurance is actuarially fair, that is, equal to the value that the insur-
ance pays in the expected term. If the premium is higher than its actuarially
fair value, the risk-averse consumers will underinsure. Since tranche prod-
ucts carry both the uncertainty of the load and the uncertainty of electricity
prices, its actuarially fair value will be above an insurance just for the elec-
tricity price. Since the uncertainty faced by end users is restricted to the
electricity price and does not include the uncertainty about the load, the
tranche products provide more protection than the end users are interested
in. In this situation, they would consider this premium above the fair value
and would prefer to underinsure. However, in the Auction 100 % of the load
was procured, with full insurance to the distribution companies. Of course,
the distribution companies may be interested in having insurance for their
total load risks. However, if they want to hedge these risks, they can do this
through normal financial mechanisms.
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Asymmetric information The presence of migration risks in the con-
tracts for the larger commercial and industrial consumers is an additional
factor for the higher prices for the products for those customers. The Illinois
restructuring legislation permits any customer to shift its load from the in-
cumbent provider to an alternative. While such freedom has had no impact
on the small residential customers, there have been major shifts of commer-
cial and industrial loads over the past decade. The fact that such shifts
may continue implies that the contracted energy consumed by the shifting
customers will be supplied by other sources than the distribution company.
Of course, while shifts into the distribution company may also occur, the
integration of the new loads by the distribution entity entails changes in the
total supply that must be delivered by the tranche sellers. Therefore, there
are considerable uncertainties for the contract sellers that the loads in the
future may change from the historical load shape. In particular, the uncer-
tainty faced by small generation entities is far more marked than that faced
by companies with many generation units since small entities have far less
flexibility in dealing with such uncertainty. Such migration-risk impacts the
valuation that each seller performs for the products associated with large
customers. The sellers have no choice but to charge an additional insurance
premium to cover against such additional uncertainty.
There are informational asymmetries in the market for the contracts to
supply medium and large customer loads of the type economists classify as
either adverse selection or moral hazard. The large consumers have the best
information about their willingness to shift their loads from the distribution
company. Given the direct contact between the distribution companies and
the medium and large customers, the distribution companies are likely to be
better informed that the sellers. As the seller of the contract is less informed
than the buyer, it is possible that market problems occur that lead to high
prices or even absence of trade.
A far more acute problem is that the adverse selection is the one with the
moral hazard issues, with respect to the large consumers and the distribu-
tion companies. A generator requires a price that pays for the impacts of the
expected migration, thereby leading to higher prices to the large consumers.
Such prices provide an incentive for such medium and large customers to
negotiate a direct deal with another generator for a period explicitly not al-
lowing any migration. The existence of such contracts further adds to the
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uncertainty of the contracts for the large customers products and consequent
high prices that encourage large consumers to leave the distribution com-
panies. There exists another, less serious, moral hazard problem for the
distribution company, which will have less incentive to hold on to the large
customers, since no direct losses are attributable to them.
The problems qualitatively discussed in this section are important and are
likely to explain most of the problems that occurred in the 2006 Illinois Elec-
tricity Auction. However, this list of problems is not exhaustive. Although
it seems almost impossible to provide quantitative figures for the relevance
of these problems, it is clear that their existence calls for a careful consid-
eration of alternative product definition. In the next section, a competitive
equilibrium analysis of the equilibrium prices for tranche-based contracts is
performed.
3.4 Market Clearance: A Comparison
We study the market clearing prices considering tranche-based products. We
assume, following the treatment of bilateral contracts in several markets [57],
that contracts and bilateral-transactions are explicitly considered into the
dispatch of the system. The comparison focuses on the energy attribute
of the tranche-based product. Other attributes associated with the tranche-
based contract such as transmission capabilities, capacity, load-following and
other ancillary services are not included. A comparison of the whole set of
services associated with the tranche-based product would require the con-
sideration of all those associated markets and it is beyond the scope of this
work. However, as discussed in [40], the aggregate of all those additional
services corresponded to a minimum part of the contract final prices. Hence,
in terms of the value of the contracts, the most important service was energy.
In order to make the comparison of the energy attribute, the traditional
economic dispatch problem is considered as a benchmark. We focus on the
simplified case in which all the information is available, there is no uncertainty
in the future load, and the only differences among suppliers are their costs
and capacities.
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3.4.1 Mathematical Formulation
Consider an index set I = {i : i = 1, ..., I} of suppliers, and an index set
H = {h : h = 1, ..., H} of time horizon. The supplier i provides a power
Pi,h at hour hour h subjected to a maximum of Pmax,i and a minimum of
zero; its cost function is given by ci(·). The load for each hour is l(h) and
its maximum during the period is lmax = max{l(1), ..., l(h), ...l(H)}. The
centralized tranche allocation problem is defined as follows.
Centralized tranche dispatch
min
αi
∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci(αil(h))
s.t.
∑
i∈I
αi = 1 and 0 ≤ αi ≤ min
{
1,
Pmax,i
lmax
}
∀i ∈ I
(3.12)
In order to get insights about the optimal solution of the problem, consider
its Lagrangian function
L(αi, λ, µ+i , µ−i ) =
∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci(αil(h)) + λ(1−
∑
i∈I
αi) (3.13)
+
∑
i∈I
µ+i
(
αi −min
{
1,
Pmax,i
lmax
})
−
∑
i∈I
µ−i αi
where the Lagrangian multipliers µ+i and µ
−
i are nonnegative, and λ is un-
restricted. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions ∀i ∈ I
are ∑
h∈H
l(h)
∂ci(αil(h))
∂Pi
− λ+ µ+i − µ−i = 0, (3.14)
µ+i
(
αi −min
{
1,
Pmax,i
lmax
})
= 0 (3.15)
µ−i αi = 0 (3.16)
From the slackness conditions (3.15)-(3.16), if 0 < α∗i < min
{
1,
Pmax,i
lmax
}
then
µ+ ∗i = µ
− ∗
i = 0. From Equation (3.14), the Lagrangian multiplier λ
∗ is
equal to
∑
h∈H l(h)
∂ci(α
∗
i l(h))
∂Pi
. Given the convex structure of the problem, if
the centralized dispatch has a solution it is possible to find a price that will
support the efficient outcome. Let p∗tranche be the competitive price associated
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with the tranche-based contract. Assuming price-taking behavior, supplier i
faces the problem of maximizing his profits,
max
αi
[
∑
i∈I,h∈H
p∗trancheαil(h)−
∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci(αil(h))]
s.t 0 ≤ αi ≤ min
{
1,
Pmax,i
lmax
} (3.17)
The Lagrangian of this problem is given by
L(αi, λ, µ+i , µ−i ) =
∑
h∈H
p∗trancheαil(h)−
∑
h∈H
ci(l(h)αi) (3.18)
+µ+i
(
αi −min
{
1,
Pmax,i
lmax
})
− µ−i αi
Writing the KKT conditions,
−
∑
h∈H
l(h)
∂ci(αil(h))
∂Pi
+ p∗tranche
∑
h∈H
l(h) + µ+i − µ−i = 0 (3.19)
µ+i
(
αi −min
{
1,
Pmax,i
lmax
})
= 0 (3.20)
µ−i αi = 0 (3.21)
Using Equation (3.19), the competitive equilibrium price is obtained and
defined as
p∗tranche =
∑
h∈H l(h)
∂ci(α
∗
i l(h))
∂Pi∑
h∈H l(h)
(3.22)
where i is any generator such that 0 < P ∗i (h) = α
∗
i l(h) < Pmax,i ∀ h, i.e.,
µ+ ∗i = µ
− ∗
i = 0 as the constraints are non-binding. In addition, comparing
Equations (3.14) and (3.19), the following relation between λ∗ and p∗tranche is
obtained:
p∗tranche =
λ∗∑
h∈H l(h)
(3.23)
Our interest is to compare the tranche equilibrium price with the results of
the economic dispatch problem. The prices associated with the economic
dispatch are used as a proxy for electricity market prices—as in the case
of implementing a spot-market dispatched at minimum cost. Certainly, in
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this case, given that it is assumed that the load is supplied by the tranche-
based products, there is no consideration of any type of interaction between a
market for tranche-based contracts and a spot market for energy. The main
objective of the comparison is to assess the effectiveness of tranche-based
products to provide energy supply, and to assess the competitive prices in
relation to those of a standard electricity market. A future research avenue
certainly could be precisely to consider the interaction between those markets
and study related strategic issues. In order to make a clear comparison, define
P ei,h as the power delivered by supplier i at time h in the economic dispatch
context, which may not be equal to Pi,h—supplier allocation in the tranche
dispatch context. The centralized economic dispatch is defined as follows.
Centralized economic dispatch
min
P ei,h
∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci(P
e
i,h)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
P ei,h = l(h), ∀h ∈ H
0 ≤ P ei,h ≤ Pmax,i, ∀i ∈ I,∀h ∈ H
(3.24)
In order to gain insight into the optimal solution of the problem, consider its
Lagrangian function
L(P ei,h, λh, µ+i,h, µ−i,h) =
∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci(P
e
i,h) +
∑
h∈H
λh
(
l(h)−
∑
i∈I
P ei,h
)
(3.25)
+
∑
i∈I,h∈H
µ+i,h
(
P ei,h − Pmax,i
)
−
∑
i∈I,h∈H
µ−i,hP
e
i,h
where the multipliers µ+i,h and µ
−
i,h are nonnegative, and λh are unrestricted.
The KKT optimality conditions ∀i ∈ I,∀h ∈ H are
∂ci(P
e
i,h)
∂P ei,h
− λh + µ+i,h − µ−i,h = 0, (3.26)
µ+i,h
(
P ei,h − Pmax,i
)
= 0 (3.27)
µ−i,hP
e
i,h = 0 (3.28)
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When the power limit constraints are non-binding, µ+ ∗i,h = µ
− ∗
i,h = 0 ∀i ∈
I,∀h ∈ H. Therefore, the Lagrangian multipliers λ∗h are equal to
∂ci(P
e
i,h)
∂P ei,h
∀h ∈
H. The solution of this problem provides, for each hour h, the well-known
marginal cost condition. The cheapest units will be loaded to their maximum
power, while those units operating within their power limits will be loaded
in such a way that they have the same marginal cost. The competitive price
for each hour, p∗h, is given by the marginal cost of the last dispatched unit,
p∗h =
∂ci(P
e ∗
i,h )
∂P ei,h
(3.29)
where i is any generator such that 0 < P e ∗i,h < Pmax,i.
In order to understand how the tranche-based product prices p∗tranche are
related to the benchmark prices p∗h, we focus on the structure of these prob-
lems. In particular, the economic-dispatch problem for the peak-hour has
a very similar structure to the centralized tranche dispatch problem. The
economic-dispatch problem for the peak-hour is given by,
min
P ei,hpeak
∑
i∈I
ci(P
e
i,hpeak
)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
P ei,hpeak = lmax,
0 ≤ P ei,hpeak ≤ Pmax,i, ∀i ∈ I
(3.30)
By writing P ei,hpeak = κilmax, the problem for the peak-hour can be written as
min
κi
∑
i∈I
ci(κilmax)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
κi = 1,
0 ≤ κi ≤ Pmax,i
lmax
, ∀i ∈ I.
(3.31)
which reads similar to the centralized tranche problem, with the only dif-
ference that in the former problem the objective function spans over all the
hours. When cost functions ci(·) are monotonically increasing and its deriva-
tives are non-decreasing, it is straightforward to prove that:
a. Centralized tranche and economic dispatch optimal solutions are related
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by
α∗i =
P e ∗i,hpeak
lmax
∀i ∈ I (3.32)
b. Centralized tranche and economic dispatch total costs are bounded by∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci(P
e ∗
i,h ) ≤
∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci(α
∗
i l(h)) (3.33)
c. Competitive prices for tranche and economic dispatch are bounded by∑
h∈H p
∗
h
H
≤ p∗tranche ≤ p∗hpeak (3.34)
Stricter bounds will depend on the specific form of the cost functions, e.g.,
linear or quadratic, and the level of similarity among suppliers.
Proposition 1 The optimal tranche-based allocations α∗i are related to the
dispatch of the peak hour κ∗i =
Pi,hpeak
lmax
by
α∗i = κ
∗
i =
P ∗i,hpeak
lmax
∀i (3.35)
Proof It is straightforward to prove that the set of κi that solves (3.31) also
is the optimal solution of the centralized tranche problem (3.12). Using the
assumption that the cost functions ci(x) are monotonically increasing, we
obtain ∑
i∈I
ci(κ
∗
i lmax) ≤
∑
i∈I
ci(κilmax) ∀κi
⇒
∑
i∈I
κ∗i lmax ≤
∑
i∈I
κilmax ∀κi
⇒ κ∗i ≤ κi ∀i, κi
⇒ κ∗i l(h) ≤ κil(h) ∀h, i, κi
⇒
∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci(κ
∗
i l(h)) ≤
∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci(κil(h)); ∀κi
(3.36)
Consequently, κ∗i is also a solution of (3.12). Hence, the centralized tranche
allocation is just settled by the dispatch of the peak-hour. In other words,
α∗i = κ
∗
i =
P ∗i,hpeak
lmax
∀i (3.37)
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uunionsq
Proposition 2 The total cost associated to the tranche-based products is
lower-bounded by the economic dispatch cost,∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci(P
e
i,h
∗) ≤
∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci(α
∗
i l(h)) (3.38)
Proof Note that in the centralized tranche dispatch, the optimal power sup-
plied by generator i at time h, P ∗i,h, is a fraction of its optimal power offered
at the peak hour, P ∗i,hpeak . In other words,
P ∗i,h = α
∗
i l(h) = P
∗
i,h peak
l(h)
lmax
(3.39)
Consider an inexpensive unit j which has to be used to its maximum power
at any hour under an economic criterion. As shown before, the centralized
tranche problem will assign P ∗j,h peak = Pj max at the peak hour but it will also
assign Pj,h = Pj max
l(h)
lmax
at any other hour. Therefore, as Pj,h 6= Pj max for
the non-peak hours, we move away from the optimal solution of the dispatch
problem. Therefore,∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci(α
∗
i l(h)) =
∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci
(
P ∗i,h
) ≥ ∑
i∈I,h∈H
ci(P
e
i,h
∗) (3.40)
uunionsq
Proposition 3 The tranche price is upper-bounded by the marginal price of
the economic dispatch at the peak hour,
p∗tranche ≤ p∗hpeak (3.41)
Proof Consider that
∂ci(α
∗
i l(h))
∂Pi
≤ p∗hpeak , ∀ h (3.42)
and therefore∑
h∈H l(h)
∂ci(αil(h))
∂Pi∑
h∈H l(h)
= p∗tranche ≤
∑
h∈H l(h)p
∗
hpeak∑
h∈H l(h)
= p∗hpeak (3.43)
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uunionsq
Proposition 4 The tranche price is lower-bounded by the average of the
hourly marginal price of the economic dispatch∑
h∈H p
∗
h
H
< p∗tranche (3.44)
Proof First of all, we establish a lower bound relating tranche prices with
the economic dispatch ones,∑
h∈H l(h)p
∗
h∑
h∈H l(h)
<
∑
h∈H l(h)
∂ci(αil(h))
∂Pi∑
h∈H l(h)
(3.45)
Consider that the marginal supplier of the tranche problem is the supplier i.
For all h where l(h) < lmax the supplier i will reduce its power by αi[lmax −
l(h)]. Consequently, the power in hour h will be given, as expected, by
P ∗i,h = P
∗
i,hpeak
− α∗i [lmax − l(h)] = α∗i l(h) (3.46)
In the economic dispatch context, the supplier i is the marginal supplier at
the peak hour generating a power equal to P e ∗i,hpeak = P
∗
i,hpeak
= α∗i lmax. For
any other hour h, two cases are possible:
• The supplier is still the marginal supplier. In this case, supplier i
reduces its power by lmax−l(h) at hour h and therefore P e ∗i,h = P ∗i,hpeak−
(lmax−l(h)) < P ∗i,hpeak−α∗i (lmax−l(h)) = P ∗i,h = α∗i l(h) ∀ h. Considering
that marginal cost functions are non-decreasing, then p∗h =
∂ci(P
e ∗
i,h )
∂P ei
<
∂ci(α
∗
i l(h))
∂Pi
holds.
• The supplier is no longer providing power. In this case, as supplier i is
ruled out, there must be a supplier j with a lower marginal cost than
supplier i such that p∗h =
∂cj(P
e ∗
j,h )
∂P ej
<
∂ci(α
∗
i l(h))
∂Pi
holds.
By using the previous result for all hours, it is clear that Equation (3.45) is
satisfied. In order to prove the original proposition, we focus on the following
bound for the economic dispatch problem:∑
h∈H p
∗
h
H
<
∑
h∈H l(h)p
∗
h∑
h∈H l(h)
(3.47)
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This relationship is easily proved by considering that marginal cost functions
are non-decreasing with respect to the load levels. Both the left and right
sides of expression (3.47) are of the form∑
h∈H
ηhp
∗
h (3.48)
with
∑
h∈H ηh = 1. On the left side the coefficients are given by κh =
1
H
,
and on the right side by τh =
l(h)∑
h∈H l(h)
. If for a particular hour h = i,
κi ≥ τi, then necessarily in order to respect the constraint
∑
h∈H τh = 1,
κj ≤ τj for any other hour h = j 6= i. Given that τj ≥ τi, it is clear that
l(j) ≥ l(i). By using the monotonicity of the marginal costs, it is obtained
that p∗j ≥ p∗i . Hence, hours with higher loads and higher prices are weighted
more and so expression (3.47) follows. By combining (3.47) and (3.45) the
original proposition is proved. uunionsq
3.4.2 Linear Cost Function Case
In the particular case of linear cost functions given by ci(x) = βix, a clear
tranche-price bound can be found. In this case the solution of the centralized
tranche problem is characterized by a marginal supplier, i = m, for which
µ+m = µ
−
m = 0, αm ∈ [0,min{1, Pmax,ilmax }]. By the complementary slackness
conditions we also know that
βi < βm ⇒ αi = min
{
1,
Pmax,i
lmax
}
, (3.49)
βi > βm ⇒ αi = 0
In this case, the tranche equilibrium price is given by
p∗tranche = βm (3.50)
It is interesting to note that, in the linear case, the economic-dispatch
problem of the ‘peak-hour’ has the same form, except for a scaling factor
given by
∑
h∈H l(h), as the tranche-dispatch problem. Hence, it is clear that
the competitive tranche-base price will be equal to the maximum hourly price
58
of the economic dispatch problem,
p∗tranche = max{ph} (3.51)
In this simple linear case, the bound (3.51) is telling us that the tranche
competitive price is always the maximum of the benchmark prices over the
period. Under mild conditions, similar bounds are illustrated in the numer-
ical exercise of the next section for a more general cost function structure.
This is just a consequence of the structural feature of the tranche-based
product of providing a fixed-percentage of the load.
Certainly, these high prices are even more likely to happen once uncertainty
is considered and additional risk premiums are expected. For example, as
Figure 3.1 illustrates, in the Illinois process all the products were above
market prices more than 85% of the time. However, the riskier products
were above market prices 90% or 97% of the time.
3.4.3 Quadratic Cost Function Case
We illustrate the type of bounds that could emerge in tranche-based markets
using a simple 5-generator test system. Consider a time horizon of 168 hours.
Cost functions have the quadratic form ci(x) = aix + bix
2 and the system
data is shown in Table 3.1. A typical load pattern is considered over the time
horizon of study. Using a price duration curve, a comparison of the optimal
tranche-contract price and prices associated with the economic dispatch is
shown in Figure 3.9.
Table 3.1: 5-generator system data
Suppliers
Parameters
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5
ai [$/MWh] 0.03 0.66 1.66 5 3.33
bi [$/(MWh)
2] 0.03 0.16 0.66 1.33 3.33
Pmax,i [MW] 400 300 200 100 50
Pmin,i [MW] 0 0 0 0 0
In this particular case, it is interesting to note that the benchmark prices
are below the tranche competitive price about 87% of the time . These results
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Figure 3.9: Price duration curve.
show that tranche product prices, even in the most idealized situation, could
be above benchmark market prices for long time periods. Certainly, these
bounds depend on the technology mix of generators and the load patterns.
In terms of technology mix, the more homogeneous the mix, the closer the
tranche product prices to the average benchmark prices. This is clearly visu-
alized by thinking of the extreme case of having all suppliers with similar costs
and a flat demand. With respect to the load pattern, higher tranche-based
product prices are expected for more variable loads due to the structural flaw
of providing a fixed percentage of the load. A product required to supply
a fixed percentage of the load could result in situations in which the set of
most expensive suppliers are required to provide energy even in the periods
of extremely low load levels, e.g., base-load periods.
3.5 An Alternative Definition:
Energy-Ramping-Blocks Products
The results presented in this work clearly illustrate the importance of defining
appropriate products. We should highlight that this is just a starting point
and our hope is that these results could increase the interest in this exciting
and important topic. Finding a proper product is a highly challenging task
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for the many reasons explained in this work. Moreover, the assessment of
the ultimate level of appropriateness will only be possible once the market is
implemented. However, it is clear that careful analysis and research, aiming
to make the market and the physical systems coexist by defining appropriate
products, will increase the chances of positive outcomes—or at least will
avoid potential bad outcomes.
As an alternative product, we propose one defined by the so-called energy-
ramping-blocks (ERB). This type of product might facilitate the contracting
of energy and the provision of investment signals to achieve an appropriate
technology mix. This product naturally captures some of the features of
different controllable technologies associated with electricity generation
ERB products focus on three load segments—the base, the cycling and
the peaking segments. For each segment, unitary products are defined in
terms of horizontal blocks. The time and capacity of each block are key
parameters in this product definition. In addition to the delivery time, the
three load segments are differentiated by ramping capabilities of the different
technologies. In other words, in order to be able to provide cycling and
peaking segments, some minimum ramping requirements must be satisfied.
In this way, there is no problem about arbitraging between different segments
because the product for each load segment captures some unique features
of different technologies. For example, nuclear units certainly can provide
base-block products, but they cannot participate in the cycling and peaking
segments. A basic set of ERB products is illustrated in Figure 3.10.
ERB products do not carry any capacity and volumetric uncertainty. Hence,
they provide a suitable definition for contracting bulk-power. In addition, the
use of markets based on these products can provide appropriate long-term
signals for the different types of technological attributes required for each
load segment. In addition, the efficiency of the physical operation—thinking
of physical contracts—could be closer to an optimal dispatch.
We do not presume that ERB products are the panacea as they may also
have their limitations. For example, ERB products might not be proper to
deal with generating units with volatile output. Appropriate products for
those technologies must consider some uncertainty in their supply; hence,
interruptible contracts as defined by [58] seem a good starting point to think
about products for uncontrollable units.
61
200
400
600
800
1000
200
400
200
400
250
500
750
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
M
W
M
W
M
W
M
W
h
h
h
h
Load forecast
Auctioned load
Blocks of 
the peaking 
segment
Blocks of 
the cycling 
segment
Base segment
Figure 3.10: ERB product illustration.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, the impact of product definition in electricity markets is
studied. Using a product definition implemented in some U.S. electricity
markets, we reveal several consequences that an improper product definition
can have in the market outcomes in terms of market efficiency, concentration,
uncertainty allocation and clearing prices. We provide several economic rea-
sons along with illustrative examples. Our findings provide guidelines about
the desired attributes of appropriate products. The key challenge is defining
products that can effectively link the markets and their associated physical
systems. To emphasize our findings, we present an alternative product based
on energy-ramping blocks that overcomes some of the critical issues discussed
in this chapter. Our results demonstrate the importance of properly defining
products in electricity markets and provide guidelines for future research.
62
CHAPTER 4
THE VALUE OF VOLATILE RESOURCES
IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS
In this chapter, the impact of volatility on renewable energy sources is in-
vestigated. While renewable resources most certainly provide environmental
benefits, and also help to meet aggressive renewable energy targets, their
deployment may have pronounced impacts on system operations. There is
an acute need to understand these impacts in order to fully harness the
benefits of renewable resource integration. This chapter addresses the in-
tegration of wind energy resources in a multi-settlement electricity market
structure. Analysis is conducted in an idealized competitive equilibrium set-
ting that incorporates both dynamics and uncertainty; closed form expres-
sions are obtained for the supplier and consumer surpluses in this stochastic
model. These formulae reveal that the value of wind generation, under the
current operational and market practices, falls dramatically with volatility.
These findings motivate the need to find resources and to create operational
schemes that address volatility. Moreover, it is argued that current market
structures must be updated to support greater renewable integration. This
chapter is based on [33,36].
4.1 Introduction
Energy security combined with environmental concerns has led regions of
the United States and other countries to adopt renewable portfolio standards
which mandate that a certain percentage of electricity production must come
from renewable resources [59,60]. Among the many renewable energy sources,
wind power is the most attractive for massive deployment due to rapid in-
stallation, low investment costs, and low operational/maintenance costs [61].
These factors coupled with legislative stimulus available for wind installation
projects have resulted in explosive growth in installed wind generation ca-
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Figure 4.1: ISO-NE day-ahead and real-time demand and supply
(Twww.iso-ne.com).
pacity over the last decade [60]. However, its extensive deployment presents
major challenges in system operations due to the inherent characteristics of
wind generation: limited control capabilities, forecasting uncertainty, and
intermittency in the generation outputs [62]. To overcome these challenges
and fully harness the benefits associated with wind resource integration and
deployment, we need to understand the unique characteristics of wind gen-
eration and the overall impact on the power system and market operations.
The operation of a power system and its electricity markets is a challenging
task because of its complexity, the variability and uncertainty in electricity
supply and demand, and a range of physical constraints.
Such complexities are further compounded in a market environment driven
by private interests as well as regulatory policies [63]. These factors coupled
with the interconnectedness of the power system require a coordination pro-
cess to dispatch the supply resources and meet the demand requirements. In
most jurisdictions, an independent entity known as the independent system
operator (ISO) is in charge of this centralized coordination process. The ISO
is responsible for operating the system and its electricity markets in a reli-
able and economic manner. The ISO typically maintains extra generation
capacity online at all times as reserves to ensure that electricity supply is
reliable in spite of uncertainty as well as variability in both demand and sup-
ply. Fig. 4.1 illustrates the reserve policy of ISO New England: Scheduled
generation is roughly 4 GWs greater than the day-ahead forecast throughout
the day.
With low penetration of wind resources, demand and supply exhibit well-
understood patterns, so that the evolution of system and market conditions
are largely predictable. As the deployment of wind resources increases, the
resulting increase in uncertainty will force the ISOs to adjust their operating
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policies to ensure reliability of electricity supply.
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Figure 4.2: Generation and load data from BPA balancing authority – two
weeks in Spring, 2012.
Shown in Fig. 4.2 is the total load as well as the available wind and thermal
generation in the balancing area of Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)
for several days during Spring, 2012.
Demand exhibits variability, but is highly predictable. Thermal generation
capacity also exhibits some variability. Note however that the jumps in
thermal capacity arise from start-up or shut-down of units as a result of the
day-ahead commitment decisions. Hence this variability is also predictable.
The variability in wind generation is much more pronounced, on time-scales
ranging from several minutes to several days.
Deep penetration of wind resources will increase the variability as well as
uncertainty of energy supply. Reliability requirements will then necessitate
the procurement of additional reserves. These impacts of wind generation are
well recognized, and attempts to quantify them have been pursued [64–67].
It is strongly implied in [68–70] that the introduction of wind resources will
require new ways of thinking about market operations. It is argued in [69]
that the allocation of risk and uncertainty associated with wind generation,
regardless of whether it is used as a supply-side resource or a demand-side
resource, is a challenging problem. Analysis of dynamic stochastic models to
address these questions is presented in [30,31,71–73].
The impact of wind generation on the grid and its markets is investigated
in this chapter, focusing on two parameters: penetration and volatility. The
goal is to understand how the low cost of wind generation may be offset
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by the impacts associated with its volatility. The analytical framework is
based on [12, 30, 31], but the model is extended to capture the inter-related
day-ahead and real-time electricity markets.
In the prior work [31], a stochastic control model is introduced that is
intended to model a real-time electricity market under the ideal assumptions
of a competitive equilibrium, but in a dynamic setting. An analogy with
manufacturing systems is exploited to quantify optimal reserves. An exact
expression for the optimal reserves is obtained, whose value grows linearly
with the variance of demand. In this chapter similar conclusions are obtained
when supply is subject to volatility. Consequently, if the currently adopted
‘use all the wind’ policy is utilized, then the volatility introduced into the
grid will create the need for higher reserves.1
Volatility also has negative impact on the market. The competitive equi-
librium for the coupled markets introduced in this chapter admits an exact
analysis. The expected surpluses for the consumers and suppliers are ob-
tained in two scenarios: one in which consumers own the wind generation
resources and one in which suppliers own the resources.
In the economist’s competitive equilibrium model, prices are not impacted
by the decisions of players. This is of course an extreme idealization of reality.
The competitive equilibrium is naive, but it is the standard benchmark in
economic studies. The conclusions of the chapter demonstrate that even
under these ideal conditions, without attention to the physics of the grid,
current market structures will not support high levels of renewable energy.
The numerical experiments presented in Section 4.3 illustrate the critical
role of volatility in determining the value of wind generation under current
operational paradigms. The model introduced in this chapter can be used to
establish thresholds for the coefficient of variation beyond which there is no
value of additional wind generation for consumers and/or suppliers.
However, these results must be understood in a limited context: Nothing
in this chapter implies that we should reduce efforts to harness more renew-
able energy. The framework of this chapter is based on standard economic
analysis, considering the welfare of consumers and suppliers with limited
time-horizons (days or weeks). When longer time-scales are considered (one
or two generations), then the cost of renewable integration is more palatable
1Note that if the ideal competitive equilibrium framework is abandoned, then other
difficulties can emerge - market dynamics can even cause instability [74,75].
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since sustainability and a clean environment are essential for the welfare of
our grandchildren.
Finally, just as in other markets such as computer memory, the costs as-
sociated with renewable generation will drop quickly once there are incen-
tives and markets to create resources that mitigate volatility. Such resources
include both storage and demand response such as batteries, flexible manu-
facturing and demand response in commercial and residential buildings (e.g.
responsive HVAC, water heaters, and pool pumps) which have been explored
in many recent chapters [76,77].
The remainder of the chapter contains three additional sections. Sec-
tion 4.2 provides a description of the multi-settlement electricity market
model and a survey of some of its features. A refinement of this model
that incorporates wind generation is introduced in Section 4.3. This section
contains the derivation of mean surpluses in the competitive equilibrium.
Concluding remarks and suggestions for future research are given in Sec-
tion 4.4.
4.2 Electricity Market Models
In many jurisdictions around the world, electricity is traded using two or more
interrelated markets that constitute the so-called multi-settlement structure.
Although all markets trade in the MWh commodity, they are differentiated
by the time intervals between the trading decisions and the energy delivery,
which range from year(s), month(s), one day, hour(s), to minutes. The mar-
ket model introduced in this chapter is based on a multi-settlement structure,
consisting of a day-ahead market (DAM) and a real-time market (RTM);
this is based on the structure that is commonly adopted by ISOs in the
U.S. today. There are economic and operational reasons for adopting such a
multi-settlement structure.
From an economic point of view, the multi-settlement structure allows
sellers and buyers to hedge against the risk associated with the uncertain real-
time conditions. In addition, some forward markets, which trade energy years
and months in advance, create signals for resource investments, facilitating
the achievement of resource adequacy.
From an operational point of view, the physical constraints on the gen-
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eration units – ramping limitations and start-up constraints – make it im-
possible to support the “just-in-time” electricity production within a market
structure which uses only real-time trading. The clearing of the DAM one
day prior to the actual production and delivery of energy allows the ISO to
schedule generation in such a way that physical constraints are satisfied with
high probability. As supply and demand are not perfectly predictable in the
DAM, the RTM – which is operated minutes ahead of the actual “real time”
– allows fine-tuning of the resource allocation decisions made in the DAM.
The RTM is typically cleared every 5 to 15 minutes, so as to maintain a
continuous balance between supply and demand.
In what follows, the main design elements used in our analysis to represent
the coupling of the DAM and the RTM are presented. While real-world
DAM and RTM clearing operates at discrete decision epochs, we construct
continuous time models to approximate the coupled markets. The models
are constructed in a stochastic setting to capture uncertainty in supply and
demand.
4.2.1 Elements of the Multi-Settlement Model
The multi-settlement market model introduced in this chapter is defined by
a coupling of two markets — day-ahead and real-time.
In today’s markets, some aspects of reliability concerns are addressed
through the use of reserves. Part of the policy to manage reserves is consid-
ered in the clearing of the different markets. That is, each supplier offers a
bundle of energy and capacity which contributes towards meeting demand
and reserve requirements. A reserve process will be critical in the multi-
settlement market model described here.
For each t ≥ 0, the total demand is denoted Dttl(t) = dda(t) + D(t) and
the total on-line capacity is Gttl(t) = gda(t) + G(t), where dda(t) and gda(t)
denote the forecasted demand and supply at time t. Hence, D(t) and G(t)
are the deviations from the forecasted demand and supply, respectively.
The demand and generation capacity are assumed to be aggregates from
many consumers and suppliers, where consumers may be utility companies,
and suppliers generation companies. It is assumed that the transmission grid
has ample capacity — we disregard these potential constraints and other
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locational features of the grid.
The reserve process is defined as the difference of generation capacity and
demand
R(t) , Gttl(t)−Dttl(t) = G(t)−D(t) + rda(t) , t ≥ 0, (4.1)
in which rda(t) = gda(t) − dda(t) represents the forecasted reserves cleared
in the day-ahead market. Throughout this chapter a fixed reserve policy is
adopted for the day-ahead market, similar to what is used by many ISOs,
rda(t) ≡ rda0 is constant. (4.2)
Under the assumptions to be imposed below, the reserves process R forms a
state-process for the optimization problems considered by the consumer and
supplier in the RTM, and the threshold level rda0 is a decision variable for
consumers and suppliers in the DAM.
The operational models used in this chapter are an adaptation of the dy-
namic models of [31]. The stochastic model considered in [30,31] consists of
the following components:
(i) Volatility : The deviation in demand D is modeled as Brownian motion:
D is a driftless Brownian motion with instantaneous variance σ2.
(ii) Ramp Constraints : Since generation cannot increase instantaneously,
there exists ζ ∈ (0,∞) such that
G(t′)−G(t)
t′ − t ≤ ζ , for all t ≥ 0, and t
′ > t. (4.3)
No corresponding lower bound is imposed.
Under these assumptions, the reserve process can be viewed as a controlled
stochastic system, which is written as the SDE,
dR(t) = ζdt− dI(t)− dD(t) (4.4)
where I is non-decreasing. That is, dG(t) = ζdt − dI(t) models the upper
bound (4.3) on the rate of increase in generation. The Brownian motion
assumption allows for closed-form expressions for mean welfare of consumers
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and suppliers in a competitive equilibrium. The existence of a competitive
equilibrium, and some structural properties similar to what is found here, can
be established under much more general assumptions on statistics, dynamics,
and costs [12,78].
4.2.2 Competitive Equilibrium Framework
The market analysis in this chapter is immersed in the competitive equi-
librium framework. We perform a backwards analysis, starting from the
characterization of the real-time market model of [31] and then the coupling
with the day-ahead market. In this way, the multi-settlement case is reduced
to a variant of the RTM model of [31].
Real-time Market Model The market analysis in [31] is based on the
physical model described above, along with the following assumptions on
costs, utility, and prices:
(i) Cost : The production technology of the supplier is subject to a production
cost c(G(t)) for the production capacity G(t) made available at time t ≥ 0.
The cost is a linear function of G(t), of the form cG(t) for some constant
c > 0.
(ii) Value of power : For each unit of energy delivered, the consumer obtains v
units of utility. Thus, the utility of power to the consumer is vmin(D(t), G(t)).
(iii) Disutility from power loss : If the demand is not met (R(t) < 0), the con-
sumer suffers utility loss cbo|R(t)| for some cbo > 0.
(iv) Perfect competition: The price of power P (t) in the RTM is assumed to be
exogenous – it is independent of the decisions of the market players. The
consumers and suppliers each observe the price process.
(v) Myopic consumer : The consumer is myopic in the sense that their internal
consumption preferences are not subject to the ramping constraints (4.3).
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The objectives of the consumer and the supplier are specified by the re-
spective welfare functions,
WS(t) := P (t)G(t)− cG(t)
WD(t) := vmin(D(t), G(t))
− cbo max(0,−R(t))− P (t)G(t)
(4.5)
It is assumed that the consumer and supplier each optimize the discounted
mean-welfare,
KS := E
[∫
e−γtWS(t) dt
]
,
KD := E
[∫
e−γtWD(t) dt
] (4.6)
where γ > 0 is the discount rate.
In order to characterize the competitive equilibrium, we first focus on
the solution of the social planner’s problem (SPP) as defined in standard
economics texts. The SPP is described as the maximization of the discounted
mean of the total welfare,
K = E
[∫
e−γt
(WS(t) +WD(t)) dt] .
The optimal solution is obtained in [31], following [79], defined so that the
resulting reserve process is a reflected Brownian motion (RBM) on the half-
line (−∞, r¯∗], with
r¯∗ =
1
θ+
log
(
v + cbo
c
)
(4.7)
where θ+ is the positive solution to the quadratic equation
1
2
σ2θ2−ζθ−γ = 0.
For γ ∼ 0 we have θ+ ≈ 2ζ/σ2 + γ/ζ. It is also shown in [31] that the
solution to the average cost case is obtained as the limit of the discount-cost
solution, as γ ↓ 0, which results in θ+ = 2ζ/σ2.
From (4.7), it can be appreciated that in a system with volatile demand
and ramping-constrained supply, the optimal reserve threshold is directly
proportional to the demand variance σ2, and inversely proportional to the
ramping rate ζ.
Fig. 4.3 shows plots of the optimal total welfareK∗ for ζ = 0.1, 100, 200, 300, 500
and various values of σ. The discount fact was γ = 1/12, the model was ini-
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Figure 4.3: Social planner’s welfare as a function of standard deviation σ,
and maximal ramp-rate ζ.
tialized with R(0) = r¯∗, and the cost parameters are given in Section 4.3.4
(see eq. (4.44)). As expected, the welfare decays rapidly with decreased
ramping rate ζ or increased volatility.
The model of Cho and Meyn [31] does not take into account volatility from
supply, and there is no consideration of the coupled markets. Fig. 4.2 makes
clear the need for considering the volatility from both supply and demand
if resources such as wind are included. The corresponding extensions to the
RTM model to capture these features are discussed in Section 4.3.
A closed form solution for the unique real-time market equilibrium is ob-
tained in [31]. It is shown that the price of power can be expressed as a static
function of the optimal reserves Re(t) obtained in the SPP. The equilibrium
price functional is a piecewise constant function of the equilibrium reserve
process,
pe(re) = (v + cbo)I{re < 0} (4.8)
The sum v+ cbo is in fact the maximum price the consumer is willing to pay,
often called the choke-up price.
multi-settlement Market Model The market model is based on the
welfare functions for consumers and suppliers.
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Definition 1 The total welfare for consumers are given by, respectively,
W ttlD (t) := vmin(Dttl(t), Gttl(t))− cbo max(0,−R(t))
−P e(t)G(t)− pda(t)gda(t) (4.9)
W ttlS (t) := P (t)G(t)− cG(t) + pda(t)gda(t)
−cdagda(t) (4.10)
where P e(t) is the market clearing price in the RTM and pda(t) is the DAM
price.
The two welfare functions can be decomposed in terms of real-time and
day-ahead welfare components.
Proposition 5 The total consumer welfare can be expressed as
W ttlD (t) =WD(t)+{
(v − pda(t))dda(t) + (P e(t)− pda(t))rda0
} (4.11)
where WD(t) is given in (6.1).
Proof The total consumer welfare expression can be transformed as
W ttlD (t):=vmin(Dttl(t), Gttl(t))− cbo max(0,−R(t))
− P e(t)G(t)− pda(t)gda(t),
=vmin(D(t) + dda(t), G(t) + gda(t))− cbo max(0,−R(t))
− P e(t)(R(t) +D(t)− rda0 )− pda(t)gda(t),
=vmin(D(t) + dda(t), G(t) + gda(t)− dda(t) + dda(t))
− cbo max(0,−R(t))− P e(t)(R(t) +D(t))
+ P e(t)rda0 − pda(t)gda(t),
=vmin(D(t), R(t) +D(t)) + vdda(t)
− cbo max(0,−R(t))− P e(t)(R(t) +D(t))
+ P e(t)rda0 − pda(t)(rda(t) + dda(t)),
Recalling the definition of WD(t) in (6.1), routine calculations give (4.11).
The terms in brackets in (4.11) are beyond the control of the consumers or
suppliers in the RTM. We now focus on finding the expectation of welfare
for consumers, based on the following average prices:
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Definition 2 (i) The average price in the DAM is denoted
pda = γ
∫ ∞
0
pda(t) e−γt dt
(ii) The average price in the RTM is the function of the initial reserves,
pe(r) := γ
∫ ∞
0
E
[
P e(t) | Re(0) = r]e−γt dt
In [31], pe(r) is shown to be a non-increasing function of r, satisfying crt ≤
pe(r) ≤ v + cbo for each r ∈ (−∞, r¯∗], and pe(r¯∗) = minr pe(r) = crt.
Proposition 6 The total discounted mean welfare for consumers is given by
KttlD =KD(r)
+ γ−1r(pe(r)− pda) +
∫ ∞
0
(v − pda(t))dda(t) e−γt dt
(4.12)
Proof The following is obtained by taking expectations of each side of (4.11),
KttlD =KD
+
∫ ∞
0
E
[
(v − pda(t))dda(t) + (P e(t)− pda(t))rda0
]
e−γt dt
The convention that the reserves in the DAM are constant will help to sim-
plify this expression.
Using Def. 2, the total discounted mean welfare is simplified to
KttlD =K
D
+
∫ ∞
0
{
(v − pda(t))dda(t) + (pe(r)− pda(t))rda0
}
e−γt dt
Substituting the expression rda0 = R(0) = r and using Def. 2 gives (4.12).
The three terms on the right-hand side of (4.12) are interpreted as follows:
KD(r) is the real-time market welfare. The second term, γ
−1r(pe(r) − pda),
couples the DAM and RTM, avoiding double-payments for reserves already
settled in the day-ahead market. The third term is the day-ahead welfare
due to energy settlements.
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For the case of the supplier, similar steps are followed. Recall that the
supplier welfare was introduced in Def. 1.
Proposition 7 The total supplier welfare can be decomposed in terms of
real-time and day-ahead welfare expressions,
W ttlS (t) =WS(t) + rda0 (pda(t)− P (t)) + dda(t)(pda(t)− c) (4.13)
where WS(t) is given in (6.1).
Proof Replacing rda(t) = rda0 in (4.1), and recalling the welfare definition
(4.10), gives
W ttlS (t):=P (t)(R(t) +D(t)− rda0 )− c(R(t) +D(t)− rda0 )
+ pda(t)gda(t)− cdagda(t),
=P (t)(R(t) +D(t))− c(R(t) +D(t))
− rda0 (P (t)− c) + pda(t)gda(t)− cdagda(t)
=WS(t)− rda0 (P (t)− c) + rda0 (pda(t)− cda)
+ dda(t)(pda(t)− cda)
(4.14)
As a single technology is assumed, cda = c. Hence, the supplier’s welfare
simplifies to
W ttlS (t) =WS(t) + rda0 (pda(t)− P (t)) + dda(t)(pda(t)− c) (4.15)
Following similar arguments as in the consumer’s case, it is possible to find
the total expected supplier welfare. The proof is omitted, since it follows the
same steps used in the proof of Prop 6.
Proposition 8 The total discounted mean welfare for suppliers is given by
KttlS =KS(r)
+ (pda − pe(r))γ−1r +
∫ ∞
0
(
pda(t)− c)dda(t) e−γt dt . (4.16)
The terms in the welfare expression (4.16) are interpreted as follows: The
first is the real-time welfare. As in the supplier’s case, (pda−pe(r))γ−1r avoids
75
the double-payments of the reserves settled in the day-ahead market. The
last term is the day-ahead welfare due to energy settlements.
Competitive Equilibrium of the Coupled Market We begin by
constructing the solution of the SPP problem, and from this the equilibrium
prices are obtained in the coupled market.
Expressions for the welfare of the suppliers and consumers in the coupled
market are obtained in Props. 6 and 8, and based on these results the total
welfare is obtained,
Kttl = K +
∫ ∞
0
(
v − c)dda(t) e−γt dt (4.17)
in which K = KD + KS. Hence, the total welfare for the coupled market
includes the total welfare for the RTM of [31] plus the day-ahead welfare.
Given this expression for the total welfare function, it is possible to solve the
SPP.
Proposition 9 In the coupled market, the optimal day-ahead reserves cor-
respond to the optimal initial reserves of [31], given by:
r¯∗ =
1
θ+
log
(
v + cbo
c
)
. (4.18)
Proof Applying the first order optimality conditions applied to the total
welfare (4.17), it is clear that,
dKttl
dr
= 0⇔ dK
dr
= 0 (4.19)
Proposition 10 In the coupled market, the expected RTM price is equal to
the marginal cost,
pe = c (4.20)
Proof This is a consequence of having, in the coupled market, the same
optimal reserves process as obtained in the Cho and Meyn model [31], which
is defined by the threshold (4.18) (see § 4 of [31] for details).
Based on the foregoing, we can compute the equilibrium day-ahead price
for the coupled market.
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Proposition 11 The expected DAM price is equal to the expected RTM
price,
pda = pe = c (4.21)
Proof The first order optimality conditions to the optimal consumer and
supplier welfare give
0 =
dKttlD
dr
=
dKD
dr
+ γ−1(pe − pda)
0 =
dKttlS
dr
=
dKS
dr
+ γ−1(pda − pe)
With r = r¯∗ it is known that
dKS
dr
=
dKD
dr
= 0
from which it follows that
pda = pe = c (4.22)
The settlement of the expected energy demand, dda(t), in the DAM is an
independent optimization problem. It follows that the equilibrium price for
the linear-cost and single-technology case is given by pda(t) = c. Hence, in
the competitive equilibrium, the average prices of both reserves and energy
in the day-ahead market are equal to the marginal cost of production.
4.3 Who Commands the Wind?
This section explores an extension of the DAM/RTM that differentiates be-
tween the generation of wind and conventional resources. Recall that it is
assumed in this chapter that all the wind generation available is dispatched
and injected into the system. Conventional generators serve the residual de-
mand. Volatility of the wind will result in volatility of this residual demand,
which will result in higher reserves in the dynamic competitive equilibrium.
With low penetration of wind resources, the increase in demand volatility will
be negligible, and hence the impact on the market outcome will not be signif-
icant. Potential negative market outcomes are possible with a combination
of high penetration and high volatility of wind generation.
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To quantify these claims, expressions are derived for the total welfare,
differentiated by who commands the wind resources: the consumer or the
supplier. Closed form expressions for the discounted mean welfare of the
consumer and supplier in each of the two settings are quantified.
Perhaps surprisingly, in the numerical results that follow it is found that
the supplier can achieve significant gains when the consumer commands the
wind. The explanation is that the higher volatility forces the consumer to
pay for higher reserves in the DAM.
This section is concluded with a discussion of some of the key issues, from
a market perspective, for integrating wind power into electricity markets.
4.3.1 Consumers Command the Wind
We first consider a setting in which the wind resources are commanded by
the demand-side. The total wind capacity is denoted GttlW(t) = g
da
W(t)+GW(t).
The consumer surplus at time t is thus given by
W ttlD,W(t) = vmin(Dttl(t), Gttl(t) +GttlW(t))
− cbo max(0,−R(t))− P (t)G(t)− pda(t)gda(t)
As in [69], the resulting market is modeled by interpreting wind generation
as a negative load. The resulting residual demand is denoted by Dnet(t) =
D(t)−GW(t). Expressions for consumer and supplier welfare with respect to
residual demand are obtained as follows:
W ttlD,W(t) = vmin(Dttl(t)−GttlW(t), Dttl(t) +R(t)−GttlW(t))
− cbo max(0,−R(t))
− P (t)(R(t) +D(t)−GW(t)− rda0 )
− pda(t)(dda(t)− gdaW(t) + rda0 ) + vGttlW(t)
= vmin(Dnet(t), R(t) +Dnet(t))
− cbo max(0,−R(t))− P (t)(R(t) +Dnet(t))
+ (v − pda(t))dda(t) + (P (t)− pda(t))rda0
+ pda(t)gdaW(t) + vGW(t)
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Hence the total welfare can be expressed as the sum
W ttlD,W(t) =W rtD,W(t)
+
{
vdda(t)− pda(t)(dda(t)− gdaW(t))
}
+
{
(P (t)− pda(t))rda0 + vGW(t)
} (4.23)
The first term is the real-time welfare expression from [31] for the equivalent
load Dnet; the next term in brackets corresponds to the DAM welfare in which
the welfare gain pda(t)gdaW(t) is due to the ownership of wind generation by
consumers. The final term in brackets contains elements that are beyond the
control of the consumer under the assumptions of this chapter.
For the supplier surplus, the expression is similar to the case without wind:
W ttlS,W(t) =
(
P (t)− crt)G(t) + (pda(t)− cda)gda(t)
=W rtS,W(t) +
(
pda(t)− cda)gda(t) + (pda(t)− P (t))rda0
in whichW rtS,W(t) is the supplier surplus obtained in the RTM for serving the
residual demand Dnet(t).
4.3.2 Suppliers Command the Wind
The alternative in which wind resources are a part of the supply side is
considered now. As in the previous case, it is assumed that all the available
wind generation is dispatched. The total social welfare will be unchanged,
but the distribution between suppliers and consumers will be different. In
particular, there is a shifting of the benefits in the DAM of dispatching wind
from consumers to suppliers. However, in the RTM suppliers face the liability
of injecting volatility into the system, quantified by a term associated with
wind power deviations. From the consumer’s viewpoint, following familiar
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calculations,
W ttlD,W(t) = vmin(Dttl(t), Gttl(t) +GttlW(t))
− cbo max(0,−R(t))
− P (t)(G(t) +GW(t))− pda(t)(gda(t) + gdaW(t))
=W rtD,W(t)
+
{
(v − pda(t))dda + (P (t)− pda(t))rda0
}
+ (v − P (t))GW(t)
In this case, the impact of the wind is captured in the last term. The term
vGW(t), as before, has no impact on the discounted mean welfare expression.
The term −P (t)GW(t) quantifies payments/compensations in the real-time
market related to wind power deviations.
The supplier welfare now includes terms due to wind generation:
W ttlS,W(t) =
(
P (t)− crt)G(t) + P (t)GW(t)
+
(
pda(t)− cda)(gda(t)− gdaW(t)) + pda(t)gdaW(t)
=W rtS,W(t) +
(
pda(t)− cda)(gda(t)− gdaW(t))
+
(
pda(t)− P (t))rda0 + P (t)GW(t) + pda(t)gdaW(t)
(4.24)
Based on this expression it is appreciated that the welfare gain pda(t)gdaW(t),
which in the previous setting was taken by the consumers, is now taken by
the suppliers. In addition, suppliers face the impacts of the wind power
deviations P (t)GW(t).
Each of these expressions is based on the assumption that all available
wind generation will be utilized. Under this assumption, regardless of who
commands the wind, there is always a systemic impact of wind volatility
reflected by the more volatile residual demand. All the terms that can be
impacted by wind volatility, such as real-time prices and optimal reserve lev-
els, are exactly the same no matter who commands the wind. When the wind
resources are commanded by suppliers, the benefits quantified by pda(t)gdaW(t)
go into the suppliers’ pocket. However, in the case in which suppliers com-
mand the wind, the term P (t)GW(t) can create losses for suppliers, and gains
for consumers.
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4.3.3 Computing Welfares
It is possible to find closed form expressions for the mean welfare for the
suppliers and consumers. These expressions are used in the numerical exper-
iments described in the next section.
The real-time mean welfare K∗S and K
∗
D are obtained in closed form by
substituting the price P e(t) into the respective welfare functions defined in
(6.1): For any time t,
E[W∗S (t)] = (v + cbo)
(
E[D(t)I{Re(t) ≤ 0}]
+ E[Re(t)I{Re(t) ≤ 0}])− cE[Re(t)] (4.25)
E[W∗D(t)] = −(v + cbo)
(
E[D(t)I{Re(t) ≤ 0}]) (4.26)
Computations of these value functions are performed based on these repre-
sentations, and on the following expression for the expectation of the welfare
associated with wind deviation:
E[P (t)GW(t)] = (v + c
bo)
(
E[GW(t)I{Re(t) ≤ 0}]
)
(4.27)
Close-form Expressions In this section the formulae for discounted
mean social welfare are derived. We begin with some generalities: X is
a Markov process on a general state space X, with semigroup {P t : t ≥ 0}.
For a given γ > 0, the resolvent is the Laplace transform
Uγ :=
∫ ∞
0
e−γtP t dt (4.28)
We let c : X→ R denote a generic function satisfying Uγ|c| (x) <∞ for each
x. In this case the function h = Uγc has the representation
h(x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
c(X(t)) e−γtdt
]
(4.29)
This is part of our motivation for considering the resolvent. The other mo-
tivation comes from its relationship with the generator.
A function h is in the domain of the extended generator if there exits a
function g such that the process below is a local martingale for each initial
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condition of Φ,
MT := h(ΦT )− h(Φ0)−
∫ T
0
g(Φs) ds, T ≥ 0. (4.30)
We let A denote the extended generator, and denote Af = g when M is a
local martingale (see [80,81]).
Under our assumption that Uγ|c| is finite-valued, the function h = Uγc is
in the domain of the extended generator with
Ah = γh− c. (4.31)
Consequently, the domain of the extended generator includes the range of
the resolvent.
Our goal is to compute solutions to dynamic programming equations of
the form (4.31), when the function c is given. The models of interest are
limited to three special cases:
(i) Φ = R: The reflected Brownian motion (4.4) on this domain, so that
X = (−∞, r¯].
(ii) Φ = (R,D): where R is in (i), and the demand process D also appears in
(4.4). In this case X = (−∞, r¯]× R.
(iii) Φ = (R,GW ): where R is in (i), and the wind deviation process GW also
appears in (4.4) once the demand is replaced by the residual demand. In
this case X = (−∞, r¯]× R.
The following result identifies a large class of functions in the domain of A.
The result is an interpretation of Iˆto’s formula for reflected diffusions [82].
Proposition 12 Suppose that h : (−∞, r¯]→ R is C2 and satisfies h′ (r¯) = 0.
Then h is in the domain of the extended generator, and Ah = Dh, where
Dh = ζh′ + 1
2
σ2h′′. (4.32)
It is often easy to solve the DP equation for D,
ζh′0(r) +
1
2
σ2h′′0(r) = γh0(r)− c(r), (4.33)
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where the function h0 is piecewise C
2. In particular, the functions defined
below satisfy (4.33) with c ≡ 0:
ϕ+(r) = e
−θ+r, ϕ−(r) = e−θ−r (4.34)
where θ− < 0 and θ+ > 0 denote the two roots of the quadratic equation,
1
2
σ2θ2 − ζθ − γ = 0 . (4.35)
These functions are building blocks for the solution of (4.31):
Lemma 1 Suppose that c is a piecewise continuous function, and that h0 is
a piecewise continuous function that is C2 on each of the intervals (−∞, 0]
and (0,∞), satisfying (4.33) for r 6= 0. Then the function h defined below is
in the domain of the extended generator for R, and satisfies (4.31):
h(r) = h0(r) +
a−ϕ−(r) r ≤ 0b−ϕ−(r) + b+ϕ+(r) 0 < r ≤ r¯ (4.36)
where the constants {a−, b−, b+} solve the system of linear equations,
1 −1 −1
θ− −θ− −θ+
0 θ−e−θ−r¯ θ+e−θ+r¯


a−
b−
b+
 =

h0(0+)− h0(0−)
h′0 (0−)− h′0 (0+)
h′0 (r¯)
 (4.37)
Proof The matrix equation (4.37) represents three constraints for the func-
tion h: Continuity at the origin, differentiability at the origin, and finally
the constraint h′ (r¯) = 0. While this function is C1 and not C2, it can be
approximated by C2 functions to establish the local martingale property.
Lemma 1 is the idea behind the proof of [22, Proposition 3.4.13], which
considers the special case in which c is a continuous piecewise linear function.
A special case required in the analysis that follows uses
h0(r) = γ
−1c(r) when c(r) = I{r ≤ 0}. (4.38)
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Solving Dynamic Programming Equations In view of (4.26), to com-
pute the discounted mean welfare functions it is sufficient to solve (4.31) for
the four functions of (r, d) and one function of (r, w),
cW (r, w) = wI{r ≤ 0}
cA(r, d) = dI{r ≤ 0}, cB(r) = rI{r ≤ 0}
cC(r) = I{r ≤ 0}, cR(r) = r
(4.39)
We denote by hW , hA, hB, hC , hR the respective solutions to (4.31). We
then apply (4.25–4.26–4.27) to obtain
K∗S = (v + c
bo)
(
hA + hB
)− chR , K∗D = −(v + cbo)hA ,
E[P (t)GW(t)] = (v + c
bo)hW
(4.40)
The functions {hB, hC} can be computed by a direct application of Lemma 1:
Proposition 13 The function hB0(r) = (γ
−1r+ζγ−2)I{r ≤ 0} solves (4.33)
with c = cB. The function hC0(r) = γ
−1I{r ≤ 0} solves (4.33) with c = cC.
An application of Lemma 1 then gives hB = hB0 + ϕB and hC = hC0 + ϕC ,
where {ϕB, ϕC} are piecewise continuous, and are linear combinations of
{ϕ+, ϕ−} on the two line segments (−∞, 0] and (0, r¯∗].
The function hR is computed in a similar fashion. The proof of Prop 14
follows from Prop 12. The constant k is chosen so that h′R (r¯) = 0.
Proposition 14 hR(r) = γ
−1r+ζγ−2+kϕ−(r), r ≤ r¯, with k = (θ−γϕ−(r¯))−1
Computation of hA and hW is a bit more complex: Let cD = h
′
C (the
derivative of hC), and suppose that hD is in the domain of the extended
generator and solves (4.31) with c = cD. We then have
Proposition 15 hA(r, d) = dhC(r) − σ2hD(r) , hW (r, w) = whC(r) +
σ2whD(r)
The proof of Prop 15 follows from the following lemmas.
Lemma 2 The function H1 defined by H1(r, d) = dhC(r) is in the domain
of the extended generator for the bivariate process (R,D), and satisfies
AH1 (r, d) = γH1(r, d)− cA(r, d)− σ2cD(r) (4.41)
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Lemma 3 The function H2 defined by H2(r, w) = whC(r) is in the domain
of the extended generator for the bivariate process (R,GW ), and satisfies,
AH2 (r, w) = γH2(r, w)− cW (r, w) + σ2W cD(r) (4.42)
Computation of each of the welfare functions is possible once we can com-
pute hD. For this we note that cD can be expressed,
cD(r) =
A−e−θ−r r ≤ 0B−e−θ−r +B+e−θ+r 0 < r ≤ r¯∗ (4.43)
where A−, B−, B+ are constants. Computation of hD then follows from
Lemma 1 combined with the following result:
Lemma 4 Writing c(r) = cD(r), the function h0 given below solves (4.33):
h0(r) =

(θ−σ2 − ζ)−1A−re−θ−r r ≤ 0
(θ−σ2 − ζ)−1B−re−θ−r
+ (θ+σ
2 − ζ)−1B+re−θ+r
0 < r ≤ r¯∗
Proof We apply the product rule Dfg = fDg+gDf+σ2f ′g′, using f(r) = r
and g(r) = e−θr, where θ is any solution to (4.35). This gives
Dfg (r) = rγe−θr + ζe−θr − θσ2e−θr
Consequently, considering the two possibilities for θ, on defining h+ = rϕ+/(θ+σ
2−
ζ), and h− = rϕ−/(θ+σ2 − ζ), we obtain
Dh+ = γh+ − ϕ+ and Dh− = γh− − ϕ−
From the formula (4.43) we conclude that Dh0 = γh0 − cD, with h0 defined
in the lemma.
4.3.4 Numerical Examples
Using the results of the previous section, closed-form expressions for the
discounted mean welfare of the consumer and the supplier are obtained. We
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now provide illustrative examples and discuss our results.
The following set of parameters – expressed in $/MWh – is used in all our
experiments:
cbo = 200, 000, v = 50
cda = crt = 30.
(4.44)
Based on the previous analysis, pda = 30.
The discount factor is γ = 1/12 (corresponding to a 12 hour time horizon),
the ramp rate ζ = 200, the mean demand was taken to be D¯ = 50, 000 MW,
and its standard deviation σ = 500.
The standard deviation of wind σW and wind resource penetration are
treated as variables, but are scaled as follows: The coefficient of variation of
wind and the percentage of wind resource penetration are denoted, respec-
tively, by
cv :=
σW
E[GttlW(t)]
and k = 100
E[GttlW(t)]
D¯
(4.45)
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Figure 4.4: Shown on the left is the optimal reserve level as percentage of
DAM demand for different coefficient of variation cv. The plot on the right
shows the optimal total welfare for different values of cv.
Fig. 4.4 shows the optimal reserves as a percentage of D¯, calculated using
(4.7), with respect to cv and k, and the other parameters held constant. The
value of r¯∗ in the model without wind generation – indicated as k = 0 in the
figure – is approximately 10% of D¯. This value rises quickly with increased
wind penetration or increased variability.
In the following subsections, the impact of wind generation volatility on
the total consumer and supplier welfare under the two different commanding
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schemes is illustrated.
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Figure 4.5: Consumer and supplier welfare when consumer owns wind for
different coefficient of variation cv.
Consumers command the wind Shown in Fig. 4.5 is the consumer
and supplier welfare when the consumers command the wind generation re-
sources. It is seen that the negative impact of wind volatility results in a
decay in welfare with increasing volatility, and the consumer breaks even at
cv ∼ 0.1. Below this threshold value, the consumer sees benefit with addi-
tional wind generation; beyond it, the consumer welfare decreases rapidly.
With high volatility, the consumer is better served by reducing the wind
generation injected into the system.
Remarkably, for the given set of model parameters, the threshold at cv =
0.1 is largely invariant to the level of wind resource penetration.
Suppliers Command the Wind If the suppliers command wind gen-
eration, the welfare expressions are impacted by the wind-deviation term
E[P (t)GW(t)]. In real time, this term is potentially harmful for suppliers. If
GW(t) 0, then it is likely that reserves are negative, so that P (t) = (v+cbo).
This will result in high penalties to the supplier, who is charged the real-time
price for not delivering the power promised in the DAM. This is seen in the
plots of consumer and supplier welfare shown in Fig. 4.6. For low volatility
levels, suppliers see benefit from owning and dispatching power from wind.
Supplier welfare drops quickly for cv > 0.1.
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Figure 4.6: Consumer and supplier welfare when suppliers own wind for
different coefficient of variation cv.
4.3.5 Updating Markets Structures
The results of this chapter show that the value of renewable energy can be
low if it is volatile. Some might argue that this means we should abandon
efforts to increase our renewable energy portfolio, but this is a misreading of
our research.
• The framework of this chapter is based on standard economic analysis.
There are of course many issues to consider beyond the value of con-
sumption, the cost of blackout, and the cost of coal. Moreover, while
the notion of utility used here is standard, it is based on just two parties
– an abstract collection of consumers and of generators. The interests
of society are far broader.
• Traditional sources of energy will be gone in just a few generations.
Optimistic estimates conclude that the natural gas supply in North
America will run out in just 100 years, at its current 20% of total en-
ergy consumption [83]. Moreover, the price of natural gas has dropped
dramatically in recent years. In response, natural gas consumption is
likely to climb to at least 40%, which would drop the time horizon to
50 years.
• Finally, the results of this chapter imply that high levels of renewable
generation can be injected into the grid provided that we also install
technologies that can offset volatility (reduce σ2), or reduce the cost of
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load shedding (cbo in this model). Resources such as storage and de-
mand response, along with today’s regulation technologies, will expand
in the future to meet these goals [76,77,84–86].
Hence it is possible to create a more sustainable energy infrastructure, and it
is necessary if we want energy for our grandchildren. Unfortunately, current
markets for electricity do little to help us move forward.
There are several reasons why innovation has been slow in energy markets.
First, there has been little consideration of the physics of the grid. In par-
ticular, energy cannot be treated as a “commodity” without recognizing the
different values of different forms of generation. Remarkably, current mar-
kets are based on the assumption that one megawatt is as good as another,
imposing uniform prices on generation from all sources. Consequently, in
many of today’s markets there are no incentives for responsive generation
that can ramp quickly, and few incentives for reliability.
A second deficiency in today’s market is that the true costs of generation
are not always considered. There are short-term costs, such as those asso-
ciated with ramping, and long-term costs associated with pollution. For-
tunately these gaps are beginning to receive attention in the systems and
control literature [70,72,87–89].
4.4 Summary
When dynamics and uncertainty are taken into account, social welfare may
fall dramatically as more wind generation is dispatched. The environmental
and sustainability benefits of wind power could be eclipsed due to the cost of
additional reserves, and the adverse impact of volatile prices. These conclu-
sions hold under the most ideal circumstances in which the consumers own
all wind generation resources and, more importantly, the perfect competition
setting in which price manipulation is excluded.
Closed-form formulae show that under the current scheme of dispatch all
the wind, key features of current electricity markets create adverse incentives
to the deployment of volatile resources. When consumers control the wind,
consumer welfare falls and supplier welfare will eventually rise with increases
in either wind penetration or its volatility or both. In the case in which
suppliers control the wind, the penalties in real-time associated with wind
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deviation can have negative impacts on supplier welfare. In either case, the
entity that commands wind resources may suffer.
These facts mean that new technologies and new policies must be created
to mitigate the impact of volatility. There are control challenges, and also
policy challenges: Appropriate incentives and penalties must be introduced
to help improve reliability of the power grid, stimulate innovation in new
technologies, and encourage the participation of new actors in these markets.
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CHAPTER 5
TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE
IMPACT OF RAMPING COSTS IN POWER
MARKETS
The purpose of this chapter is to expose the difficulties of incentivizing re-
sponsive generation in a real-time market setting. In an analysis of a dynamic
electricity market, that includes cost of capacity and ramping of generation,
it is found that
• In a competitive equilibrium, average price may coincide with average
marginal production cost. Hence, the cost of ramping is not captured
by the average prices.
• If a price for ramping is included in the market, then the competitive
equilibrium price is no longer unique. A complete characterization of
possible prices is obtained.
The analysis is based on the solution to what economists call the social plan-
ner’s problem (SPP), which is a stochastic control problem in this dynamic
setting. Numerical experiments expose the structure of the solution to the
SPP, and illustrate the main issues regarding the competitive equilibrium.
These findings underscore the need to find alternative ways to structure elec-
tricity markets.
5.1 Introduction
The Smart Grid vision is expected to change many paradigms in the power
and energy industry. In particular, the implementation of new technolo-
gies and policies will bring new means of interaction between participants—
suppliers, consumers and system operators. Increased deployment of renew-
ables and participation of new players (both consumers and new generation
service providers) will bring many challenges to both engineers and policy
makers.
91
The new technological environment, along with the empirical results of
several decades of implementing electricity markets, are forcing some to re-
consider established paradigms in electricity markets. The elegant market
formalism of Schweppe et al. [14] led many to believe that real-time mar-
kets for energy would be sufficient to create appropriate economic signals
for electricity markets. Empirical evidence over decades combined with re-
cent theory demonstrate that real-time markets have deficiencies on many
grounds. One explanation is that the 30-year-old real-time market paradigm
treats electricity as a commodity, much like bread or natural gas.
This view of electricity ignores engineering realities. The commodity per-
spective does not recognize the many different attributes and services, beyond
energy, that different technologies can provide. Policy makers have started to
recognize these facts, and in response new federal policies have been imple-
mented. One example of a “service” is the ramping of generation to respond
to volatility in the grid. FERC order 755 is designed to ensure that ramping
capabilities are properly compensated [15]. Appropriate market mechanisms
to provide adequate compensation remain a subject of intense debate.
Market design is non-trivial in part because the “product” is not easily
defined. A generator or a battery can provide ancillary service to the grid.
These resources have very different attributes in terms of cost, capacity,
reliability, and bandwidth of service. There are hundreds of other resources
that can provide ancillary service. Do we have a single real-time market
for all? If so, how is the price determined as a function of cost, reliability,
ramping rate, and capacity?
It is a thesis of this work that another difficulty with market design in
the electricity sector is the focus on real-time markets. Distinguishing the
dynamic attributes of generation is difficult in a real-time setting. Moreover,
even in simple markets with just one or two generation classes, it is known
that real-time markets can lead to uncertainty, uncertain dynamics, and high
price volatility [12,74,78]. These theoretical results reflect what is seen today
in electricity markets all over the world. There is no theory to predict better
behavior if we add real-time markets for ancillary services.
Markets for electricity and ancillary service must be based on the costs
and attributes of service providers. From the point of view of the service
provider, important attributes include the following:
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1. Cost and capacity of energy
2. Cost and capacity of ramping
3. Reliability of income
From the point of view of the grid (ISO or utility company):
1. Value of energy
2. Value of ramping
3. Reliability of service
An electricity product is thus a multi-attribute concept, and markets must
take this into account. The precise definition of a product will require ab-
stractions since it is impossible to define exactly “the cost of ramping” or
the “reliability of ramping”.
A starting point is to construct models to obtain insight regarding these
costs and values. Following [89], it is argued that we must first reconsider
the social planner’s problem (SPP) of economics in a dynamic setting, taking
into account the dynamic costs and benefits of the various services. The SPP
is a centralized stochastic control problem, and hence a realistic yet tractable
representation of the physical system is key. The use of stochastic differen-
tial equation models and approximate dynamic programming approaches is a
promising avenue [30,36,86,90]. The next step is defining appropriate prod-
ucts based on the value that different technologies can offer. The last point
is the implementation of market structures and pricing schemes in which the
use of contractual arrangements emerges as a natural alternative [89].
In order to capture the value of different technologies, it is mandatory
to consider the real cost and benefits of producing and consuming power.
This will require moving from the standard use of cost and utility functions
towards the use of cost and utility functionals.
So, instead of having cost and utility functions that are a function of quan-
tities at a given time, the model will be constructed around cost functionals
c[f(.)] or utility functionals u[f(.)] in which the argument is a function in
time, f : [0, T ]→ Rm, where T is the time horizon, and m indicates the num-
ber of technologies in the system; it is assumed that m = 1 in this chapter.
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In addition, functionals are assumed to be of integral form, such as
C[f(t)] =
∫ t
0
{αf(s) + β|f˙(s)|}ds (5.1)
where α and β are non-negative constants.
From the suppliers’ viewpoint, a nuclear unit might have a very small α
and a very large β reflecting the fact that producing energy is cheap, but
ramping it up and down can be costly. Similarly, a peaking unit might have
large α and small β reflecting the fact that once in operation the cost of
ramping up and down is not so high. Many other technological costs can be
represented by appropriate functionals.
From the consumers’ viewpoint, a utility functional can be constructed
to represent many attributes beyond energy. For example, some consumers
might care about the environmental impact of the energy they consume over
a period. In that line, as the results in [36] show, having more volatile
resources might require having an increased number of fast units, or the
deployment of more reserves. So “green” consumers might put some value on
faster units that will make up for the inherent volatility of a “green” system.
Utility functionals can also capture the utility or disutility of flexibility to
consumers. Using the same functional form (5.21), a consumer that requires
little flexibility in consumption might have very small β reflecting the small
value of changing consumption patterns over time. On the other hand, a
consumer that requires more flexibility in consumption might have larger
values of β.
Given functionals that define cost and utility over some time horizon, the
market problem is examined within the context of dynamic competitive equi-
librium theory as in [12, 31]. One conclusion in this prior work is that the
volatility of prices is not necessarily a sign of market failure. Even in the
most idealized competitive equilibrium setting, volatility in prices is a natu-
ral outcome. These results are extended in the present chapter to explicitly
model the costs of both energy and ramping. The main objectives of this
chapter are to
• Understand how prices, in a competitive market setting considering
dynamics and uncertainty, are impacted by ramping costs.
• Investigate the impact of having differentiated prices for capacity and
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ramping.
• Quantify mean values of economics metrics, in particular, prices and
welfares.
In the literature, there is little discussion about the impact of ramping costs
on market structures. In [91], Tanaka studies the impact of ramping costs on
electricity markets, restricted to a deterministic and single-price setting. In
the present chapter, such impacts are investigated from a general perspective
and under broader settings. In particular, following our previous work, we
consider a dynamic electricity market with uncertainty. Additionally, we in-
vestigate multi-pricing schemes—having a single price or differentiated prices
for capacity and ramping. We focus special attention on quantifying mean
values that can provide insights about the appropriateness of real-time mar-
kets. Based on our analytical and numerical findings, the main conclusions
of this chapter include,
• In a competitive equilibrium, price is never marginal cost, but average
price may coincide with average marginal cost. Hence, the cost of
ramping is not captured by the average prices.
• If a price for ramping is included in the market, then the competitive
equilibrium price is no longer unique. A complete characterization of
possible prices is obtained in the chapter.
These results expose the difficulties of incentivizing responsive generation
in a real-time market setting, reinforcing the need to develop alternative
market designs. Other results in this chapter can facilitate the design of
alternative market structures. In particular, the quantification of mean costs
and utilities is valuable information in the design of appropriate contractual
arrangements [89].
This chapter has five additional sections. In Section 5.2, the basic concepts
of competitive equilibrium analysis are presented. Section 5.3 is devoted to
the characterization of competitive prices in a dynamic and deterministic
setting. In Section 5.4, the analysis is extended to a dynamic and stochastic
setting and the main analytical results of the chapter are presented. In
Section 5.5, numerical experiments illustrating the analytical findings are
discussed. Finally, concluding remarks and future avenues for research are
presented in Section 5.6.
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5.2 Competitive Equilibrium Analysis
In this chapter, we focus on integral functionals to capture costs or utility.
For the finite-horizon market model, an example is,
F [f(t)] =
∫ t
0
F(f(s), f˙(s)) ds (5.2)
where F is a real-valued function of two variables. For the case of costs, this
representation captures the costs of capacity and ramping. In order to per-
form a competitive equilibrium analysis, we need to construct an appropriate
social planner’s problem (SPP). Players and basic modeling assumptions are
reviewed in this section.
5.2.1 Models and Players
In order to capture the impact of ramping costs, we extend the queuing model
introduced in [30] for power generation. In this model, there are two players
— consumers and suppliers — and transmission capacity is assumed to be
enough to allocate all the transactions. Given that the impact of ramping
costs is expected to be key in coping with the uncertainty associated with
volatile resources, we focus mainly on the real time operation of the grid.
Consequently, we focus on supplying the deviation of the expected demand.
D = {D(t) : t ≥ 0} denotes the residual demand process.
The capacity of a generator is the maximum amount of power that can
be extracted from the generator at a given time. The respective capacities
of the aggregated of generators at time t are denoted by G(t). The reserve
process at time t is defined by
R(t) = G(t)−D(t), t ≥ 0 . (5.3)
We say that loss-of-load occurs at time t if R(t) < 0.
The objectives of the consumer and the supplier are specified by their
respective welfare functions,
WS(t) := P (t)G(t)− c(G(t))− cR(G˙(t))
WD(t) :=B(G(t))− P (t)G(t)
(5.4)
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in which c(G(t)) and cR(G(t)) represent the costs for capacity and ramping,
respectively, and B(G(t)) represents the utility function for consumers.
It is assumed that the consumer and supplier each optimize either dis-
counted or total mean-welfare,
WS := E
[∫
e−γtWS(t) dt
]
,
WD := E
[∫
e−γtWD(t) dt
] (5.5)
where γ > 0 is the discount rate. In the total welfare case γ = 0.
In order to characterize the competitive equilibrium, we first focus on the
solution of the SPP as defined in standard economics texts. The SPP is
described as the maximization of the social welfare,
W = E
[∫
e−γt
(WS(t) +WD(t)) dt] .
For many of the results presented in this chapter, in terms of competitive
prices, the explicit solution of the SPP is not required. This situation changes
on the numerical experiments in which the solution of the SPP is quantified.
5.2.2 Revisiting Simple Cases
Here we introduce simple cases in order to review terminology and concepts
of competitive equilibrium (CE) theory. These results and examples will
facilitate the transition from standard economic results in a static setting to
the case in which dynamics and uncertainty are considered.
The underlying idea of the CE theory is using prices to achieve a state, the
so-called competitive equilibrium, in which consumers and suppliers agree. In
this analysis two assumptions are crucial:
• Price taking assumption: prices are not impacted by players’ decisions.
• Information symmetry: Information is available to both sellers and
consumers without distinctions.
The equilibrium is assumed to arise from the separate optimization prob-
lems performed by consumers and suppliers. The price P is exogenous and
independent of the decisions of consumers or suppliers.
97
In its simplest form, the problem faced by the consumer is
max
GD
U(GD)− PGD
s.t. GD ∈ XD
(5.6)
in which U(GD) is an abstract utility function for consumers, and XD repre-
sents constraints faced by the consumer.
The supplier maximizes income minus cost,
max
GS
PGS − C(GS)
s.t. GS ∈ XS
(5.7)
in which C(GS) is a cost function, and XS represent supplier constraints.
A competitive equilibrium exists if there exists a price P such that suppliers
and consumers agree, i.e., GD = GS. An equilibrium is called efficient if the
equilibrium solves the following SPP:
max
GD,GS
U(GD)− C(GS)
s.t. GS = GD
GS ∈ XS, GD ∈ XD
(5.8)
The usual pictographic representation of equilibrium points, represented by
the intersection of two curves, is shown in Fig. 5.1. For a model without state
constraints, this is explained as follows: from the consumer’s viewpoint, for
given prices, it is possible to find a demand function GD(P ). This function,
as its name suggests, will represent how many units of GD the consumer
demands for a particular price P . It is clear that the price is the independent
variable. However, it is standard in economics to use the inverse demand
function P (GD). In this representation, price would seem to be the dependent
variable and the quantity the independent variable. However, this is just a
graphical representation. Price is still the independent variable.
Proposition 16 The inverse demand function for consumers is given by the
marginal value,
PD(GD) =
∂U
∂GD
(5.9)
Following a similar reasoning, the supply function GS(P ) will describe how
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many units of GS the supplier can provide for a particular price P . Its inverse
is denoted P (GS), and it is identified in
Proposition 17 The inverse demand function for supplier is given by the
marginal cost,
PS(GS) =
∂C
∂GS
(5.10)
The two propositions follow directly from the first-order conditions of op-
timality. Consequently, they hold only for unconstrained markets. In a
competitive equilibrium, the optimizers agree, G∗S = G
∗
D, and the price must
satisfy P ∗ = PS(G∗S) = PD(G
∗
D); that is, marginal cost coincides with marginal
utility.
[P ]
[G]
P
D (G
D )
P S
(G
S
)
P ∗
G∗D = G
∗
S = G
∗
Figure 5.1: Pictographic representation of the competitive equilibrium.
The graphical representation represented by the intersection of the suppli-
ers and consumers inverse demand functions is only possible in simple cases.
Once dynamic, temporal and other type of constraints are considered, it is
not straightforward to write explicit inverse demand and supply functions.
However, even in those cases, it is possible to find competitive prices. The
impact of hard constraints is examined in the following example.
Impact of ramping constraints In the book chapter [12], the condi-
tions for the existence of the competitive equilibrium are thoroughly studied
. Under those conditions, it is possible to decouple the process of finding the
99
competitive prices and the efficient allocation. The existence of the compet-
itive equilibrium depends on the properties of the centralized problem. As
explained in Theorem 3 of [12], if the centralized problem has a solution and
there is no duality gap, then a competitive equilibrium exists.
In many situations, the construction of inverse demand functions is straight-
forward. This is the result of the fact that usually consumers are not subject
to hard constraints. In these cases, the competitive price will be equal to the
marginal value for consumers evaluated at the centralized problem solution.
Using these ideas, we investigate the impact of ramping constraints on prices.
Consider the competitive equilibrium model in which the utility function
for the consumer is piecewise linear,
U(GD) = vmin(D,GD)− cbo(GD −D)− (5.11)
in which cbo represents the cost of load shedding. In this example the
consumer is not subject to constraints. Hence the inverse demand function
is given by
PD(GD) =
∂U
∂GD
= (v + cbo)I((GD −D) < 0) , GD 6= D (5.12)
If GD = D, then the consumer will accept any price between zero and (c
bo+v).
(v + cbo)
GDD
Figure 5.2: Inverse demand function, simple case.
It is assumed that the supplier’s cost function is linear.
C(GS) = cGS (5.13)
Two cases are considered – the standard setting in which the supplier is
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unconstrained, and a more realistic setting with constraints.
Unconstrained model From the preceding we know that price coincides
with marginal cost,
PS(GS) =
∂C
∂GS
= c (5.14)
The equilibrium is obtained by computing the intersection of supply and
demand curves. This gives GS = GD = D, provided c < (v + c
bo). The
competitive equilibrium is efficient.
(v + cbo)
GDD
c
Figure 5.3: Inverse demand and supply functions unconstrained.
(v + cbo)
GDD
Figure 5.4: Inverse demand function.
Ramping constraints Given that the supplier is subject to ramping con-
straints, it is not possible to find a simple inverse supply function. Hence, in
order to find an expression for the equilibrium prices, we use the existence
results from [12]. Assuming the solution of the SPP exists, the competitive
price will be given by the inverse demand function of consumers evaluated
at the SPP solution,
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P (Gspp) = (v + cbo)I((Gspp −D) < 0) + cI(Gspp = D) (5.15)
Note that price will be equal to marginal cost only if suppliers can ef-
fectively follow demand. In general, either because ramping constraints are
active or demand is uncertain, price will never be equal to marginal cost and
it will show high volatility patterns, taking either 0 or (v + cbo) values.
The message of these examples can be summarized as follows. Once more
reality—constraints and dynamics— is brought into consideration, compet-
itive prices are no longer the intersection of textbook’s inverse supply and
demand curves. Prices still can be calculated, but interesting and many
times undesirable behaviors might emerge, such as extreme price volatility.
In the next section, a deep investigation about the impact of ramping costs
on prices is provided.
5.3 Competitive Prices — Deterministic Case
The remainder of the chapter concerns dynamic models, beginning with a
finite time-horizon setting and deterministic dynamics. Suppliers and con-
sumers are not subject to any physical and temporal constraints. The two
welfare functions are integrals over the time horizon of length T ,
WS :=
∫ T
0
WS(t) dt, WD :=
∫ T
0
WD(t) dt (5.16)
where the integrand will be specified in two different settings, differentiated
by the pricing framework.
In the first case there is a single price for capacity, and in the second there
are two prices: one for capacity, and one for ramping. In the first stage of
analysis it is assumed that the initial condition is specified. This section
concludes with an analysis of the case where initial capacity is a decision
variable for consumers and suppliers. This case leads to an elegant solution
in which average price is precisely average marginal cost.
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5.3.1 One Price
Assume that there is a single price Pˆ (t) associated with the capacityGS(t), GD(t)
at time t. It is assumed in this case that consumer and supplier welfares are
given by
WD(t) :=B(GD(t))− Pˆ (t)GD(t) (5.17)
WS(t) := Pˆ (t)GS(t)− c(GS(t))− cR(G˙S(t)) (5.18)
The social welfare function is the sum
W(t) = B(GD(t))− c(GS(t))− cR(G˙S(t)) (5.19)
The solution of the SPP, denoted Gspp(t), is the optimizer of the following
functional optimization problem:
max
GS,GD
W =
∫ [
B(GD(t))− c(GS(t))− cR(G˙S(t))
]
dt
s.t. GD(t) = GS(t)
(5.20)
This functional optimization problem is similar to the classical variational
problem of finding a function f over a time interval with the aim of mini-
mizing an integral functional,
F [f(t)] =
∫ t
0
F(f(s), f˙(s)) ds (5.21)
An elegant study of the optimality condition for this type of problem is
provided in [92].
Lemma 5 The optimality conditions for an integral functional on f and f˙ ,
over a time interval, are given by the Euler-Lagrange equation
∂F
∂f
− d
dt
(∂F
∂f˙
)
= 0
Along with transversality conditions depending on the boundary conditions
for the end points:
• For fixed initial and final points, no additional conditions are required.
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• For fixed initial but free final point, a transversality condition is re-
quired,
∂F
∂f˙
∣∣∣
t=T
= 0
• For free initial and final points, transversality conditions are required,
∂F
∂f˙
∣∣∣
t=0
=
∂F
∂f˙
∣∣∣
t=T
= 0
Proof These results can be straightforwardly shown by performing admis-
sible variations and setting the differential of F equal to zero,
δF
δf(t)
= 0
Details can be found in Chapter 7 of [92].
Applying Lemma 5, it is possible to find the optimality conditions for the
SPP (5.20),
δW
δG(t)
= 0⇒ ∂W
∂G
− d
dt
(∂W
∂G˙
)
= 0
from which the following is obtained as a condition for optimality,
∂B
∂G
=
∂c
∂G
− ∂
2cR
∂2G˙
G¨(t)
In addition, boundary conditions are required. If the initial condition is fixed,
G(0) = g, a transversality condition is required for optimality at the ending
point,
∂cR
∂G˙
∣∣∣
t=T
= 0
If end-points are free, transversality conditions at both initial and final points
are required,
∂cR
∂G˙
∣∣∣
t=0
=
∂cR
∂G˙
∣∣∣
t=T
= 0
As in the static case, computation of equilibrium prices is based on an
analysis of the optimization problems faced by the players. We begin with
the consumer’s optimization problem:
Proposition 18 The competitive price is given by the marginal utility func-
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tion of the consumer evaluated at the SPP solution,
Pˆ (t) =
∂B
∂G
∣∣∣
G(t)=Gspp
(5.22)
Proof Recall that the consumer is not subject to temporal or spatial con-
straints. The consumer’s optimization problem reduces to a static one for
each time. On differentiating the welfare WD(t) :=B(GD(t))− Pˆ (t)GD(t) in-
troduced in (5.17) with respect to GD(t), the first order optimality conditions
imply that Pˆ (t) = ∂B
∂G
. At the equilibrium GD = G
spp, and the formula is
proved. uunionsq
Ramping costs in the supplier’s optimization complicate analysis, and in
particular rule out the simple marginal-cost representation.
Proposition 19 The competitive price is given by the marginal cost of ca-
pacity minus the time derivative of the marginal cost of ramping, evaluated
at the SPP solution,
Pˆ (t) =
[ ∂c
∂G
− ∂
2cR
∂2G˙
G¨(t)
]∣∣∣
G(t)=Gspp
(5.23)
Proof The optimization problem faced by the supplier is given by
max
GS
WS =
∫ [
Pˆ (t)GS(t)− c(GS(t))− cR(G˙S(t))
]
dt (5.24)
The optimality condition for this problem can also be found by using results
from Lemma 5:
δWS
δGS(t)
= 0⇒ ∂WS
∂GS
− d
dt
(∂WS
∂G˙S
)
= 0 (5.25)
from which it is obtained that
Pˆ (t) =
∂c
∂GS
− ∂
2cR
∂G˙2S
G¨S(t) (5.26)
At the equilibrium GS = G
spp and the formula is proved. uunionsq
Once ramping costs are considered, the equilibrium price is no longer equal
to marginal cost. The price can go above marginal production cost when
G¨(t) < 0, and the price can be negative for some periods of time.
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However, similar to what is seen in dynamic-stochastic models [12,31,78],
the average of prices over the period T are equal to the average marginal
cost of capacity over the period, plus some boundary terms related to the
ramping costs:
Proposition 20 In the deterministic case, average price is equal to the av-
erage marginal cost of capacity plus boundary terms related to ramping cost.
1
T
∫ T
0
Pˆ (t)dt =
1
T
∫ T
0
∂c
∂G
dt+
1
T
(∂cR
∂G˙
∣∣∣
t=0
− ∂cR
∂G˙
∣∣∣
t=T
)
(5.27)
Proof Direct application of the average to price expression (5.23). uunionsq
The boundary terms vanish if the constraint G(0) = g is relaxed. That is,
the average price is exactly the average marginal cost of capacity:
Proposition 21 If the initial condition is free, then the average price is
equal to the average marginal cost of capacity,
1
T
∫ T
0
Pˆ (t)dt =
1
T
∫ T
0
∂c
∂G
dt (5.28)
Proof In the free end-points, in addition to the Euler-Lagrange equation,
the transversality condition becomes
∂cR
∂G˙
∣∣∣
t=0
=
∂cR
∂G˙
∣∣∣
t=T
= 0 (5.29)
As in the previous proof, this implies that the average price is average
marginal cost of capacity. uunionsq
5.3.2 Two Prices
We study now the case in which different prices for both capacity and ramping
are considered. The welfare functions for consumers and suppliers are given
by
WD(t) :=B(G(t))− P1(t)G(t)− P2(t)G˙(t) (5.30)
WS(t) := P1(t)G(t) + P2(t)G˙(t)− c(G(t))− cR(G˙(t)) (5.31)
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Note that the previous section is just a particular case in which P2 ≡ 0. Fol-
lowing the assumptions of the previous case, suppliers and consumers are not
subject to physical or temporal constraints. Hence, the SPP is unchanged,
max
GS,GD
W =
∫ [
B(GD(t))− c(GS(t))− cR(G˙S(t))
]
dt
s.t. GD(t) = GS(t)
(5.32)
In order to find expressions for the competitive prices, as before, the prob-
lems faced by consumers and suppliers are analyzed.
Proposition 22 The competitive prices of capacity and ramping are related
to the value for consumers by the following ordinary differential equation
(ODE):
P1(t)− P˙2(t) = ∂B
∂G
∣∣∣
G(t)=Gspp
(5.33)
Proof The result follows directly by writing the optimality conditions of the
problem faced by the consumer. Unlike the previous case in which the con-
sumer’s optimization problem was reduced to a static one for each time. In
this case, the term P2(t)G˙D(t) creates a time coupling. Hence, the optimality
condition must be obtained by using Lemma 5,
δWD
δG(t)
= 0⇒ ∂WD
∂G
− d
dt
(∂WD
∂G˙
)
= 0 (5.34)
The proposition is proved by doing the explicit calculations,
P1(t)− P˙2(t) = ∂B
∂G
(5.35)
along with the fact that at equilibrium GD(t) = G
spp. uunionsq
A similar result is found by looking at the optimization problem faced by
the supplier problem.
Proposition 23 The competitive prices of capacity and ramping are related
to the supplier’s costs by the ODE,
P1(t)− P˙2(t) =
[ ∂c
∂G
− ∂
2cR
∂G˙
G¨(t)
]∣∣∣
GS(t)=Gspp(t)
(5.36)
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Proof The result also follows by writing the optimality conditions of the
problem faced by the supplier,
δWS
δG(t)
= 0⇒ ∂WS
∂G
− d
dt
(∂WS
∂G˙
)
= 0 (5.37)
Hence,
P1(t)− P˙2(t) = ∂C
∂G
− ∂
2CR
∂G˙
G¨(t) (5.38)
along with the fact that at equilibrium GS(t) = G
spp. uunionsq
An interesting point is the fact that there is a lack of uniqueness on P1(t)
and P2(t). In other words, there are multiples pairs of P1(t) and P2(t) that
provide a competitive equilibrium. This fact might seem strange, but it is
not. Both prices are dependent and a link with the single price of the previous
section can be established.
Proposition 24 P1(t) and P2(t) are related to a single price for capacity,
Pˆ (t), by
P1(t)− P˙2(t) = Pˆ (t) (5.39)
Proof The relationship can be found by working the welfare expressions.
We will focus only on the consumer welfare. Supplier is analogous. The total
consumer welfare is given by
WD =
∫ (
B(G(t))− P1(t)G(t)− P2(t)G˙(t)
)
dt (5.40)
integrating by parts the term P2(t)G˙(t), we obtain
WD =
∫ (
B(G(t))− P1(t)G(t) + P˙2(t)G(t)
)
dt− P2(t)G(t)|T0 (5.41)
Consequently, the welfare functions for suppliers and consumers are then
given by
WD(t) = B(G(t))− (P1(t)− P˙2(t))G(t) (5.42)
WS(t) := (P1(t)− P˙2(t))G(t)− c(G(t))− cR(G˙(t)) (5.43)
with the condition that P2(T )G(T ) = P2(0)G(0).
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Hence, it is clear that prices for capacity and ramping are coupled, and
related to the single price of capacity by
P1(t)− P˙2(t) = Pˆ (t) (5.44)
uunionsq
An intuitive way to understand the lack of uniqueness for P1(t) and P2(t) is
the following. The price of ramping P2(t) could be associated to the Lagrange
multiplier of an additional constraint in the SPP, given by G˙D(t) = G˙S(t).
However this constraint is just a redundant one. The solution for the prob-
lem considering only the GD(t) = GS(t) constraint is also a solution of the
problem with the new constraint G˙D(t) = G˙S(t). Hence, a relationship be-
tween the Lagrange multipliers of the original problem and the new one can
be found.
This lack of uniqueness implies that any pair of prices satisfying (5.36), (5.33)
would provide the same welfares for consumers and suppliers. An illustration
of this situation is developed for the case in which c(x) = cx, cR(x˙) =
1
2
cRx˙
2
and the demand is inelastic. First, the welfare for the single price case is
evaluated,
• Pˆ (t) = c− cRG¨
Hence, supplier welfare in this case is given by,
WS =
∫ [
Pˆ (t)G(t)− cG(t)− 1
2
cRG˙
2
]
dt
WS =
∫ [
(c− cRG¨(t))G(t)− cG(t)− 1
2
cRG˙
2
]
dt
WS =
∫ [
− cRG¨(t)G(t)− 1
2
cRG˙
2
]
dt
(5.45)
Integrating by parts the term
∫ −cRG¨(t)G(t)dt = −cR[G˙G− ∫ G˙2dt],
WS =
1
2
∫
cRG˙
2dt− cRG˙G
∣∣∣T
0
(5.46)
Using the fact that G˙(0) = G˙(T ) = 0, we obtain that the supplier
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welfare is
WS =
1
2
∫
cRG˙
2dt (5.47)
Now, it is possible to find several pairs of appropriate P1 and P2 that will
give the same welfare as with Pˆ (t).
• P1 = c and P2 = cRG˙+K
Hence, the supplier welfare will be given by,
WS =
∫ [
P (t)G(t)+P2(t)G˙−cG(t)−1
2
cRG˙
2
]
dt =
1
2
∫
cRG˙
2dt+K
∫
G˙dt
(5.48)
By comparing with (5.46), it is clear that K is
K =
−cRG˙G
∣∣∣T
0∫
G˙dt
(5.49)
• P1 = 0 and P2 = −ct+ cRG˙+K
WS =
∫ [
(−ct+cRG˙)G˙−cG(t)−1
2
cRG˙
2
]
dt =
1
2
∫
cRG˙
2dt−cTG(T )+K
∫
G˙dt
(5.50)
the result is clear by integrating by parts the term
∫ −ctG˙ = −c[tG−∫
Gdt]. By comparing with 5.46, it is clear that in this case K is
K =
cTG(T )− cRG˙G
∣∣∣T
0∫
G˙dt
(5.51)
5.4 Competitive Prices — Stochastic Case
In this section, we study the competitive equilibrium prices in the case in
which uncertainty in demand is considered. We focus on the case in which
there is a single price. This setting would be appropriate for analyzing a
real-time market in which ramping costs are included. The following welfare
functions are considered:
WD(t) := v(GD(t))− cbo(D(t)−GD(t))− P e(t)GD(t) (5.52)
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WS(t) := P e(t)GS(t)− c(GS(t))− cR(G˙S(t)) (5.53)
in which v(.) and cbo represent the utility and disutility function for con-
sumers, respectively, and c(.) and cR(.) represent capacity and ramping costs
for suppliers. It is assumed that the consumer and supplier each optimize
the total discounted cost,
WS := E
[∫
e−γtWS(t) dt
]
,
WD := E
[∫
e−γtWD(t) dt
] (5.54)
where γ > 0 is the discount rate.
We first establish formulas for P e.
Proposition 25 Suppose that (G∗) is a solution to the SPP that defines a
competitive equilibrium with price process P e. Then,
P e(t) = ∇v (G∗(t)) +∇cbo (D(t)−G∗(t)), t ≥ 0 . (5.55)
Proof In this case we have that WD(t) := v(GD(t)) − cbo(D(t) − GD(t)) −
P e(t)GD(t). The formula follows by writing the optimality conditions for
consumers and using the fact that consumer is not subject to any type of
constraints. In addition, at the competitive equilibrium G∗ = GD. uunionsq
For the case of piece-wise linear utility functions, similar to the case pre-
sented in [31], the price is a function of the social planner’s reserve process.
Proposition 26 For the particular case of piece-wise linear benefit function,
given by vmin(D,G)− cboR∗−, the competitive price is given by,
P e(t) = (v + cbo)I(G∗(t)−D(t) < 0) (5.56)
Proof Direct application of Prop. 25. uunionsq
Unlike [31], in this case, the supplier is not subject to ramping constraints.
Hence, an expression for the equilibrium prices can also be obtained by look-
ing at the supplier’s problem.
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Proposition 27 Suppose that (G∗) is a solution to the SPP that defines a
competitive equilibrium with price process P e. Then,
P e(t) = ∇ c(G∗(t))− eγt d
dt
[
e−γt
∂cR
∂G˙∗
]
t ≥ 0 . (5.57)
Proof The welfare function of the supplier is given byWS(t) :=P e(t)GS(t)−
c(GS(t)) − cR(G˙S(t)). In this case, the supplier is not subject to ramping
constraints. Hence, the optimality conditions for maximizing the supplier
welfare
WS = E[
∫
e−γtWSdt] (5.58)
are given by
δWS
δGS(t)
= 0⇒ ∂WS
∂GS
− d
dt
(∂WS
∂G˙S
)
= 0 (5.59)
along with appropriate boundary conditions depending on whether the initial
condition is fixed. By using (5.59) the expression for the price is obtained.
uunionsq
The expression for equilibrium prices in terms of the cost functions allows
one to quantify explicitly the expected price related to the expected costs.
Proposition 28 In the stochastic case, expected price is equal to the expected
marginal cost of capacity plus boundary terms related to expected ramping
costs.
E
[ ∫
e−γtP e(t)dt
]
= E
[ ∫
e−γt∇c (G∗(t))dt
]
+ E
[∂cR
∂G˙
∣∣
t=0
]
(5.60)
Proof
WS(GS(t), G˙S(t), t) = E[
∫
e−γtWS(GS(t), G˙S(t), t)dt] (5.61)
We perform a perturbation on GS(t) of the functional associated with sup-
pliers welfare by using
GαS (t) = GS(t) + αh(t)
G˙αS (t) = G˙S(t) + αh˙(t)
(5.62)
in which h(t) is an admissible variation.
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Using the fundamental result for optimality conditions,
d
dα
WS(G
∗
S(t) + αh(t), G˙
∗
S(t) + αh˙(t), t)
∣∣∣
α=0
= 0 (5.63)
By (5.61), (5.62) and (5.63) the following is obtained:
d
dα
WS = E
[ ∫
e−γt
d
dα
[
P e(t)(GS(t) + αh(t))− c(GS(t) + αh(t))− cR(G˙S(t) + αh˙(t))
]
dt
]
d
dα
WS = E
[ ∫
e−γt
[
P e(t)h(t)−∇c h(t)− ∂cR
∂G˙
h˙(t)
]
dt
]
d
dα
WS = E
[ ∫
e−γt
[
P e(t)−∇c+ eγt d
dt
(
e−γt
∂cR
∂G˙
)]
h(t)dt
]
− b.t.
(5.64)
Hence,
d
dα
WS
∣∣∣
α
= 0⇒ P e(t) = ∇c (G∗(t))− eγt d
dt
(
e−γt
∂cR
∂G˙
)
(5.65)
plus additional boundary conditions depending on the end-points.
Taking expectations in (5.65), we obtain
E
[ ∫
e−γtP e(t)dt
]
= E
[ ∫
e−γt∇c (G∗(t))dt
]
− E
[ ∫ d
dt
(
e−γt
∂cR
∂G˙
)
dt
]
E
[ ∫
e−γtP e(t)dt
]
= E
[ ∫
e−γt∇c (G∗(t))dt
]
+ E
[∂cR
∂G˙
∣∣∣
t=0
]
(5.66)
uunionsq
As in the deterministic case, for the free-end points case the expected price
is exactly the expected marginal cost of capacity,
Proposition 29 If initial condition is free, then expected price is equal to
the expected marginal capacity cost,
E
[ ∫
e−γtP e(t)dt
]
= E
[ ∫
e−γt∇c (G∗(t))dt
]
(5.67)
Proof The formula is proved by considering the additional transversality
condition required for optimality,
E[
∂cR
∂G˙
∣∣∣
t=0
] = 0
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on (5.60). uunionsq
In the case in which the initial condition is fixed, it is possible to find an
expression for the expected price in terms of the sensitivity to the initial
condition.
Proposition 30 If the initial condition is fixed, then expected price is equal
to expected marginal cost plus a sensitivity term to the initial condition,
E
[∫
e−γtP e(t) dt
]
= E
[∫
e−γt∇c (G∗(t)) dt
]
+ ν∗ (5.68)
in which the initial condition GS(0) = g0 is captured in the Lagrange multi-
plier ν∗.
Proof Consider a Lagrangian relaxation of the suppliers problem, in which
the constraint associated with the initial condition GS(0) = g0 is captured in
the Lagrange multiplier ν. For this we define the Lagrangian,
Ls(GS, ν) = E
[∫
e−γtWS(t) dt
]
− ν[GS(0)− g0] . (5.69)
We perform a feasible perturbation on GS(t) of the Lagrangian by using
GαS (t) = GS(t) + α
G˙αS (t) = G˙S(t)
(5.70)
and we apply the local Lagrange multiplier theorem of [92]. If (G∗) is a
solution of the constrained problem, then
d
dα
Ls(G∗S(t) + α, G˙∗S(t), t)
∣∣∣
α=0
= 0 (5.71)
Calculating d
dα
Ls, we obtain,
d
dα
Ls = E
[ ∫
e−γt
d
dα
[
P e(t)(GS(t) + α)− c(GS(t) + α)− cR(G˙S(t))
]
dt
]
− d
dα
ν∗[GS(0) + α− g0]
d
dα
Ls = E
[ ∫
e−γt
[
P e(t)−∇c
]
dt
]
− ν∗
(5.72)
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from which
E
[∫
e−γtP e(t) dt
]
= E
[∫
e−γt∇c (G∗(t)) dt
]
+ ν∗ . (5.73)
uunionsq
5.5 Numerical Illustrations
Following the same structure of Section 5.4, numerical illustrations for the de-
terministic and stochastic cases are presented. These numerical illustrations
will help to visualize the impact of ramping costs on competitive prices. In
the deterministic case, the impact of the ramping cost on the prices is the de-
viation from the marginal cost of capacity. The level of deviation will depend
on both the ramping costs and the trajectory of supply. In the stochastic
case, prices are going to be equal to the marginal value for consumers.
One of the most interesting features of these prices is that, in average terms,
the impacts of ramping costs are mild or even negligible. Consequently, the
validity of these prices to provide appropriate compensations to suppliers and
to work as signals for investment becomes questionable.
5.5.1 Deterministic Case
The first experiment is in a deterministic context. We focus on the case in
which demand is inelastic, and no reserves are deployed. It is also assumed
that the end points are fixed. The family of demand trajectories is given by
the quadratic expression,
D(t) = −at2 + aT t (5.74)
in which a is just a parameter used to modify the quadratic shape, and T is
the time length. With this family of demand the price of electricity is given
by
P e(t) = c+ 2acR (5.75)
Two demand trajectories are compared to illustrate the impact of the shape
on the prices, a = 1 and 6. The additional parameters used are c = 200 and
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cR = 50.
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Figure 5.5: Demand and prices for the inelastic demand case, c = 200,
cR = 50
.
The equilibrium prices illustrate the impacts of the additional ramping
costs. Prices are no longer equal to the marginal cost of capacity since they
are impacted by the trajectory of supply. The average price is the marginal
cost of capacity plus some additional terms related to the boundary terms.
5.5.2 Stochastic Case
We now move into a stochastic setting in which uncertainty from demand is
considered. For the purposes of these experiments, a simple cost structure is
imposed:
Constant marginal benefits for consumption of energy: The
benefit of consumption of energy is given by vmin(D,G).
Constant marginal production cost: cg represents the marginal costs
for any additional unit of capacity.
Constant marginal loss-of-load value: If there is excess demand for
power, then loss-of-load occurs. The cost of excess demand is given by cbo|r|
when r < 0, where cbo > 0.
In addition, a structure for ramping cost is imposed.
Quadratic ramping cost: The cost of ramping is modeled as a quadratic
function of the instantaneous rate of change of the available capacity cR
2
G˙2(t)
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Hence, the cost function has the following form:
C(t) := cgG(t) + (v + cbo)R−(t) + cR
2
G˙2(t), t ≥ 0 . (5.76)
Using the definition of the reserve process (6.3), it is possible to rewrite the
cost function (6.4) in terms of the reserve process.
C(t):=cg(R(t) +D(t)) + (v + cbo)R−(t) + cR
2
G˙2(t)
cgR(t) + (v + cbo)R−(t) +
cR
2
G˙2(t) + cgD(t)
(cbo + v − cg)R−(t) + cgR+(t) + cR
2
G˙2(t) + cgD(t)
Given the fact that D(t) is exogenous, for terms of optimization the terms
cgD(t) can be dropped off. Hence, the cost in terms of the reserve process
can be written as
C(t) := (cbo + v − cg)R−(t) + cgR+(t) + cR
2
G˙2(t), t ≥ 0 (5.77)
in which R−(t) = max(−R(t), 0) and R+(t) = max(R(t), 0).
The reserve process (6.3) can be interpreted as a special case of a controlled
random walk of the form:
Q(t+ 1) = Q(t)− U(t) + A(t+ 1), t ≥ 0 (5.78)
Assuming that D(t + 1) = D(t) − A(t + 1), it is clear that the dynamics of
the reserve process is given by
R(t+ 1) = R(t) + (G(t+ 1)−G(t))− (D(t+ 1)−D(t)),
R(t+ 1) = R(t) + U(t) + A(t+ 1)
in which U(t) := G(t+ 1)−G(t). Using this definition for the control U(t),
it is possible to write the cost (5.79) as a function of the state R(t) and the
control U(t),
C(x, u) := c(x) + cR
2
u2, t ≥ 0 (5.79)
in which c(x) = (cbo + v − cg)x− + cgx+. This cost function has similarities
to the cost function of speed scaling applications [90], in which the cost
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considers the trade-offs between delay of service and the power consumption
associated with the control u.
Several expected values are computed using standard Monte Carlo esti-
mators. First, we focus on the quantification of expected prices. The state
and action spaces are discretized. The optimal policy is numerically obtained
using a standard value iteration algorithm (VIA) [22]. The price functional
for a particular sample path is given by
P e(t) = (v + cbo)I(R(t) < 0) + (c− cRG¨)I(R(t) = 0) (5.80)
In these experiments, the parameters are given by cbo = 3000, c = v = 50
and cR = 500. The state space is given by {−480∆, ..., 0, ..., 480∆}, in which
∆ = 1/24. The demand process is given by a symmetric distribution around
zero. Such a distribution is constructed by replicating a standard geometric
distribution with parameter 0.93 on the negative demand side. Sample paths
for generation, demand, reserves and prices are presented in Figs. 5.6, 5.7
and 5.8.
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Figure 5.6: Sample paths for generation and demand.
In order to find an estimator of the expected price, 103 sample paths of
104 time steps were considered. The expected price in this case is given by
E[P e(t)] = 45.3618 (5.81)
The next experiment aims to verify that the expected price is mildly or not
impacted at all by ramping costs. Several simulations are performed, quan-
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Figure 5.8: Sample paths for prices.
tifying the expected prices for different values of the ramping cost parameter
cR = [0, ..., 1000], and two values of the capacity marginal cost c = 50, 100.
The results are illustrated in Fig. 5.9.
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Figure 5.9: Prices and ramping costs for different values of c.
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As expected from the analytical results of the previous section, the ex-
pected prices do not reflect the impact of ramping costs: expected prices are
usually close to the marginal cost of capacity c.
Finally, quantification of the impact of ramping costs in suppliers welfare
is investigated. Mean values of the supplier welfare,
WS(t) := P (t)G(t)− c(G(t))− cR(G˙(t)) (5.82)
are numerically evaluated for different values of the ramping cost parameter
cR = [0, ..., 5000]. The capacity marginal cost is set at c = 50. The results
are shown in Fig. 5.10. In general, for higher ramping costs the supplier
welfare decreases. This result is coherent with the fact that prices, do not
properly capture the additional ramping costs.
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Figure 5.10: Supplier welfare and ramping costs.
The main message of these results is the fact that under spot pricing of
electricity, even if ramping costs are considered, suppliers with high ramping
costs might not be properly compensated. This is clear when the relative
welfare respect to the case in which cR = 0 is analyzed. The numerical re-
sults show that the expected welfare for higher values of cR is lower than the
welfare when cR is zero. Hence, a natural question is: Why would suppliers
with ramping costs want to participate in these markets? Suppliers partici-
pating only in the real-time markets, as usually peaking units do, will have
little incentive to stay. These results demonstrate the need to investigate al-
ternative compensation schemes once the real costs of generation along with
dynamics, uncertainty and shared constraints are considered.
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5.6 Summary
The use of spot markets, even with the explicit consideration of ramping
costs, does not guarantee the creation of incentives for investments on ap-
propriate technologies. This conclusion is apparent from the current state of
the power grid, and is reflected in the analysis of the competitive equilibrium
model introduced in this chapter: First, in average terms, competitive prices
do not properly capture the impact of ramping costs. Second, once prices
for power and ramping are considered, there is a lack of uniqueness on the
competitive equilibrium. These analytical results were illustrated through
simulation. Under several scenarios, it is shown that expected prices are
mainly related to marginal capacity costs. Similarly, once the supplier wel-
fare is quantified, taking into account the cost of ramping, it is possible to
appreciate the negative impact of ramping costs.
More realistic consideration of the costs and benefits associated with power
generation may prove to be the appropriate way to incentivize needed re-
sources. However, we challenge the widely adopted paradigm of using spot
market schemes, and in particular, real-time prices as a foundation for mar-
ket design. The grid needs reliable resources for energy and for ramping
service, and innovation that will bring better services that will allow greater
adoption of renewable energy. Generators need a reliable source of revenue,
and signals that inform them how to best invest in new technology to in-
crease their revenue. Current research focuses on contract design as a means
to satisfy these goals.
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CHAPTER 6
DIFFERENTIATED ELECTRIC POWER
PRODUCTS
In this chapter, elements of an alternative view for organizing the markets
in a Smart Grid scenario are discussed. The key element is the consider-
ation of electricity as a multi-attribute product associated to contractual
arrangements. The specification of these attributes will first require a clear
understanding of the social planner’s problem (SPP), as defined in standard
economics. Such understanding will facilitate the valuation of the resource
attributes with respect to the fulfillment of societal objectives. The empha-
sis of the chapter is investigating on the SPP for resource allocation, getting
resources appropriately sized in advance. The solution of this problem of-
fers insight, and provides sensible guidelines for how many resources, and
of which type, are required. These viewpoints are illustrated via a detailed
investigation of the system-wide value of operational flexibility, along with
the market implications. A general discussion about the role of contracts
to support multi-attribute products is also included. This chapter is based
on [89].
6.1 Introduction
It is recognized that one of the main challenges of designing electricity mar-
kets is the coexistence of two coupled dynamical systems: a physical system
driven by hard and soft engineering constraints, and a market/financial sys-
tem driven mainly by the self-interests of players. The differences are also
evident in the views and metrics of the two main professional communities:
engineers usually care about reliability, while economists care about market
efficiency.
After three decades of deploying markets in electricity and recognizing
some positive outcomes, there are still deep unsolved issues and open ques-
122
tions. Well known unresolved issues surround basic questions such as system
reliability [4], high tariffs [5], and the failure of spot prices as investment
signals [6]. While innovation, increased efficiency in running companies, and
the development of new technologies are usually proclaimed as positive con-
sequences of the restructuring of the electricity industry [8], many authors
still argue about the real achievements of the process [5, 43, 44]. Without
proper design, many of the current unsolved issues in the market arena could
be magnified by the deployment of Smart Grid technologies [3, 93].
Many of the current issues in electricity markets are a consequence of the
interference between the physical and the financial/market systems of elec-
tricity markets. A common diagnosis of many electricity markets around
the world is the assertion that many design elements are intended to achieve
financial/market objectives but need to be modified to attain physical objec-
tives [12,13].
The seminal work on spot pricing of electricity by Schweppe et al. [14]
provided the theoretical framework to develop and implement the idea of
markets for electricity. The underlying starting point is the idea of treat-
ing electricity as a commodity, in terms of MWhs, without qualitative dis-
tinctions. As a result of this commoditization of electricity, several market
structures from other commodity markets —financial derivatives, forward
contracts — started to be replicated in electricity. These structures typically
depend on the implementation of a spot market in which “delivered power”
is the essential product for sale.
In our view, one step required for conciliating the physical and the market
systems is to start considering electricity not as a simple commodity such
as oil or copper, but as a product offering more services than plain energy.
In other words, electricity should be seen as a multi-attribute product in
which energy is just one dimension. Nuclear power, for example, provides
steady power with little ramping capability; wind and solar power provide
environmentally friendly power but little control; gas turbines provide a lot of
flexibility and controllability that is required to compensate for the inherent
volatility of power supply and demand. The Smart Grid will provide the
technological conditions for even more service differentiation. The success of
the whole new paradigm will depend critically on the design of appropriate
market structures that take into account this reality.
It is often claimed that real-time pricing schemes are a necessary compo-
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nent for the new market structures in a Smart Grid setting. There is an
over-riding belief in both industry and academia that an intelligent grid can
only be realized with real-time pricing: fluctuations in energy prices for con-
sumers based on the current strain on the grid. The vision held by many
economists [94, 95] is that customers will be exposed to high prices when
there is a shortage of electricity. If prices are too high, the theory says, they
will postpone their laundry or dim their lights. The market and consumers
are expected to adapt and evolve towards an economic ideal.
In reality, the notion that residential consumers would accept having this
volatility passed on to them is very implausible: exposing consumers to the
price fluctuations of current energy markets could cause public rejection of
the exciting current trend towards a sustainable energy future. Indeed, re-
cent research has exposed the dangers of real-time pricing: Real-time pricing
can lead to uncertainty along with high volatility of prices [12,31,74]. Addi-
tionally, the review of a few small-scale tests reported in [96] shows that the
use of prices to control the grid has not been successful. We will avoid costly
mistakes and public backlash only by looking more closely at the needs of
the grid, the public, and the planet.
In this chapter, we provide elements of an alternative view for organizing
the markets in a Smart Grid scenario. Our starting point is to treat elec-
tricity not as a simple commodity. In that line, we discuss the importance
of taking into account the true cost of power generation, which depends not
just on the total instantaneous power delivered but also on the shape of the
generation trajectory. In our view, a natural way to accommodate multi-
attribute products is through the use of contracts for different products and
services. The use of contracts will lead to a more predictable system. Con-
tracts will also simplify the decision making by ISOs, generators, and utility
companies. The central authority will have greater certainty about what re-
sources will be available in the future to satisfy their needs, and suppliers
will have long-term signals that will enhance investment in new services and
technologies. In addition, we believe that prices will be less volatile when
carefully constructed contracts replace today’s real-time markets.
The specification of multi-attribute products will first require a clear un-
derstanding of the social planner’s problem (SPP), as defined in standard
economics theory [93]. Such understanding will facilitate the valuation of
the resource attributes with respect to the fulfillment of societal objectives
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such as reliability, sustainability and efficiency.
We set out to illustrate this approach to design an SPP that is tractable
and captures key dynamical issues. In this chapter we focus on a single pair
of generator attributes: the cost of generation and the ramping capability of
generation. We investigate the value that investing in operational flexibility,
in terms of ramping rates, has for the system. Once we understand the
SPP and the system-wide impact of ramping rates, the value of securing
contracts for various resources will be clearer. This chapter illustrates the
construction of supply and demand functions for ramping rates that can be
used to construct simple market structures for these services.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 contains a
survey of recent cases of chaotic prices around the world which illustrate im-
portant issues of spot markets for electricity. In addition, an overview of the
use of contracts in current electricity markets is presented. In Section 6.3, the
importance of having appropriate models representing the physical reality to
capture the different attributes provided by electricity suppliers is discussed.
In addition, the evaluation of flexibility, in terms of ramping rates, is dis-
cussed. Several numerical illustrations are presented. Our findings illustrate
the need for having products and markets associated with ramping rates. The
rationale and challenges for a new architecture are discussed in Section 6.4.
The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 6.5.
6.2 The Grid Today
6.2.1 The Lens of Perfect Competition
The current way of evaluating markets is through the lens of perfect com-
petition. This presumes symmetric information and lack of market power.
A few examples from the past year will serve to assess if these assumptions
hold true. Additionally, these examples will illustrate the amount of volatil-
ity that the current market system is exposed to and why it is likely that
volatility and dysfunction will not go away without new ways of thinking
about markets.
During periods of calm, prices in both real-time and day-ahead markets
hover between $10 and $60 per megawatt hour (MWh) in the United States,
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New Zealand, Australia, and Canada. But it is not unusual to see huge
deviations, or even prices that are negative. A clear example happened in
New Zealand is shown in Fig. 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: New Zealand prices.
In a typical hour from the spring of 2011, a price map of energy in the mid-
western United States shows that prices spanned from well over $200/MWh
in parts of Missouri to below negative $20 /MWh in parts of Minnesota.
This happens in large part because of the unpredictable intermittency of re-
newable energy. Imagine that strong winds hit the turbines in Minnesota,
flooding the system with effectively free energy. A coal or nuclear generator
in the region cannot afford to shut off during a transient period of low de-
mand and turn back on later; the process is too slow and expensive. Instead
many generators stay on, hoping that the windy weather will end or that de-
mand will surge from the cold. They are willing to pay what is essentially a
fine to the utilities for the resulting strain they place on the grid — injecting
excess power when it is not wanted.
Equally bizarre are extreme price spikes. In Texas, real-time prices for
power exceeded $2,000 for several hours one day in February 2011 during a
cold snap that actually froze some power-generating equipment; and during
an August heat wave, day-ahead prices were over ten times the norm for half
of the days of the month. It is arguably in the best interest of generators
to not worry about 10% of their equipment failing (or being scheduled for
repairs) during periods of high demand, since the resulting spike in energy
price more than makes up for the losses incurred by the malfunctioning ge-
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nerators — often by a factor of ten. A 2011 study by the non-profit Texas
Coalition for Affordable Power claims that electric deregulation — allowing
the generators to operate under the rules of a free market — has cost Texas
residential consumers more than billions in higher rates since deregulation
began there in 1999. In New Zealand on 26 March 2011, power prices reached
$20,000 per MWh for several hours, caused by repairs on several generators
in the middle of the day. The result was a NZ$25 million dollar windfall for
generation companies over a six hour trading period.
All these chaotic behaviors are the result of the interference between the
physical and the market systems associated with electricity markets [12, 31,
74]. Power markets have been designed through the lens of perfect competi-
tion, where efficiency is the goal. In addition, the fundamental assumptions
include lack of market power and symmetry of information. Based on the
previous examples, consider these two questions:
• Is there market power? Yes - generators in Texas and New Zealand
know that withholding power can cause an enormous jump in prices.
• Is information symmetric? Of course not! Do utility companies know
the intent behind maintenance schedules in Texas? Does the New
Zealand electricity authority know if the generators deliberately with-
held power?
Recall the two fundamental assumptions of competitive equilibria theory:
market power does not exist, and information is completely symmetric among
the market participants. In the case of electricity markets operating in real
time, these assumptions are absolutely false, and there is no reason to see
significant improvements by market evolution alone.
In addition, immersed in the analysis and design of electricity markets is
the concept of marginal cost: When static market models are considered
through the lens of competitive equilibria theory, economists conclude that
prices should coincide with marginal cost.
Consider how you might define this concept – you might ask an engineer.
For example, the operator of a coal-fired generator would respond, this de-
pends on how the generator is operated. A steady stream of power will be
cheap. If the generator is forced to ramp up and down, then the cost will be
far greater. Concepts surrounding the term “marginal cost” are the founda-
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tion of every economist’s education, yet this term is virtually undefinable in
the context of power generation.
We strongly believe that many of the current unsolved issues in the market
arena along with the crazy prices observed today could be magnified by many
of the smart grid initiatives, such as incentives for introduction of renewables
without commensurate incentives for operating reserves; FERC mandates for
pricing demand response (DR) resources, without careful rules on how the
DR is delivered; and smart meters to homes, without a science to support
their use.
6.2.2 Contracts Today
Contracts have been a subject of extensive research in commodity markets.
In particular, some results show that under certain settings, contracts might
reduce market power in oligopolistic spot markets [20]. Considerable research
has been performed on the role of contracts to hedge against uncertainty in
spot markets [47]. In addition, some authors argue that contracts are needed
as the result of transactions costs [97].
In the particular case of electricity, research on the value of contracts is
staged in the context of market efficiency, and even in this limited scope there
is no clear agreement about the benefits of contracts. For example, some
authors have found that long-term contracts might reduce market power
[48]. Others argue that contracts could enhance market power [49]. Both
viewpoints have merit, since no market model can capture all the complexities
and underlying issues.
In terms of research frontiers, major goals are to broaden the analysis
to include metrics beyond efficiency, to understand the role of contracts to
achieve other objectives such as incentivizing and securing reliable, responsive
and even green energy supply. In the case of resource adequacy, there exists
empirical evidence of the use of contracts to achieve some of these objectives.
For example, the auction processes held in Brazil, Chile and Illinois illustrate
the use of forward contracts with the aim of facilitating resource adequacy
[6, 38–40].
The design of contracts for attributes beyond energy will require the under-
standing of the value that such attributes can have for the system. Achieving
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that will require the use of appropriate models, in particular models able to
handle uncertainty and dynamics, and provide insight on market outcomes.
Realistic models of cost/value are also required – long-term and short, in-
cluding the value of reliability.
6.3 The Value of Operational Flexibility
Understanding the value of attributes is the first step towards the creation of
appropriate products (or services) and contracts associated with them. We
describe the role of the social planner’s problem in designing and evaluating
markets and capturing attributes value. We illustrate our viewpoints by
considering the value of operational flexibility in terms of ramping rates.
6.3.1 Social Planner’s Problem — Capturing System Needs
In order to capture the value of attributes for the system, consumers, and
suppliers, it is necessary to construct an appropriate social planner’s prob-
lem (SPP) as understood in standard economic theory [16]. An effective SPP
must describe appropriately the physical reality of the energy system, espe-
cially when the available resources is much more diverse than only standard
generating units, as illustrated in Fig. 6.2. In that line, the consideration of
operational issues into the planner’s problem becomes key.
However, the big challenge is how to capture key issues and constraints
without constructing intractable and unsolvable models. In that line, the use
of stochastic differential equation (SDE) models as in [30,98] is our starting
point. In addition to tractable models for representing the physical reality,
key components of the SPP are the welfare functions of the players. Captur-
ing the value of different attributes is the key step to design proper contracts
and market structures.
In previous work [31,33] the welfare functions of the supplier and consumer
were taken to be of the simple piecewise linear form,
WD(t) := vmin(D(t), G(t))− cboR−(t)− P (t)G(t)
WS(t) := P (t)G(t)− cG(t)
(6.1)
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Figure 6.2: Capturing Attributes.
For the consumer, there is unit value v for consumption, cbo for loss-of-load,
and P (t)G(t) is the price paid for power. The supplier receives this payment,
but the cost of production is cG(t). In this model, the attribute MWh has
an important, explicit and instantaneous value for the system. This model
ignores the dynamical considerations surveyed in Section 6.2. In particular,
the cost of ramping is ignored in this previous work.
In this section the cost of ramping is modeled in a long-term setting: We
consider a continuum model in which more responsive generation can be pro-
cured, but this comes with a cost for more sophisticated technology. To un-
derstand the value of more responsive generation sensitivities are computed,
such as
dE[WS(t)]
dζ
(6.2)
where ζ is the system ramp-rate limit. In this analysis the fine-details of the
cost of generation are not considered.
6.3.2 Model
In order to capture the value of operational flexibility, we start with a queu-
ing model introduced in [30] for power generation. For the sake of simplicity,
we consider the case without transmission constraints and with only 2 tech-
nologies — primary and ancillary services — illustrated in Fig. 6.3. Given
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Figure 6.3: Power network with two-suppliers and a single consumer
our aim of finding the value of flexibility, we focus mainly on the real-time
operation of the grid. Our main interest is supplying of the deviation of the
expected demand. The residual demand process, in which the mean demand
is subtracted, is denoted D = {D(t) : t ≥ 0}. In power systems terms, D(t)
corresponds to the difference between the day-ahead expected demand and
the actual demand at time t over a 24-hour period.
Primary generators correspond to generating units providing the bulk of
the required power. Examples are large nuclear units or coal units, with
large investment costs and small operational costs. In contrast, ancillary
generators correspond to more flexible generators or peaking units such gas
turbines, with lower investment cost but often higher operational cost.
The capacity of a generator is the maximum amount of power that can
be extracted from the generator at a given time. The respective capacities
of the primary and ancillary generators at time t are denoted by Gp(t) and
Ga(t). The reserve process at time t is defined by
R(t) = Gp(t) +Ga(t)−D(t), t ≥ 0 . (6.3)
We say that loss-of-load occurs at time t if R(t) < 0.
Capacity is subject to strict ramp-rate limits: For constants ζp+, ζa+, and
for each 0 ≤ t0 < t1 <∞,
Gp(t1)−Gp(t0)
t1−t0 ≤ ζp+,
Ga(t1)−Ga(t0)
t1−t0 ≤ ζa+ .
The lower rate constraints on the generators are relaxed.
We model deviation of the demand process D as a zero-mean Brownian
motion with instantaneous variance σ2D > 0. In this way we can apply tech-
niques from [22] to compute quantities such as average cost. Both analytical
and simulation results contained in [22] suggest that our conclusions do not
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change dramatically with the precise distribution of demand.
For the purposes of computation, a simple cost structure is imposed:
Constant marginal benefits for consumption of energy: The
benefit of consumption of energy is given by vmin(D,Gp(t) +Ga(t)).
Constant marginal production cost for primary and ancillary
service: (cp, ca) represents the marginal costs for the primary and the an-
cillary services.
Constant marginal loss-of-load value: If there is excess demand for
power, then loss-of-load occurs. The cost of excess demand is given by cbo|r|
when r < 0, where cbo > 0.
The cost function on the state-space (Gp, Ga, R) has the form
C(t) := cpGp(t) + caGa(t) + (v + cbo)R−(t), t ≥ 0 . (6.4)
In addition, it is assumed that cbo  ca > cp, and ζa+ > ζp+. The higher
cost of ancillary service is justified by its more flexible ramping capability.
6.3.3 Optimization Problem
The basic optimal control problem, assuming that resources become available
at the beginning of the time horizon and considering average cost metrics,
becomes
min
m,ED,ES,RS
{
i(m) + lim sup
T→∞
Ex
[ 1
T
∫ T
0
C(t) dt
]}
, (6.5)
The decision variables include m representing investments decisions and
ED,ES,RS the scheduling of energy and reserves. In the general case, the
problem is subject to operational/physical constraints, network constraints,
and energy-balance constraints. Transmission constraints are not considered
here.
6.3.4 Operational Costs
The operational costs are obtained using results from [30]. The optimal policy
is affine under either the discounted or average-cost criterion. A sample path
is shown in Fig. 6.4. In particular, the average-cost optimal policy is affine
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“Blackout”
Figure 6.4: Sample path of the supply capacity.
with parameters
r¯a∗ = 1
γ0
ln
(
1 + c
bo−ca
ca
)
, γ0 = 2
ζp++ζa+
σ2D
r¯p∗ = r¯a∗ + 1
γ1
ln
(
1 + c
a−cp
cp
)
, γ1 = 2
ζp+
σ2D
(6.6)
The steady state cost is given by
φ(r¯) = γ−10
(ζa+
ζp+
ca + e−γ0r¯
a
(v + cbo)
)
e−γ1(r¯
p−r¯a) (6.7)
+ (r¯p − γ−11 )cp
6.3.5 Investment Costs
Piecewise linear investment costs are assumed for the ramping capabilities
of resources. These are constructed based on the assumption that pri-
mary/ancillary technologies have high/low investment costs, and low/high
operational costs.
A convex relaxation of the inherent integer constraints associated to invest-
ment decisions is used for calculations: The investment costs for ζ+p,a ‘units’
of ramping capabilities of primary/ancillary service are given by
i(ζ+p,a) = α
p,a
1 ζ
+
p,aH(0, bp,a1 )+(
αp,a1 b
p,a
1 + α
p,a
2 (ζ
+
p,a − bp,a1 )
)
H(bp,a1 , bp,a2 )+(
αp,a1 b
p,a
1 + α
p,a
2 (b
p,a
2 − bp,a1 ) + αp,a3 (ζ+p,a − bp,a2 )
)
H(bp,a2 , bp,a3 )
in which H(u, v) = [H(ζ+p,a − u)−H(ζ+p,a − v)], where H( · ) is the Heaviside
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function and αp,a1,2,3 and b
p,a
1,2,3 are constants.
6.3.6 Economic Value of Flexibility
In order to quantify the economic value of flexibility, we follow a approach
similar to [99] for the case of valuing reserves. This involves the construction
and analysis of an equivalent cost C in terms of the expected costs and the
risk preferences. Here we take
CT = µCT + kσCT (6.8)
in which µCT and σCT correspond to the mean and standard deviation of the
total cost, and k is a constant that capture the risk preference of the firm.
The system-wide value of ramping rates is defined as the sensitivity,
VT (ζ+p,a) := −
dCT
dζ+p,a
(6.9)
The results here are restricted to the risk-neutral case in which k = 0.
Given these elements, supply and demand functions can be constructed
that define a clearing price for a hypothetical market associated with ramp-
ing rates. Such supply and demand functions are quantified by evaluat-
ing marginal cost and marginal utility. Cost/utility functions for suppli-
ers/consumers are given by,
CS(t) := cpGp(t) + caGa(t) + i(mp) + i(ma)
UD(t) := vmin(D(t), Gp(t) +Ga(t))− cboR−(t)
(6.10)
Hence, the marginal utility function is
VD(ζ+p,a) :=
dE[UD(t)]
dζ+p,a
(6.11)
and the marginal cost is
VS(ζ+p,a) :=
dE[CS(t)]
dζ+p,a
(6.12)
The equilibrium price associated with a particular ramping rates mix will be
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given by the intersection of these demand and supply functions. A numerical
example is given in the next section.
6.3.7 Numerical Experiments
The optimal value of ramping rates in the SPP problem, and the supply and
demand functions, are computed here for these parameters:
cbo = 105, ca = 500, cp = 20, σD = 250,
αp1 = 2 10
5, αp2 = 1.2α
p
1, α
p
3 = 1.5α
p
1,
αa1 = 2 10
4, αa2 = 1.2α
a
1, α
a
3 = 1.5α
a
1,
bp1,2,3 = 2, 5, 12, b
a
1,2,3 = 3, 15, 40
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Figure 6.5: System operational cost and ancillary ramping rate sensitivity.
The total cost (6.8) can be expressed as
CT = φ(r¯) + i(ζ+p ) + i(ζ+a )
For these parameters, its minimum cost is given by
ζ+p = 3.1 ζ
+
a = 8.6
It is possible to appreciate in Fig. 6.5 that system operational costs de-
creased with more system flexibility, reflecting the fact that the more flexible
the system, the lesser loss-of-load situations. In Fig. 6.6 the total cost is
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shown. Beyond ζ+a = 8.6, the system operational benefits are eclipsed by the
investment costs.
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Figure 6.6: Total system cost as a function of total ramp-rate ζ+a .
The demand and supply functions are shown in Fig. 6.7. The two curves
intersect, as expected, at the optimal value ζ+a = 8.6. The clearing price of
this hypothetical market associated to ramping rates is approximately 5000
$/MW.
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Figure 6.7: Clearing the ramping market.
6.4 Toward a New Architecture
The solution of the SPP problem provides insights with respect to system
needs and attribute values. The next task is to design appropriate market
structures to procure resources to meet these needs. The success will de-
pend mainly on the creation of appropriate incentives for both suppliers and
consumers.
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There are several reasons to make greater use of contracts in electricity
markets:
1. Contracts can easily incorporate the multi-attribute nature of both
power generation and demand response
2. Suppliers will have long-term signals that will enhance investment in
new services and technologies
3. The decision-making processes of ISOs, generators, and utility com-
panies will be simplified. Complexity of resource allocation on short
time-scales is simplified when resources are secured in advance through
contracts. In particular, the on-going unit commitment problem solved
every five minutes in today’s real-time market can be eliminated or sim-
plified.
4. Contracts can lead to a more predictable system — similar to the use
of lanes and speed limits in highways that reduce the range of possible
behavior by market participants.
5. For similarly reasons, prices will be less volatile when carefully con-
structed markets for contracts replace today’s real-time markets.
Certainly, the extensive use of contracts could create a loss of efficiency,
since this amounts to regulation of the behavior of market participants. This
is similar to the “inefficiencies” seen in today’s highways, that we all know
is necessary to enhance reliability. Following the highway analogy, some of
these contracts will be handed down by government, and will be enforced
through regulatory frameworks.
Extensive research is required in this exciting topic. In particular, changing
the commodity paradigm will require questioning the need for real-time mar-
kets, as well as significant changes to current day-ahead markets. The design
of contracts must take into account potential monopolization and market
power, and built-in mechanisms for evolution of contract terms in response
to a rapidly evolving grid. These are just a few critical avenues for future
research.
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6.5 Summary
The main message of this chapter is the importance of organizing electric-
ity markets around differentiated electric power products; the treatment of
electricity as a commodity does not incentivize the kinds of services needed
in the power grid. New products defined in terms of contracts are an alter-
native to organize these markets. To be successful, it is critical to appropri-
ately capture the value of attributes such as instantaneous energy, ramping
capabilities, and environmental impacts. Therefore, design and analysis of
markets cannot be based on a snapshot model; it must include the dynam-
ics, uncertainty and complexity of the power grid, just as these features are
considered in any engineering analysis. To obtain meaningful estimates of
the value of attributes, we require a better understanding of system costs,
utility to consumers, and the long-term needs of society.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
This final chapter contains a summary of the main results and ideas developed
in this work. Moreover, future research avenues are discussed.
7.1 Summary
The term Entropic Grid is coined in this thesis to characterize a grid with
increased levels of uncertainty and dynamics. Those changes are being driven
by several Smart Grid initiatives. In this work, it is argued that proper design
is mandatory to fully achieve the potential that the Smart Grid could pro-
vide. Without proper design, the interference between the physical and the
market/financial systems, which is recognized in today’s electricity markets,
could be magnified.
Achieving this objective will require the reconsideration of well-established
paradigms in the way of planning and operating the grid and its associated
markets. A proper scaffolding of models and tools, complementing successful
power and energy methodologies, will be the vehicle to make the transition
from the Entropic to the Smart Grid.
A central contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate the key role of prod-
uct definition in electricity markets. Market designs based on appropriate
definitions of the various products will not create interference between the
physical and the market/financial systems. There was a lack of research in
this area, mainly because in standard commodity markets there is no need
to define products. In this thesis, concrete contributions to start filling the
gaps are discussed. Several recommendations to define appropriate prod-
ucts in electricity markets are presented in Chapter 3. This point of view is
illustrated with in-depth analyses of several prototype models.
A key requirement to evaluate market designs is to understand the behav-
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ior of the physical system. Such understanding requires the developing of
appropriate models able to capture and handle the salient characteristics of
the entropic grid—uncertainty and dynamics. In order to achieve this, dy-
namic electricity market models tailored to the physical reality are presented
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.
The investigation of the impact of volatility and uncertainty of renewable
sources of energy is one of the areas in which dynamic market models for the
purpose of market analysis are constructed. With this purpose, in Chapter 4
a multi-settlement dynamic electricity market model—considering day-ahead
and real-time markets— is introduced. Analysis is conducted in an idealized
competitive equilibrium setting that incorporates both dynamics and uncer-
tainty. Closed form expressions are obtained for the supplier and consumer
surpluses in this stochastic model. These expressions allow one to quantify
the impact that volatility and uncertainty can have on market outcomes.
The results show the need to implement policies and technologies able to
cope with the volatility of renewable sources. In addition, the results also
show the need to update the market structures to properly incentivize the
deployment of renewable sources.
Motivated by the need to consider the real costs and benefits of power,
the idea of using functionals rather than functions is presented in Chapter 5.
A dynamic market model with the consideration of ramping costs is imple-
mented. A complete characterization of the competitive prices, under a broad
range of settings, is presented and several conclusions are obtained. First,
in average terms, competitive prices do not properly capture the impact of
ramping costs. Second, once prices for power and ramping are considered,
there is a lack of uniqueness on the competitive equilibrium. These analytical
results are illustrated through several numerical simulations. More realistic
consideration of the costs and benefits associated with power generation may
prove to be the appropriate way to incentivize needed resources. However,
based on these results, the widely adopted idea of using spot market schemes,
and in particular, real-time prices as a foundation for market design, must
be reconsidered.
General elements of an alternative architecture to organize markets are
discussed in Chapter 6. These steps can be understood as a natural con-
sequence of the results developed in this thesis. Hence, the key ideas are
summarized in understanding the social planner’s problem in a dynamic and
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uncertain setting, the definition of products based on the value that differ-
ent technologies can offer and the implementation of contractual agreements.
These steps are illustrated via an investigation of the system-wide value of
operational flexibility.
Exciting and challenging times are being faced in power and energy sys-
tems. The ultimate realization of many of the Smart Grid expectations will
depend on intelligent design. It is hoped that the contributions of this dis-
sertation will help to engineer a more reliable power grid.
7.2 Future Work
The results of this dissertation reveal many exciting open research frontiers.
7.2.1 Market Design
In terms of electricity markets, the notion of treating electricity as a ser-
vice rather than a commodity opens many possibilities for research in the
development of new market designs. In particular, designing markets at the
distribution level due to the fact that many Smart Grid initiatives are ex-
pected to be deployed precisely at that level. Also in terms of market design,
a natural extension to the market models presented in this work is the con-
sideration of strategic issues. The economic models in this work assume a
competitive equilibrium setting, disregarding strategic issues. Even in that
idealized setting, as the results of this work show, the outcomes are not the
best ones: volatile prices, few incentives for deploying renewable sources and
inappropriate capture of key costs. New market designs will have to deal
with strategic and market power issues. This is of particular interest if mar-
ket designs constructed around the notion of contractual arrangements are
implemented.
7.2.2 Reliability in Power and Energy Systems
In an entropic grid setting the well-known notions and ways to quantify re-
liability should be complemented with new ideas and methodologies. The
difficulty in achieving reliability guarantees is due in part to the breadth
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of the meaning of the term “reliability”. It is recognized that reliability is
dependent on time scales : The usual time scale dependence in reliability
analysis of power systems is in terms of adequacy and operational reliability,
defined respectively on long- and short-time horizons. Similarly, reliability
has a locational dimension: A black-out in the Boston area has more impact
than a black-out in New Salem. In addition, reliability depends upon both
the frequency and the magnitude of disruption. For these reasons, system
reliability cannot be summarized in a single scalar quantity, and for example,
the usual procedure of planning energy systems for achieving specific relia-
bility targets, i.e., LOLP of 1 day in 10 years, becomes hard to justify. The
several dimensions of reliability can be separated into two broad classes: The
first is a measure of the frequency of rare-events, such as the LOLP empha-
sized by today’s practitioners. The second is average-cost metrics, where the
‘cost’ arises from various sources, and these costs are persistent rather than
rare. Understanding and creating appropriate metrics for reliability in this
new setting is an exciting future research area.
7.2.3 Models for Planning
In terms of planning models, an extensive area of research is the development
of long-term resource planning models using ideas, tools and methodologies
from decision & control, and simulation & learning disciplines [21–23]. The
proposed models will be able to capture operational issues and the under-
lying dynamics and uncertainty of the grid of the future, and convey this
information to longer time scales. Techniques from decision & control such
as aggregate models and workload relaxations lead to tractable models that
can be approximately solved [22], in particular, using similar approaches
to [22,30,98,100] in which a fluid-model based on first-order statistics is con-
structed and effective policies are constructed based on a lower dimensional
relaxation. The impact of variability on the optimal control solution is inves-
tigated by introducing variability in the relaxation. These models could be
used to complement the models developed in this work and get a better un-
derstanding of the impact of dynamics and uncertainty along with the value
of flexibility of the generating resources and other technological attributes.
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